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Remarkably, in the view of some observers, a poor and relatively weak 
government in Laos survives as a one-party state, even as it transforms the country’s 
political economy in response to declining communist fortunes in the early 1990s and 
the onslaught of economic globalization. How has the Lao government managed the 
socialist transformation and capitalist incorporation, while maintaining some 
semblance of external sovereignty and internal legitimacy? Through the broad lens of 
political economy and sociology, my research addresses this question, in exploring 
three areas of Lao state capacity: (1) political structure, (2) public administration, and 
(3) fiscal management.  
I rely on several sources: a set of observations during my time on research 
assignment in Laos (May 2004-April 2005); an examination of governance-related, 
donor-funded development projects; an exhaustive survey of government laws, 
regulations, and documents since the reform period; and a review of literature on the 
political economy of development, market transition, and globalization. To assess 
different points of view on contemporary Laos, I conducted open-ended interviews 
with selected Lao officials, townspeople, expatriates, international consultants, and 
members of the diplomatic and donor communities.  
  From my research, evidence suggests that the Lao government actively 
promotes political, administrative, and economic centralization over regionally 
dispersed and fiscally independent provinces. In the transition process, a strong central  
government capable of regulating and enforcing economic governance has gradually 
eroded traditional autonomy of Lao provincial authority. The recent history reveals a 
party apparatus pragmatically adjusting to economic constraints, while consolidating 
its power base, unifying the country, and exerting its centralizing influence on an 
ideologically indifferent countryside.  
  Laos is not an isolated case. For many developing countries struggling to build 
a unitary state and a national economic space of private exchange, centralized control 
over regionally autonomous regions constitutes one of the major governance 
challenges of nationally guided development. Contrary to the general global trend of 
public decentralization in the transition process, Laos provides a stark contrast, 
offering a valuable insight into the important role of governments in structuring 
economic relations. iii 
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Chapter I 
LAOS AND THE SEARCH FOR THE END OF HISTORY 
 
The end of the Cold War and the accelerated pace of global integration have 
dramatically altered the dynamics of the international system of states. According to 
John Lewis Gaddis, a prominent cold war historian, the collapse of the Soviet 
communist sphere discredited dictatorships and inaugurated the globalization of 
democracy.
1 In one famously optimistic account, Francis Fukuyama proclaims the 
“end of history,” in which liberal democracies constitute the highest form of social 
organization, embodied in the universal, homogeneous state.
2 According to this 
reasoning, a Leninist party-state like the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR 
or Laos) remains “mired in history” for not upholding the liberal ideals of democracy. 
Although this “end of history” thesis has been severely criticized in academic circles, 
the belief in a liberal democracy as a normative vision and universal trend has broad-
based appeal, cutting across the ideological spectrum. Moreover, the apparent decline 
of the socialist state raises questions about the viability of alternatives to liberal 
democracies.  
On the fate of Marxism, the Economist wryly notes, “As a system of 
government, communism is dead or dying. As a system of ideas, its future looks 
secure.”
3 Even so, this observation fails to appreciate the adaptive capacity of non-
                                                 
1 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2006). 
2 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" The National Interest  (1989). presents a compelling 
argument of the inevitable marriage between economic liberalism and democracy. See also his Francis 
Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), especially Chapter 1. 
In essence Fukuyama identifies capitalism with democracy. “The ideology of victorious industrial 
capitalism defined democracy almost completely in agreeable economic terms, as liberty of contract.” 
See Daniel Bell, "Is There a Ruling Class in America? The Power Elite Reconsidered," in The End of 
Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001), 67. 
3 Economist, "Marxism after Marx," Economist  (2003).      2 
 
European forms of Marxist-Leninism. Ignoring the glaring exceptions of China, 
Vietnam, North Korea, Laos, and Cuba, one scholar notes, “while the end of 
communism is a matter of fact, the transition to democracy and free markets remains a 
work in progress.”
4  
In the Lao PDR, the market transition has not produced the communist decline 
experienced in the former communist states of Eastern Europe. Underscoring this 
astonishing communist complacency, the weak government in Laos earlier relied 
almost completely on the former Soviet Union for military aid, financial assistance, 
and ideological support, all of which disappeared by 1989. Since then, the party-state 
has pragmatically embraced market liberalization, all the while restructuring its public 
administration, plugging its financial gap, and regulating political demands upon the 
state. What accounts for Laos’ divergent socialist trajectory? To what extent does the 
Lao experience provide clues to the ways in which other developing countries 
integrate into the world economy?  
In addressing these broad questions, my dissertation examines the political and 
economic restructuring of the Lao government since the early 1990s. This introductory 
chapter begins by laying out my research inquiry and hypotheses about the nature of 
the market transition in Laos. Following a brief overview of contemporary Laos, I 
present some theoretical perspectives on global economic integration and post-
socialism. The fourth section justifies my method of inquiry, a regime-centered 
organizational perspective on the processes of political and economic change. The 
concluding section outlines the chapters to follow. 
                                                 
4 Michael Mandelbaum, ed., Post-Communism: Four Perspectives (New York: Council of Foreign 
Relations, 1996) 4. On the fate of Marxism, the Economist writes, “As a system of government, 
communism is dead or dying. As a system of ideas, its future looks secure.” Economist, "Marxism after 
Marx."      3 
 
The Collapse of Communism and Expectations of Democracy 
By the late 1980s, the international movement of communism pulled back in 
full retreat. The idealism and sense of historical inevitability that animated much of 
the socialist movement gave way to the harsh reality of economic privation, in stark 
contrast to the wealth creation of market capitalism. In the name of reform, communist 
governments the world over began to promote free enterprise and private property. 
Instead of strengthening the leading role of the communist party, however, economic 
reforms in the second world hastened regime change. In 1989, the Berlin Wall came 
tumbling down, symbolizing the opening of the Iron Curtain. Demand for change 
resonated strongly in many parts of the communist world. In Poland, the Solidarity 
trade union forced multi-party elections that resulted in a coalition government. In 
China, tens of thousands of university students gathered in Tiananmen Square to 
protest government corruption and to demand democratic elections. Although brutally 
crushed, the student takeover of Tiananmen called into question the legitimacy of a 
communist dictatorship in China and elsewhere. Tellingly, the communist leader of 
the Lao PDR, Kaysone Phomvihane, celebrated these repressions by making the first 
post-Tiananmen state visit to Beijing, where he re-affirmed his government’s 
solidarity with its Asian brethren. 
Back in Laos, the communist leaders worked diligently to crush dissent. An 
editorial in the Lao communist newspaper decried 1989 as “a nightmare year for 
socialism,”
5 and party operatives moved swiftly to limit the democratic contagion. In 
an initial burst of glasnost, or political opening, the Social Democratic Club, a group 
of about 40 Lao intellectuals and party members, vocally criticized the government in 
early 1990. In an open letter of resignation to the party, Thongsouk Saisangkhi, a vice-
                                                 
5 As quoted in Soren Ivarsson, Thommy Svensson, and Stein Tonnesson, The Quest for Balance Is a 
Changing Laos: A Political Analysis, Nias Report Series, No. 25 (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of 
Asian Studies, 1995).      4 
 
minister in the government, described the Lao PDR as a “communist monarchy” and a 
“dynasty of the Politburo.” He called for “a multiparty system in order to bring 
democracy, freedom and prosperity to the people.”
6 Instead of provoking a thoughtful 
process of change, the political opening helped Kaysone identify and purge 
democratic sympathizers within the party. Thongsouk and two other leading members 
of the Social Democratic Club were jailed and later tried on charges of libel and 
defamation “against the country.”
7  
Rumblings of democratic dissent soon faded in Laos.
8 In this sparsely 
populated and geographically dispersed land, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party 
(henceforth LPRP or party) retains a strong grip on power. The 5
th Party Congress in 
1991 promulgated the regime’s first constitution and re-confirmed the party’s leading 
role in society. As the country moves toward the Chinese model of market-based 
authoritarianism, economic reforms occur under the aegis of the party.  
Today, the authoritarian regime survives politically and remains unchallenged. 
In its commentary on recent party elections for the National Assembly, the Economist 
captures the following scene in Laos:  
 
Up swept both cars of the presidential motorcade, bringing Khamtay 
Siphandone to choose between the various party functionaries running for 
office. As Mr.  Khamtay cast his ballot, a journalist asked him what would 
change as a result of this uplifting spectacle.  “There will be no change,” the 
president explained, since last year’s party congress had already undertaken all 
                                                 
6 As quoted in Grant Evans, A Short History of Laos: The Land in Between, Short History of Asia Series 
(Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2002) 200. 
7 Thongouk, Latsami Khamphoui (vice-minister of Economics and Planning), and Pheng 
Sakchittaphong (from the Ministry of Justice) were eventually tried in 1992 and sentenced to 14 years 
in a re-education camp in Houaphan Province. Ibid.  200-1. 
8 In October 1999, about fifty students and teachers at the National University of Laos organized a 
peaceful protest outside the Presidential Palace in central Vientiane. The protesters called for a multi-
party system, elections for a new National Assembly, respect for human rights, and the release of 
political prisoners. The government quickly silenced these dissenting voices. All the protesters were 
sent to prison. To this day, five organizers of the protest remain in detention and without recourse to 
due process before the law or the possibility of a trial.      5 
 
the necessary measures to update and reinvigorate the revolution….  As the 
hammer-and-sickle flags draped over the polling booths attested, Laos remains 
a resolute and unabashed communist dictatorship.
9 
 
The large-scale uprising that engulfed most of the communist bloc in the period 1989-
91 lacked a Lao counterpart. Among the small intelligentsia in Laos today, democratic 
change remains a distant possibility.  
This democratic silence is even more striking in light of recent transformations 
in Southeast Asia. Boasting the longest running democracy in the region, the 
Philippines has embraced political pluralism since the “people power” revolution of 
1986 forced Ferdinand Marcus and his cronies into exile. In 1988, student 
demonstrations in Burma culminated in multiparty elections two years later, when the 
National League for Democracy, under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, appeared 
poised for victory. Elsewhere, democratic breakthroughs followed the forceful retreat 
of the military in Thailand (1992) and the collapse of Suharto’s New Order in 
Indonesia (1998). The 1990s also inaugurated a period of democratic consolidation in 
Cambodia.
10 
Against this wave of democracy, the communists in Laos face little opposition 
to one-party rule. Remarkably, in the view of some observers, a poor and relatively 
weak government in the Lao PDR survives as a one-party state,
11 even as it transforms 
the country’s political economy in response to declining communist fortunes in the 
early 1990s and the onslaught of economic globalization. Motivating my research is a 
desire to unpack this conundrum— in the hopes that an analysis of the Lao state might 
broaden our understanding about the changing nature of peripheral states, their general 
                                                 
9 The Economist, "Elections in Laos: Not Exactly a Cliff-Hanger," The Economist, Mar 2-8 2002, 41. 
10 For a general overview of Southeast Asian history, see Norman G. Owen, ed., The Emergence of 
Modern Southeast Asia: A New History (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawai'i Press, 2005). 
11 Ivarsson, Svensson, and Tonnesson, The Quest for Balance.      6 
 
relationship to development, and the pre-conditions of capitalist development. Several 
questions guide this inquiry. What accounts for the government’s stability in the face 
of major upheavals in the communist and capitalist worlds? How has the Lao 
government managed the socialist transformation and capitalist incorporation, while 
maintaining some semblance of external sovereignty and internal legitimacy?  
An early, but well-regarded, analysis of the socialist transformation in Laos 
quickly dismisses, out of hand, any immediate prospect for political pluralism.
12 
Another, by one long time observer, notes, “The economic liberalization of the late 
1980s did little to weaken the Party’s hold on power, not even after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.”
13 The party-state continues to monopolize political power, while 
overseeing a more market-oriented economy. Still, these developments leave several 
questions unanswered.  
In what ways have macro-historical changes engendered by the collapse of the 
Soviet empire created space for meaningful democratic transformations in one of the 
last communist holdouts? How have changing economic and regional dynamics 
affected domestic political change in Laos? Have changes in the international system 
fostered or inhibited democratic developments in the country? What are the 
determinants for a successful socialist transformation in Laos? To this end, do 
democratic institutions matter?   
In tackling these questions, my dissertation will outline the general 
characteristics of Laos’ emerging political economy
14 and the role of international 
                                                 
12 Martin Stuart-fox, "Prospects for Democracy in Laos," Asian Studies Review 17, no. 2 (1993). 
Ivarsson, Svensson, and Tonnesson, The Quest for Balance, come to a similar conclusion. 
13 Martin Stuart-fox, Buddhist Kingdom, Marxist State: The Making of Modern Laos (Bangkok: White 
Lotus, 1996) 151. He goes on to argue, “Greater economic freedom led to some relaxation of the more 
arbitrary aspects of the Party’s social control.” But his pessimism about democratization remains firms.  
14 In general, political economy as an idea implies the relationship between politics and economics. As a 
field of study, it entails an investigation into the systematic links between politics and economics in 
society. From classical economics, political economy simply means the study of how society materially 
reproduces itself. Prior to the twentieth century, the study of economics in various and sundry forms      7 
 
actors in shaping the contours of the evolving Lao state. While documenting socio-
economic change in the country, I also explore the relationship between the 
development of a market economy and the ways in which it necessitates a 
reorganization of political interests and creates space for considering alternative forms 
of political organizations.  
For many Lao nationalists, the establishment of Lao PDR in 1975 marked the 
first time in modern history that Laos became truly independent. For others, its relative 
backwardness and dependence upon the communist sphere for political guidance and 
financial support have ensured a continuity of external meddling in the country’s 
political economy. In popular myth, the communist government in Laos survives only 
                                                                                                                                              
was always considered political economy, and no sharp distinction was made between the two. With the 
development of more abstract analyses of economics, especially with the marginalist revolution in 
economics early in the 20
th century, the politics was formally dropped from critical inquiry of economic 
behavior.  
A modern interpretation of political economy starts with the assumption that the economy is 
politically and socially embedded in society and structured by power relations. See R. Andrew Sayer, 
Radical Political Economy: A Critique (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). The classic definition of political 
economy comes, however, from Karl Polanyi, who distinguishes between the study of formal and 
substantive economics. The former refers to the study of economic decision making under conditions of 
scarcity (a choice of sufficiency of means in relations to ends). See Karl Polanyi, "The Economy as 
Instituted Process," in The Sociology of Economic Life, ed. Mark Granovetter and Richard Swedberg 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992). Analyses of these choices under scarce resources (i.e. price-
making markets) make up the academic field normally considered economics. The formal, abstract 
deductive approach focuses on prices as a manifestation of relative scarcity, under conditions of supply 
and demand. Formal economics “offers a total description of the economy as determined by choices 
induced by an insufficiency of means” (Ibid. 32). On the other hand, substantive economics, or political 
economy, involves an analysis into the working of the economy, which requires investigating its social 
structure. As academic inquiry, political economy requires an empirical analysis into the instituted 
processes of an economy. For Polanyi, political economy presupposes the human economy, which “is 
embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and noneconomic. The inclusion of the noneconomic 
in society is vital. For religion or government may be as important for the structure and functioning of 
the economy as monetary institutions or the availability of tools and machines themselves that lighten 
the toil of labor” (Ibid. 34). Political economy thus suggests “the shifting place occupied by the 
economy in society” and “the manner in which the economic process is instituted at different times and 
places” (Ibid.). By instituted process, he means the institutionalization of rules and modes of conduct 
that govern economic behavior. 
For a good summary of the competing currents of political economy, see Frank Stilwell, Political 
Economy: The Contest of Economic Ideas (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002).       8 
 
as a satellite of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
15 — and increasingly of the People’s 
Republic of China. By extension, the Lao PDR’s political fortunes depend, first and 
foremost, on the fate of its socialist sponsors. Repeating a familiar historical pattern, 
the argument runs, Laos exists for the political convenience of stronger states.
16 
No doubt partly accurate for all Lao regimes in the modern era, this assessment 
fails to take into consideration the ways in which the Lao PDR successfully 
transitioned to a form of market capitalism without the need for a deeper political 
realignment. As in Vietnam and Cambodia, internal dynamics provided the initial 
impetus for reforms in Laos.
17 The collapse worldwide of state communism forced the 
Lao state to embrace economic restructuring, in accommodating market capitalism. 
This market opening (perestroika) has transpired in the absence of a political one 
(glasnost). That is, communism survives in Laos because the regime has opted not to 
deregulate authority. In trying to understand how and why perestroika can succeed in 
the absence of glasnost, this dissertation examines the ways in which the market 
transition has unfolded under the guidance of the communist party in Laos.  
Political and economic modernization elsewhere in East Asia provides a 
window onto the possible socialist trajectory in Laos. In the book Governing the 
Markets, Robert Wade analyzes the success of one of the East Asian success stories. 
                                                 
15 In one revealing analysis, Hans Luther argues that Laos’ political liberation from France and the U.S. 
has not resulted in national self-determination, but rather has reproduced a new and more structural 
form of dependency. Hans Ulrich Luther, Socialism in a Subsistence Economy: The Laotian Way: An 
Analysis of Development Patterns in Laos after 1975 (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Social 
Research Institute, 1983) 28-9. In his analysis of economic development in Laos under socialism, 
Luther fails to provide convincing evidence to back up his argument of Laos’ structural dependency.  
16 As some historians suggest, “The political history of Laos since 1945 has been dominated by the 
efforts of various Lao and foreign groups to construct a political entity named “Laos” where none 
existed before.” See David Joel Steinberg, ed., In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History, Rev. ed. 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987) 383. 
17 Changes have come about as a consequence of peasant alienation and other internal discontent over 
the part-state symbiosis. Borje Ljunggren, Market Economies under Communist Regimes: Reform in 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, Development Discussion Paper No. 394 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Institute for Interational Development, 1991).      9 
 
Through the 1960s, the political system of this country maintained, in the words of 
Wade, “a virtual monopoly on power in a single party or institution for a long period 
of time.” This state exhibited both authoritarian and corporativist tendencies “with 
very limited scope for popular preferences in the selection of rulers,” as well as “tight 
restrictions on interest groups.” Not only was the regime militarized, but the entire 
society as well. The military enjoyed “veto-power over the selection of the top most 
political leaders.” Civil society had a weak presence, and  
 
indeed, even today the state shows resemblance to a Leninist party-state. It 
lacks the element of class struggle, and it explicitly sanctions private property 
and markets; but it shares with Leninist states a need to limit commitment to 
existing groups, a sense of urgency to develop, a comprehensive prospective 
on the development problem, and a tutelary notion of government. 
  
The 1970s witnessed a “softening of the authoritarian qualities of the regime.” 
As Wade argues, “What is striking… is how this softening comes—long after the 
regime was well formalized and institutionalized… long after the period of economic 
breakthrough, long after living standards began to rise for everyone.” Throughout, 
“the government has continued to be preoccupied with the legitimacy question, with 
insuring its survival in power.”
18 Although referring to Taiwan, Wade’s observations 
may, in fact, describe a general path of modernization promoted by the regime in Laos 
and other East Asian government’s pursuing the developmentalist model of economic 
development.  
Questioning the sustainability of China’s economic boom under a communist 
dictatorship, a reporter recently asked Chinese President Hu Jintao, on the occasion of 
his first visit to the United States: Would limiting political freedom cause social unrest 
that could undermine economic growth? Dismissing the links between democracry 
                                                 
18 Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1991) 253-4.      10 
 
and economic development, the communist leader responded that China was 
committed to democracy but that, nonetheless, “China’s political system suits its 
economic development.”
19 Insofar as the regime in Laos replicates the economic 
successes of its East Asian neighbors, the developmentalist path of modernization also 
legitimizes its one-party dictatorship.  
My observations suggest that the development of a market economy in Laos, 
as well as the inevitable reorganization of political interests it engenders, continues to 
enhance the political structure of the Leninist party-state, rather than de-stabilize it. 
Further, the reorganization of political interests says less about the relative strength of 
the regime or the institutional failings of socialism, per se, and more about the ways in 
which the Lao party-state successfully controls access to political power and economic 
wealth, while adroitly navigating the geo-political—and increasingly geo-economic—
landscape of Southeast Asia.   
Socio-economic Underdevelopment in Laos 
Laos merits study. (See Appendix A1 for map of Laos.) The threads of “post” 
socialism, internationalization, and globalization converge in a forgotten country once 
at the periphery of state socialism but now at the margins of global capital. By most 
standards of modernity, Laos captures the definition of a poor country.
20 The United 
Nations Human Development Index rates it as one of the most wretched places on 
earth. Out of 177 countries, Laos ranks near the bottom of many socio-economic 
indicators. Normalized for cross-country comparison, gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita in Laos roughly equals US$ 1,759, far removed from the wealthiest country, 
Luxembourg (at US$ 62, 298). The average Lao person can expect to live 54 years, 
                                                 
19 Associated Press, "Hu Caps U.S. Tour with Yale Visit." Associated Press, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/21/hu.visit.ap/index.html, Friday, April 21, 2006. 
20 For detailed macroeconomic data on Laos, see Appendix A2.      11 
 
two-thirds as long as people in the West. In educational enrollment, Laos falls in the 
bottom quartile of countries. Together, these figures combine to give Laos an overall 
human development ranking of 133, below all its Southeast Asia neighbors, except 
newly formed Papua New Guinea.
21  
The predominance of the agricultural sector helps explain this low level of 
development in the Lao socio-economy. Of the 5.5 million Lao, around three-quarters 
live in the rural area, following the natural rhythms of life and engaging mostly in the 
natural economy.
22 In the past few decades, the agricultural sector has accounted for 
over half of all economic output in the country. In recent years, an expanding 
industrial sector has taken a larger portion of economic output, rising from 19.3% in 
1995 to over 25% in 2003. The manufacturing subsector, particularly the expanding 
garment industry, accounts for over three-fourths of all industrial output. All the while, 
the private sector has yet to take root in Laos. Military conglomerates, state-owned 
enterprises, and other party-affiliated businesses dominate many areas of the 
expanding economy. 
With services contributing steadily to a quarter of the economy in the past 
decade, industrial gains have come at the expense of agriculture. On the labor side 
however, the agricultural sector continues to employ over four-fiths of the population. 
                                                 
21 Most recent data were collected in 2003. United Nations Development Programme, Human 
Development Report 2005, International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in an 
Unequal World (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005). 
22 The natural economy characterizes the primitive, pre-capitalist mode of production, in which peasants 
live off the land, produce the bulk of their basic subsistence needs, and occasionally engage in barter 
trade. In Western scholarship, this rural economy is often wrongly described as a “subsistence 
economy,” which implies a lack of surplus. In reality, rural villages produce a variety of surplus value. 
For example, wealth is accumulated in the form of non-consumable heirloom wealth, or stored in 
livestock, especially buffaloes, for the purchase of heirlooms or dowry payments. Personal 
communications with James Chamberlain, February 2005. Anthropologists have long observed that “a 
significant proportion of what is produced in primitive economies is exchanged, although the nature of 
exchange is different from that in a capitalist market.” Rules of reciprocity to strengthen group 
solidarity govern the natural economy, which expresses no uniform economic logic. See Grant Evans, 
Lao Peasants under Socialism and Post-Socialism (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1995) 11.       12 
 
In trade, the country runs a perennial current account deficit, mitigated by foreign 
direct investment, bilateral grants, and concessionary loans from the international 
financial institutions (e.g., IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank). These 
external funds nourish the country’s insatiable appetite for consumption goods, which 
devour over half of all imports. Meanwhile, exports, dominated by natural resource 
extraction, barely pay for 70% of all imports. Garments, timber, and electricity 
together account for almost three-quarters of all exports by value.  
These economic conditions reflect a Lao people straddling the margins of 
modernity. The government estimates that 31% of Lao people live in poverty, down 
from 46% in 1993.
23  
In the process of reforming its economy, in response to globalization and 
economic change, the Lao government has recently integrated into the regional 
                                                 
23 The government boasts that poverty has reduced substantially in the country and floats the number of 
31% around the development community in Vientiane. In the late 1990s, household surveys put the 
poverty level at 39%. The poverty line in Laos denotes the food benchmark of money required to satisfy 
the nutritional requirements of all household members. The minimum poverty threshold corresponds to 
about 2000 calories per person per day. See Nanak Kakwani et al., "Poverty in Lao PDR During the 
1990s," ed. National Statistics Center (Committee for Planning and Cooperation, Lao PDR, 2002). A 
recent qualitative assessment of poverty in Laos discovers that poverty in Laos is new poverty. See 
Asian Development Bank, Participatory Poverty Assessment: Lao People's Democratic Republic 
(Manila, Philippines: ADB, 2001). Authored by anthropologist James Chamberlain, this important 
research explores the cultural construction of poverty, which is not an endemic condition to Lao people. 
When left to fend for themselves in the natural economy, Lao peoples of all ethnic stripes do not go 
hungry. Thus, poverty does not equate with hunger in Laos. In fact, linguistically the word “poverty” 
(in reference to economic circumstances) does not exist for any of the 47 ethnic groups in the country. 
Abundant natural resources have long sustained traditional livelihoods throughout the 
countryside. Only with their incorporation into a modernizing state have Lao villagers recently 
experienced poverty. This “new poverty,” argues Chamberlain, derives from failed government land use 
policies and other development initiatives that deprive villagers of their livelihoods. For example, focal 
sites, (resettlement), land tenure, and other development schemes continue to deprive ethnic minority 
villages of their traditional means of livelihood. Programs to eliminate shifting cultivation (but only 
pioneering—not rotational— cultivation indigenous to the Hmong peoples, who have been, since their 
alliance with the CIA during the Indochinese conflict, the center of the resistance movement against 
communist rule in Laos) serve to control a suspicious countryside known for resistance to communist 
rule. According to the participatory poverty assessment, poverty for many villagers refers to individual 
conditions of depravity associated with misfortune or suffering precipitated by external forces. Asian 
Development Bank, Ppa, Lao PDR  31. Privately, development professionals concede that poverty may 
have actually increased in Laos, due in no small measure from poorly administered land use policies 
and resettlement schemes.       13 
 
grouping, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). As the country opens up 
to the world, its membership in ASEAN and incorporation into the world market 
present as many opportunities and possibilities as challenges and threats. Rich in land 
and natural resources, but lacking in technical skills and finance capital, Laos could 
conceivably become a key node in the development of mainland Southeast Asia.
24 As 
a sign of changes, major transport arteries through Laos will soon link the country to 
all of mainland Southeast Asia.   
Nonetheless, the country remains at a cross-road. Surrounded by powerful 
neighbors in a dynamic and fast growing region, it is either well-positioned to benefit 
from economic integration, or regrettably isolated and potentially overwhelmed by 
more powerful economic actors.  The economic necessity of trade, the small size of its 
economy, the dependence on limited markets, and vulnerability to natural disasters 
will invariably condition the country’s degree of openness. Yet, the social and 
economic repercussions of Laos’ internationalization have received a minimum of 
attention in the academic literature.  
The Lao state is situated uncomfortably at the heart of mainland Southeast 
Asia. Throughout most of the modern era, the country has remained politically and 
economically exposed to regional and international forces. As Peter Katzenstein notes, 
small states like Laos are, on the whole, more vulnerable politically, economically and 
militarily than larger ones.
25 For this forgotten country, sovereignty has had, in the 
past, little meaning. Yet, the global process of reterritorialization presents the current 
                                                 
24 Jonathan Rigg, "Land-Locked Laos: Dilemmas of Development at the Edge of the World," in Land-
Locked States of Africa and Asia, ed. Dick Hodder, Sarah J. Lloyd, and Keith McLachlan (London: 
Frank Cass, 1998), 171. 
25 Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
UP, 1985) 80. In his analysis of democratic corporatism, he focuses primarily on small states of 
Western Europe and also notes that they are more open economically than larger states.       14 
 
regime in Laos with opportunities to transform this historical legacy. According to 
Jonathan Riggs,  
 
The linking of Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar and China’s 
Yunnan province, with Laos as ‘keystone’ of this so-called ‘Golden 
Quadrangle’ or ‘Economic Rectangle’, is an attempt to minimize the 
dependency that is part and parcel of being a poor, largely powerless, and land-
locked state… At the same time, the Lao leadership are hoping that by 
integrating more fully into the regional economy, their country will be in a 
better position to benefit from the economic growth and prosperity of countries 
and regions like Thailand and southern China.
26 
 
For two hundred years, Laos as a political entity has been considered a satellite 
of– as well as a buffer for– more powerful neighbors.
27 In fact, its existence as a 
nation state owes more to the historic interests of its more powerful neighbors than to 
any systematic scheme of self-determination on its own part.
28 Some scholars have 
gone so far as to call Laos a non-state and view it as a modern construct because of its 
“comparatively thin, short-lived history as a unified nation.”
29  
In the most recent past, its landlocked position and unfortunate propinquity to 
the Vietnam quagmire resulted in countless unnecessary deaths and lasting ecological 
damage from the heaviest bombing in the history of warfare at the time.
30 During the 
                                                 
26 Rigg, "Land-Locked Laos: Dilemmas of Development at the Edge of the World," 170. 
27 For a good, concise history of Laos’ turbulent past, see W. Randall Ireson and Carol J. Ireson, "Laos: 
Marxism in a Subsistence Rural Economy," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 21, no. 2 (1989). A 
more substantial and academic reading of Lao history can be found in Martin Stuart-fox, A History of 
Laos (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UP, 1997). See also Evans, A Short History of Laos: The Land in 
Between. 
28 According to Grant Evans, Laos: Culture and Society (Bangkok: Silkworm, 1999) 21, “the modern 
state of Laos only exists because of French colonial occupation. Without this it is almost certain that at 
least the lowland areas of Laos would have become part of the Thai state, while the upland areas such 
as Houaphan (which only became part of French Laos in the 1930s anyway) would probably have been 
absorbed by Vietnam.” 
29 Randi Jerndal and Jonathan Rigg, "Making Space in Laos: Constructing a National Identity in a 
"Forgotten" Country," Political Geography 17, no. 7 (1998): 813. 
30 Although the country took a neutral stance officially, more bombs were dropped in Laos during the 
Vietnam struggle than in all of World War II. According to Titus Peachey, "Figures and Cost 
Comparisons on U.S. Air War over Laos" Memo (Lao PDR: Mennonite Central Committee May 1994), 
for the period 1964-1973, the American military dropped over 2 million tons of bombs over Indochina      15 
 
war, the Royal Lao Government survived off the goodwill of its American benefactor, 
which abruptly ended with the Pathet Lao communist victory in 1975. Thereafter, the 
Lao PDR has relied heavily on its communist brethren for financial, ideological and 
military support. With the collapse of Soviet communism, Western donors have taken 
over the supporting role for a country marred by the legacy of Vietnam, during an 
otherwise uninterrupted history of dependency. Nonetheless, the country’s dependent 
position cannot be assumed. The strength and durability of the current regime needs to 
be explained.    
Global Integration and Post-socialism  
This research delves into the relationship between socio-economic 
internationalization and the Lao state’s management, control, and regulation of these 
same changes. I situate this work within the larger debates on global transformations, 
specifically the academic literatures on globalization, post-socialist transition, and 
economic internationalization, most of which, as explained in the following section, 
prove inadequate to describe the processes unfolding in Laos.  
Dialectics of Globalization 
The trend towards democracy coincides with the modern era of capitalism, 
marking a new phase in capitalist expansion and domination, a period otherwise 
known as late-capitalism or popularized as globalization. While some academics 
                                                                                                                                              
(33 percent more than on Germany during World War II, according to Keuleeers et al. 230). Using 
detailed accounting of bombing missions, tonnages, and costs (from the U.S.  Congressional Record, 
Senate, May 14, 1975, pp.14264-66), Peachey calculates that over the nine-year period, bombing 
missions (including fighter-bombers and B-52s over Laos) totaled 580,344 (costing $6.9 billion, with an 
average per day cost of $2,190,124). These figures do not include pilots' salaries.  As a cost comparison, 
an unexploded ordnance training and clearance project in Xieng Khouang province totals $1 million per 
year and equals the cost of sustaining the air war for 12 hours, by conservative estimates.  Moreover, 
the ordnance clearing project would need to continue (at the same spending rate) for an additional 6,894 
years to match the amount spent on the air campaign.  It is a tragedy out of all human proportions that a 
small and relatively backwards country would become a pawn in the geopolitical chess game waged by 
the superpowers in their ideological struggle for supremacy in Southeast Asia.      16 
 
herald the apparent victory of liberal democratic principles, others are more sobered 
by the dominance and exploitation of rich countries in the capitalist world system.  
Without a doubt, the literature on globalization is vast. The popular and 
academic discourses on globalization are unlikely ever to produce agreement on its 
meaning, provenance, significance, or implications.
31 Categorized as hyperglobalizers, 
many of the early writers on globalization over-emphasize or prematurely celebrates 
the decline of state power, a victim or accomplice to the logic of global capital.
32 At 
the other extreme of the globalization debate, skeptics counter that hyperglobalizers 
oversimplify the role of nation states and ignore the dynamic process of legitimation in 
which states redefine their existence.
33 In between the two extremes, 
                                                 
31 In a recent overview of the debates, Guillén provides, nonetheless, a useful way to start thinking 
about the content of these discourses. Instead of a monolithic concept of globalization, he suggests the 
notion of globality as “a network of relationships that creates mutual awareness.” Mauro F. Guillen, "Is 
Globalization Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble? A Critique of Five Key Debates in the Social Science 
Literature," Annual Review of Sociology 27 (2001): 244. With this definition, Guillén extends upon 
Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1990) 64. for whom 
globalization implies “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in 
such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.”  
To make sense of the various and sundry forms of globalization, I follow the work of David 
Held et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 
1999), who outline three broad schools of thought on this vibrant debate: the hyperglobalizers, the 
skeptics, and the transformationalists. 
32 From this perspective, the full rationalization of a disembedded world economy takes shape, 
demanding new rules of global governance in a supposed borderless world. In this sense, markets 
amount to a de-nationalizing movement in which state management of national economies becomes 
reactionary, forcing governments to accept a global agenda (or project) of economic management. For 
the roots of this school, see Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the 
Interlinked Economy (New York, NY: Harper Business, 1990). and Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the 
Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies (New York: The Free Press, 1995). 
33 While capital may diminish the significance of states in some areas of economic management, the 
skeptics remind us that a loss of sovereignty for some might imply a gain for others. Paul Hirst and 
Grahame Thompson hold to the centrality of states because of the growing significance of the rule of 
law and regulation of the global economy, on the one hand, and the political implications of physical 
territory and, concomitantly, control of interior population on the other. For Hirst and Grahame, states 
remain key actors in the legitimacy of moves to transfer power or sanction new power centers that 
either undermine or transcend traditional bounds of state authority. They view states not as sovereign 
subjects to the logic of capital, but as enablers of capital. Hence, “Sovereignty is alienable and divisible, 
but states acquire new roles even as they cede power.” Paul Q. Hirst and Grahame Thompson, 
Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance 
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996) 276-7.      17 
 
transformationlists criticize both for reducing all facets of socio-cultural and political 
life to economics and promoting a normative vision on a defiant reality. This more 
nuanced school of thought views globalization dialectically as a contingent historical 
process, full of contradictions and in search of meaningful synthesis.
34 The dialectics 
of globalization captures the fundamental transformation of the state and its relations 
to the economy and society.  
Economic Internationalization 
This dialectical process of global change and development remains for the 
most part uneven and contradictory, while lacking a coherent logic and intentional 
design.
35 The complex nature of global processes invites more research, especially to 
address the global-local nexus in ways that “clarify the economic, political, cultural, 
and aesthetic dimensions of globalization and how they interact with each other.”
36 
Laos is a good place to begin. While the dialectical approach, broadly conceived, 
presents globalization as a conflictive and highly indeterminate process, it fails to 
                                                 
34 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity  175, 64. describes globalization as “a process of uneven 
development that fragments as it coordinates…The outcome is not necessarily, or even usually, a 
generalised set of changes acting in a uniform direction, but consists in mutually opposed tendencies.” 
See also the work of Held et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture.; the 
collection of essays in David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven Topik, eds., States and 
Sovereignty in the Global Economy (New York: Routledge, 1999). Instead of their demise, we witness 
the decentering of nation states, which constitute one of many emerging sources of authority. In the 
process, states become intertwined in broader networks and constellation of power. Thus, in the current 
era of globalization, more fruitful insights on the dynamics of the international system of states come 
from interpreting the transformation of state sovereignty, rather than debating the merits of its strength. 
See Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996) 
303. The transformation reveals many contradictions. While powerless to the logic of capital, states are 
also enablers of capital expansion. 
35 Giddens describes globalization as “a process of uneven development that fragments as it 
coordinates…The outcome is not necessarily, or even usually, a generalised set of changes acting in a 
uniform direction, but consists in mutually opposed tendencies.” Giddens, The Consequences of 
Modernity. 
36 Guillen, "Is Globalization Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble?" 255. Guillen suggests the need to 
“bridge the micro-macro gap, i.e. that move across levels of analysis from the world-system to the 
nation-state, the industry, sector, community, organization, and group.” In his view, many of the 
disagreements in the literature stem from “the various levels of analysis at which different researchers 
operate.”      18 
 
capture adequately the process of social change in an economically marginal place like 
Laos. A close examination will reveal, for example, the role of human agency, special 
interests, and local resistance in shaping the content and meaning of these global 
processes.  
At a lower level of analysis, the international political economy literature is 
instructive of how countries continue to integrate into the world economy. According 
to Jeffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, the literature on the domestic politics of 
internationalization has implicitly relied on a model of “economic pluralism,” in 
which the content of policies is “a function of political conflict shaped by preferences 
of different actors, weighted by their market power and their propensity for collective 
action.”
37 In the seminal article “Internationalization, Institutions, and Political 
Change,” Jeff Frieden and Ronald Rogowski, aided by various trade models of 
economic pluralism, assert that transactions costs, to varying degrees, affect all states, 
where changes in relative prices impose opportunity costs of economic closure.
38 This 
neoliberal model of economic internationalization posits that external, or exogenous, 
easing of trade restrictions leads to increased demands for liberalization from 
relatively competitive economic actors, with concomitant demands for protection from 
uncompetitive ones. According to some analysts, this model of “exogenous easing” 
also applies to transforming socialist countries as well.
39  
                                                 
37 Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, "Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change," in 
Internationalization and Domestic Politics, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner (New York: 
Cambridge UP, 1996), 49. 
38 Jeff Frieden and Ronald Rogowski, "The Impact of the International Economy of the National 
Policies: An Overview," in Internationalization and Domestic Politics, ed. Robert O. Keohane and 
Helen V. Milner (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
39 See for example, Susan Shirk, "Internationalization and China's Economic Reforms," in 
Internationalization and Domestic Politics, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner (New York: 
Cambridge UP, 1996).       19 
 
In line with this approach and applied to a socialist state, David Zweig, in 
Internationalizing China : Domestic Interests and Global Linkages, presents a model 
of  “segmented deregulation,” in which governments like China favor policies of 
selected liberalization, favoring some localities, sectors, or organizations over others.
40 
From his extensive research, Zweig discovers that the country’s transformation has 
followed a neomercantilist route, and not deeper integration and internationalization, 
which economic liberals continue to promote and celebrate. However, as the country 
further internationalizes, his model of segmented deregulation predicts a move from 
neomercantilism to neoliberalism. On the whole, Zweig’s model of segmented 
deregulation superficially looks suspiciously like the neoliberal variant promoted by 
Frieden and Rogowski, who posit that exogenous easing of international exchanges 
would create a competitive environment in domestic politics that pushes for more 
economic liberalization. 
There are several reasons to believe that the experience of Laos’ economic 
transition differs markedly from predictions of these various neoliberal models. First, 
the low level of both development and marketization cautions against economic 
generalities in a country where upwards of 80 percent of the population remains at 
subsistence level. Second, Laos’ political, economic, and physical isolation effectively 
limits the scope for autonomous action that these models, anyhow, assume away. 
Given the country’s historic dependency on more powerful neighbors, socio-economic 
and political inclusion into the capitalist world system will, in all likelihood, be 
predicated on exogenous forces. Third, a symbiosis of state, party, and army seems to 
play a role in the political system.
41 Such an institutional arrangement appears to have 
                                                 
40 David Zweig, Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages, Cornell Studies in 
Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2002). 
41 Ivarsson, Svensson, and Tonnesson, The Quest for Balance  16.      20 
 
a mediating effect on policies of economic liberalization. Fourth, there is enduring 
strength of a clan patronage system, which has characterized Lao politics and 
government since the country’s independence from France in 1954.
42 In the Lao form 
of clientelism, political power and prestige derive more from family politics and 
personal connections than from unbending adherence to ideology. But how have 
greater socio-economic openness transformed these relations? Research exploring 
these issues in Laos is currently lacking. Finally, restrictions on free, political 
expression in the country thwart internal pressure for continued change along the lines 
of most macroeconomic models. Associations normally linked with civil society 
hardly exist in Laos.  
In countering the neoliberal school, Matthew Evangelista, in “Stalin's 
Revenge: Institutional Barriers to Internationalization in the Soviet Union,” puts 
forward a version of internationalization that more plausibly captures the dynamics of 
the Lao case. His model emphasizes the mediating role of institutions in obstructing, 
channeling, and regulating market openness, to the point of distorting the logic of 
exogenous easing.
43 In his analysis of internationalization in the former Soviet Union, 
Evangelista argues that Soviet institutions, such as the State Planning Commission 
(Gosplan), shaped the ways in which domestic economic actors viewed their 
preferences. He discovers that Soviet authorities, through the central planning system, 
limited the impact of internationalization through direct instruments of policy or 
simply the inefficient running of the domestic economy. Even in post-Soviet Russia, 
the legacy of the Stalinist economic system continues to frustrate efforts to liberalize 
the economy in predictable, neoliberal ways. Evangelista points to the important role 
                                                 
42 Martin Stuart-fox, "Politics and Patronage in Laos," Indochina Issues 70 (1986): 3. 
43 Matthew Evangelista, "Stalin's Revenge: Institutional Barriers to Internationalization in the Soviet 
Union," in Internationalization and Domestic Politics, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner 
(New York: Cambridge UP, 1996).      21 
 
of pre-existing institutions in shaping the domestic politics and impacts of 
internationalization. He writes,  
 
Not only actors’ strategies and behaviour but their very goals are influenced by 
the institutional context. Institutions shape actors’ perceptions of their interests, 
and, therefore, their behaviour, sometimes even after the demise of the 
institutions themselves.
44 
 
Building upon the study of organizations and institutions, the literature on 
postsocialism offers keen insights into the functioning of bureaucracies and also helps 
to explain political and economic trajectories of transitioning societies.  
Socialist Transformations 
The academic literature on postsocialism advances competing theories on the 
eventual embrace of capitalism in the former Soviet block, in light of the institutional 
failings of communism. Much of this literature posits the eventual weakening and 
demise of the communist, one-party state.
45 In an edited volume by Andrew Walder, 
for example, the essays examine the ways in which departures from the practices of 
central planning (by altering control over property and opportunity) have brought 
about political change.
46 As Walder observes, “all communist regimes have departed 
in some way from the defining features of central planning in an effort to compensate 
for shortcomings in the performance of these institutions.”
47 While many observers 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 185. 
45 See for example, Gil Eyal, Ivâan Szelâenyi, and Eleanor R. Townsley, Making Capitalism without 
Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe (London; New 
York: Verso, 1998).; David Charles Stark and Lâaszlâo Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming 
Politics and Property in East Central Europe (New York: Cambridge UP, 1998).; Zweig, 
Internationalizing China. ; and Shirk, "China's Economic Reforms." 
46 Andrew G. Walder, The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in 
China and Hungary (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). Emphasis original. 
47 Andrew G. Walder, "The Quiet Revolution from Within: Economic Reform as a Source of Political 
Decline," in The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in China and 
Hungary, ed. Andrew G. Walder (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 3.      22 
 
concede that economic reforms lead to political changes, few agree about how.
48 The 
collection of essays analyze how departures from central planning reallocate resources 
and redirect opportunities, while ushering in a process of political change. The authors 
claim that changes in economic institutions bring about a steady political decline of 
state power, irrespective of the success of economic policies.
49 Departures from 
central planning “set in motion a chain of consequences, usually unintended, and if the 
departures are extensive enough, they eventually alter political institutions and 
relationships to the point where Communist party rule can no longer be sustained.”
50 I 
challenge his conclusions– on grounds similar to those used against the neoliberal 
school above– but agree with his methods for the Laos case. 
In making these claims, Walder advances two ways in which to gauge the 
decline of socialist states: (a) a weakening of the bureaucratic state apparatus in 
promoting social mobility of party members, and (b) a decay of surveillance 
capabilities of the state to monitor and sanction political behavior. He focuses 
exclusively on the former factor but, nonetheless, gives no way to measure– and hence 
to falsify– the extent and scope of regime decline. Furthermore, the thesis provides no 
clue to the interactions between the two factors and, by ignoring the role of the 
military to mediate any push away from socialist norms, says little about how the 
strength of one can obviate or circumscribe that of the other. For example, what if the 
state over-compensates the decline of the party-state bureaucracy (a) with an increase 
in its surveillance power (b)? What combination actually leads to a decline of the 
communist state? Walder provides no plausible threshold of state decline.  
                                                 
48 Ibid., 4. 
49 Ibid., 2. 
50 Ibid., 3.      23 
 
Yet, even with the weakness of his argument, Walder provides a useful 
approach to the study of market transitions in former communist states. In using an 
organizational approach, he moves away from the prevalent concerns on state-society 
relations common in much of the transition literature.
51 For example, in Making 
Capitalism without Capitalists: the New Ruling Elites in Eastern Europe, Gil Eyal, 
Iván Szelényi, and Eleanor Townsley describe how the working class became 
demobilized in the postcommunist transition.
52 In the communist period, interclass 
struggle played a minimum role in historical changes. Rather, rank determined power 
and privilege, and political capital mattered more than economic wealth. In the 
subsequent transition period when these socialist regimes collapsed, the socialist 
working class had lost all significance and lacked the capacity for collective action.
53 
The socialist system prevalent in Eastern Europe contained a dual stratification system 
in which rank took precedence over class. Thus, intraclass instead of interclass conflict 
over the making of a new dominant class characterized the transition period for the 
Eastern European countries in their study. In the immediate decade after the transition, 
the working class failed to pursue any collective goals for a noncapitalist alternative.
54 
According to Eyal et al., struggles to make classes continue to shape, in significant 
ways, postcommunist Eastern Europe. 
The title of their book, Making Capitalism without Capitalists, nicely captures 
the main findings of their work. In postcommunist Eastern Europe, a domestic, 
                                                 
51 See for example, the transition debates in  
52 Eyal, Szelâenyi, and Townsley, Making Capitalism without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite 
Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe. 
53 See Gil Eyal, Ivâan Szelâenyi, and Eleanor R. Townsley, "The Utopia of Postsocialist Theory and the 
Ironic View of History in Neoclassical Sociology," Review Symposium  (2001), which nicely 
summarizes their book Making Capitalism without Capitalist, while making a strong rebuttal to 
Burawoy’s book review.  
54 Ibid.: 2-3. In their ethnographic accounts, the authors document “the demobilization of the working 
class: the loss of solidarity, the failure of collective organization, and the absence of an attractive 
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propertied bourgeoisie has developed slowly. In this environment, the intelligentsia 
matured into what Eyal et al. call a “cultural bourgeoisie,” the vanguard of the 
capitalist transformation. Extending upon Bourdieu’s work on symbolic capital, the 
authors argue that cultural capital, as opposed to property or political capital, 
constitutes the main source of power and privilege in the emerging social system of 
Eastern Europe.  
Elsewhere, in Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in 
East Central Europe, David Stark and László Bruszt chart the different paths from 
socialism shaped by the strategic interaction of (1) hardliners and reformers and (2) 
ruling elites and the opposition.
55 The diversity of actually-existing socialism accounts 
for the plurality of emergent capitalism. The authors suggest that, most prominently, 
postsocialist transformations have created property holders, while extending political 
rights to the property-less.
56 They use path dependency to explain why different 
privatizations strategies in four Eastern European countries (Germany, the Czech 
Republic, Poland, and Hungary) produced different transitions out of state socialism. 
That is, “a diversity of origins gives rise to a plurality of capitalisms.”
57 In this sense, 
path dependency simply implies past dependency, where origins matter. Diversity 
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56 See David Charles Stark and Lâaszlâo Bruszt, "One Way or Multiple Paths: For a Comparative 
Sociology of East European Capitalism," Review Symposium  (2001), in which the authors respond to 
criticism of their book from Michael Burawoy, "Neoclassical Sociology: From the End of Communism 
to the End of Classes," Review Symposium  (2001).  
57 Burawoy, "Neoclassical Sociology," 7. Here, Burawoy provides a strong critique of Stark et al.’s use 
of path dependency and questions the appropriateness of their critical juncture (late 1980’s and early 
1990’s) to explain differences in postsocialist pathways. He writes, “there may be path dependency, but 
where does the path begin, which crystallizing event determines which future, how many such events 
might there be? It is far from obvious that the most significant divergence of historical paths begins 
when the party state is replaced by the formal trappings of liberal democracy” (7). He later points to the 
need to incorporate the mediating, and decisive, effects of the capitalist world system: “Russia and 
Hungary may diverge in remarkable ways, but that divergence is as much a product of their differential 
insertion into what is a singular world capitalist system as it is of their communist origins. Or better, it 
is a product of the way global capitalism combines with antecedent forms of production as these 
undergo market transition” (12).      25 
 
within Central Europe has its roots in recent patterns of extrication from communism. 
Nonetheless, these analyses focus on state-society relations, which may have 
relevance in Eastern Europe but remain inadequate to describe the processes of change 
in Laos.  
If changes within political institutions themselves play a major role in shaping 
the post-socialist transition, then a focus on state-society relations may fail to capture 
the dynamics of places like Laos. As Walder suggests “large systemic changes can 
occur without the agency of citizens, whether organized or not.”
58   
Methods of Inquiry 
Through extensive field work in Laos, my research examined the process of 
market liberalization and regional integration in Laos’ socialist transformation. This 
research involved a mixture of observation, literature review, and qualitative 
interviews methods. I rely on observations during my time on research assignment in 
Laos (May 2004-April 2005); an examination of governance-related, donor-funded 
development initiatives; an exhaustive survey of government laws, regulations, and 
documents since the reform period; and a review of literature on the political economy 
of development, market transition, and globalization.  
Regime-centered Organizational Perspective 
The research documents the different ways in which Laos’ internationalization 
has transformed the country’s socio-economic infrastructure, domestic politics, and 
capacity for reforms. Through the broad lens of political economy and sociology, the 
inquiry focuses on three areas of Lao state capacity: (1) political structure of the Lao 
People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP); (2) public administration as revealed in the 
Governance and Public Administration Reform (GPAR) program, and (3) fiscal 
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management under the Ministry of Finance (MoF). In choosing these areas, I draw on 
the insights of Theda Skocpol, who suggests, “Basic questions about a state’s 
territorial integrity, financial means, and staffing may be the place to start in any 
investigation of its capacities to realize goals.”
59  
An exploration of the structure and political culture of the party-state 
(presented in Chapter II) provides a window onto the territorial integrity of the 
country, sovereignty, the party’s basis for legitimate rule, and the inevitable re-
organization of political interests engendered by economic liberalization. The study of 
the public administration (Chapter III) examines the organization and management of 
government ministries in their restructuring for market liberalization. Reforms at the 
MoF (Chapter IV) have specific relevance to the state’s role in extraction, 
redistribution, and financial infrastructure for accumulation, particularly with the 
abrupt withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1989.  
For each Lao government institution, I pay particular attention to the 
transformation of state capacity, the government’s freedom of action, and ability to 
determine its own destiny. During the extended transition period, what accounts for 
the state’s ability to realize its capacities in key areas of political authority (LPRP), 
governance (GPAR), and extraction (MoF)? The state, of course, is more than just the 
sum of its organizations. To be sure, the state is not reducible to either a system of 
decision making or a monopoly on violence. Nor is the state simply an arrangement of 
authority or policies backed by force. Nonetheless, the focus on these three state 
institutions, subsumed under the study of political sociology, provide a meaningful 
way to gauge relative state capacity and the strength of governments as containers of 
socio-economic processes. 
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I take this organizational approach in the belief that social changes can result 
predominantly within institutions themselves, and not only or even primarily through 
struggles that redefine state-society relations. There are several reasons why this 
methodological approach makes sense in the Lao case. First, the country lacks any 
elaborate civil society. Public organizations are inseparable from the state, which 
persists in frustrating public outlets for free political expression. Second, a ruling party 
anchored in Marxist-Leninist theory continues to govern Laos. Economic 
liberalization has yet to lead to a political one. Third, a clan patronage system, blurring 
the lines between party, state and army, continues to characterize the political system. 
Thus, my more organizational and regime-centered focus will better capture and 
explain the country’s transition than would a study concerned with state-society 
relations. As Walder notes, 
 
Communist regimes have owed their existence to the discipline and cohesion 
of the party apparatus and to that apparatus’s ability to avert organized political 
opposition. If we can uncover the process that weaken the discipline and 
cohesion of the party-state apparatus, we shall have illuminated one of the 
main causes of decline of communist rule, and perhaps also have helped to 
explain the rise of citizen resistance and changes in state-society relations.
60 
 
Whereas state-society approaches see societal actors and their capacity for collective 
action as keys to explaining the dynamics of postsocialist transitions, a regime-
centered method gives primacy to political institutions as themselves the motor force 
of change.  
From an organizational perspective, I can better appreciate “the changing 
interests, orientations, and capacities of party-state officials”
61and how they negotiate 
the changing organizational environment wrought by globalization. An analysis of the 
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emerging character of these powerful government institutions can provide insights into 
their contribution to the political stability of the current regime. I reason that relations 
of clan patronage, linked to the enduring Leninist party structure, continue to provide 
coherence and stability to a relatively poor and weak government struggling to forge a 
sense of national unity. It is the shape and form of these relations that I wanted to 
examine. How has the country’s marketization entrenched economic and political 
elites? In what ways have the country’s economic liberalization and strategies of 
dependent incorporation into the world economy served to cement domestic coalitions 
of rule? How are these coalitions expressed through the workings of the three 
institutions under investigation? What are the changing patterns of authority in these 
institutions, in relation to either its respective line ministries or international 
organizations? Under what conditions have old patterns reproduced themselves despite 
the introduction of new practices? In what ways does the clan patronage system 
continue to take shape? Concomitantly, what is the evolving relationship among the 
party, state, and army?  
Because these organizations have continued to evolve since the country’s 
market liberalization in the early 1990’s, questions of bureaucratic commitment have 
specific relevance to each organization’s ability to realize public aims. What attitudes 
and symbols are commanding the loyalties of the staff? What precedents and 
institutional norms are being established? What alliances are being made within and 
across these government institutions? 
  Following Walder’s approach, for each organization, I analyze “changes in the 
relationship of higher to lower levels of government, in the relations between superior 
and subordinate within the party and government, and the interests and orientations of 
officials within the party-state apparatus, especially in its lower reaches.”
62  For this 
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task, the pathbreaking work of Philip Selznick provides important insights into 
organizational dynamics
63 and has shaped the content of my methodology. From his 
classic study of the Tennessee Valley Authority, he advances the thesis that  
 
All formal organizations are molded by forces tangential to their rationally 
ordered structures and stated goals…. [T]he organization may be significantly 
viewed as an adaptive social structure, facing problems which arise because it 
exists as an organization in an institutional environment, independently of the 
special (economic, military, political) goals which called it into being.
64  
 
Drawing on Selznick’s methods, the organizational approach led me to: 
 
•  analyze the policies of these organizations in administering their programs and 
operational objectives;  
•  search for the underlying implications of official doctrines promulgated by 
each organization;  
•  observe the interaction of these agencies with other organizations in their area 
of operation; and  
•  explore patterns of cooperation with international donors, which fund the 
operation of practically every state agency in this highly aid-dependent 
country. 
 
Throughout my investigation, I paid particular attention to political actors at the 
vanguard of the country’s economic integration and the ways in which they responded 
to the opportunities and challenges presented by the country’s openness. 
Ethnography 
While using a variety of quantitative methods to measure state capacity and 
restructuring, I also relied on qualitative methods, specifically Michael Patton’s 
phenomenological approach to research, which “focuses on descriptions of what 
people experience and how it is that they experience what they experience.”
65 
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Ethnography played important part in this study of state restructuring. As Michael 
Burawoy suggests, there exists a need “to understand how the global, whether through 
supranational institutions, transnational connections, or postnational discourse, has 
mediated effects on what has come to be called the “local.”
66 For these purposes, he 
advocates the use of ethnographic research. In Uncertain Transition : Ethnographies 
of Change in the Postsocialist World, he and Katherine Verdery bring together a 
diverse range of social scientists who use ethnography in studying the local content of 
postsocialist transitions.
67 These ethnographic accounts reveal the “complex relations 
of socialist and postsocialist life worlds, emphasizing unintended consequences and 
the way the past enters the present, not as legacy but as novel adaptation.”
68   
Influenced by this approach, my ethnographic research comprised interviews, 
meetings, discussions, dialogues, and debates with over 100 private citizens, 
government officials, business people, and development professionals in Laos. To 
assess different points of view on economic liberalization in Laos, I conducted open-
ended interviews with the following people: (i) high-level government officials from 
all three agencies, to understand the country’s overall goals and objectives for regional 
integration and market liberalization; (ii) mid-level government bureaucrats to 
understand their motivations, perceptions, and interpretations of government policies; 
and (iii) donor representatives to scrutinize their organization’s policies vis-à-vis 
development objectives and their role in assisting the country’s internationalization 
and marketization.
69 More informally, I surveyed the opinions of selected 
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townspeople, expatriates, international consultants, and members of the diplomatic 
and development communities. I considered their views on a variety of topics relating 
to contemporary Laos, such as the socialist transformation, the economy, socio-
economic development, the reform process, foreign aid, and the future outlook for the 
country.  
Data Collection 
I used a comprehensive, multi-level approach to data collection and apply both 
qualitative and quantitative techniques to strengthen the quality of information 
gathered and to ensure reliability across data sets. In addition to the organizational 
analysis and ethnographic data, the research also relies on an exhaustive examination 
of development reports and government documents. Data sources include the National 
Statistics Center, the organizations under investigation, as well as the information 
centers of the multilateral organizations such as the United Nations Development 
Programme, International Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank, and the World 
Bank.  
Organization of Dissertation 
Examining the political, administrative, and fiscal restructuring of the Lao 
state, the following three chapters present the findings of my dissertation research, 
which broadly point to government centralization since the reform period. Chapter II 
analyzes the political and territorial re-organization of the country since the collapse of 
state communism elsewhere. In relation to the population at large, the communist 
party in Laos appears small; yet its strong party apparatus pervades all organizations 
of government and oversees many areas of society. Although the public administrative 
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remains weak, as Chapter III documents, the party retains a strong grip on the 
machinery of government. Fiscal reforms emphasize the need for strong national 
controls over tax management, revenue collection, and customs administration; and 
Chapter IV investigates how the Lao government controls public expenditures, while 
expanding the tax base in an overall push to mitigate fiscal crises. Here, I also use a 
model of decision making to simulate the pros and cons of various policies of fiscal 
restructuring. In confronting the challenges of market reforms, the Lao party-state’s 
struggle for modernization equates with a bureaucratic centralization and 
rationalization of the apparatus of government. A running theme of these three 
chapters, centralization follows a familiar pattern of restructuring experienced in other 
peripheral states. The concluding chapter summarizes the findings of the dissertation 
while contrasting two diametrically opposed views of market developments.  
Contrary to the liberal tradition in the West, the development of markets is not 
anathema to central government control and regulation. In fact, for many developing 
countries struggling to create a unitary state and a national economic space of private 
exchange, centralized control over regionally autonomous regions constitutes one of 
the major governance challenges of nationally guided development. Small developing 
countries struggling to create the rudiments of a market society, on the whole, will 
require more central government control and oversight of the development process 
than is currently advised by the international development community.    
33 
Chapter II 
THE ANATOMY OF PERIPHERAL SOCIALISM IN  
THE LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 
 
Today, the socialist programs envisioned by Marx and Engels and realized by 
Lenin and Stalin no longer provide a viable alternative to capitalist development. To 
many observers, the end of communism is a matter of fact. Only five communist states 
exist in the world today: China, Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba, and Laos. While their 
commitment to the economic program of socialism remains suspect, their adherence to 
its political structure signifies the enduring legacy of Marxist-Leninism.
70 One-party 
rule, modeled on the political organization of the former Soviet Union, continues to 
characterize these last communist holdouts, the remnants of a fading political system 
and its bankrupt economic program. Where communist states in Eastern European 
attempted perestroika with glasnost to their own demise, these remaining regimes 
pragmatically embraced the former and astutely resisted the political suicide of the 
latter.  
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Marxist-Leninism more accurately refers to the latter. While the idea of communism dates back to at 
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thus repudiates all private property and, hence, economic inequality and the redistributative role of 
government. The state has no larger task than the management of things. Economic functions have a 
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With a population of 5.5 million people, the Lao PDR is the smallest of these 
remaining states and its leaders possibly the least ideologically committed. This 
regime in also the newest and poorest, by far. Nominally still communist, the Lao 
party-state maintains a monopoly of political expression within its borders, while 
successfully managing the transition to a form of market capitalism. The political 
structure and socialist system that developed in the Lao PDR diverges from classical 
socialism in several important respects, relegating this party-state to the status of 
“peripheral socialism.”
71 By examining the nature of these differences, this chapter 
hopes to provide important clues to the nature of the reform process (as examined in 
subsequent chapters) and why the trajectory of the Lao PDR continues to diverge from 
the experience of the former Soviet block in Eastern Europe.  
Before delving into the structure and political culture of communist Laos, this 
anatomy of peripheral socialism begins with an overview of the Marxist legacy that 
gave rise to the classical system of socialist production and central planning. Based on 
the European experience, many accounts of the system’s failures wrongly point to the 
inability of communist institutions to reform under the dominating presence of the 
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Peripheral Socialist Economy: A Conceptual Note," World Development 13, no. 1 (1985). Although 
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vanguard party. This Euro-centric bias, thus, limits the analytical value of much of the 
transition literature in explaining socialist transformations elsewhere. The rest of the 
chapter then examines the contours of the Lao party-state, focusing on political 
restructuring since market reforms. The second section provides background on the 
brief phase of socialist planning. In analyzing reforms to the state apparatus at central 
and local levels, the third section focuses on the organization of the Lao People’s 
Revolutionary Party, as well as the political administration of the country. Evidence 
reveals a process of political consolidation taking place in the Lao state— as 
manifested within the party and the territorial organization of the country. For 
modernizing states, these political developments fit a familiar pattern; and a body of 
literature on peripheral state power, presented in the final section, helps to shed light 
on developments in Laos.  
Communism in Asia and the Limits of the European Experience 
Revolutionary Socialism and the End of History 
Karl Marx championed a socialism that envisioned a world free of capitalist 
exploitation and inequality. In his writing, he offers a clear vision of a humane world, 
which requires "replacing the domination of circumstances and chance over 
individuals by the domination of individuals over chance and circumstances.”
72 In 
Marx’s vision of dialectical history, communism, as the higher form of social 
organization, overcomes the inner contradictions of capitalism and progresses to the 
end of human history.
73 Supposedly, the birth of communism resolves the tendency 
towards crises in capitalist development. Marx was incensed by the contradictions of 
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wealth and productive capacity, on the one hand, and their resultant impoverishment 
and waste, on the other. Although he marveled at technological and productive 
advances of capitalist industrialization, he reserved the brunt of his invective at the 
waste and social inequality of the same wealth-generating system. For Marx, private 
property creates the basis for exploitation, alienation, unfreedom, and untold human 
misery. Those who owned the means of production exploited those who were forced, 
on pain of starvation, to sell their seemingly “free” labor as a commodity for wage 
subsistence.
74  
Marxism articulates a political philosophy of redistribution and a revolutionary 
program for gaining power. Its program of government, however, subverted the very 
ideals of democracy that Marx so vigorously championed. The theoretical splendor of 
Marxism degenerated into the practical horrors of Leninism and the mass terror of 
Stalinism. Regrettably, socialist revolutions and their transformation of property 
relations, when and where they occurred, did little to remove the substance of 
exploitation and only succeeded in changing its nature. One ruling class replaced 
another, while exploitation and domination continued in new forms. The conquest of 
power in the name of Marxist utopias relied on un-Marxist means of workers’ 
exploitation. Would-be state builders in the name of Marx the world over have used 
undemocratic means to achieve the impossible democratic end-state, a workers’ utopia 
under public ownership of the means of production. From the gulags of Stalinist 
Russia, the Cultural Revolution and the great leap backward in Maoist China, to the 
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killing fields of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, more people have arguably died in the 
name of socialism than for any other cause in human history.
75 
Contradicting Marx and Engel’s materialist conception of history, 
revolutionary socialism emerged not in mature capitalism, as they predicted, but in 
underdeveloped, economically backward and illiberal societies wrought by 
inequalities ripe for social upheavals.
76 Real socialism emerged not through crisis 
tendencies of capitalism but rather as a reaction to capitalist imperialism.
 77 And the 
same is true of Lao communism. 
                                                 
75 This assertion denies the whole history of capitalist development and its coincidence with nation state 
building in the West, which was marked by incessant warfare throughout the modern era. In gleeful 
validation of the market order, The Economist, "Marxism after Marx," Dec 28-Jan 3 2002-3, 
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York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1976) 90, gives food for thought, 
What, in fact, took place in the Soviet Union was a modernising revolution, complete with 
industrialisation  and urbanisation, nation-building, construction of a modern state towering 
over vast domains of public life, ruled by a narrow minority, with the masses engaged in their 
habitual everyday routine and rarely transcending the confines of commonsense. This 
modernising revolution, however, achieved at tremendous cost, took place before the eyes of a 
world already appalled by the consequences of its own past industrialist intoxication, and 
unlikely to take delight in the sight of a few more factory chimneys and a denser crowd at the 
factory gates. The same world could be bewildered and terrified when shown its own past 
cruelty at the same time as it prided itself on its compassion for human suffering, its 
observance of the inviolable rights of the individual and its advances on the road to personal 
freedom.  
Nonetheless, in Stalinist Russia, as many as 20 million disappeared from the gulag, according toTariq 
Ali, The Stalinist Legacy: Its Impact on Twentieth-Century World Politics (New York: Penguin Books, 
1984). In a utopian campaign to ruralize Cambodia, the Kmer Rouge were directly responsible for the 
deaths of over two million people, a quarter of population.  
76 In later writings, Marx qualified his materialist conception of history. A socialist revolution in Russia 
was possible, but only as an adjunct to the much anticipated upheavals in the industrial, Western 
Europe.   
77 Countries which eventually developed a socialist system exhibited these key characteristics on the 
eve of revolutionary change: a poor and underdeveloped economy; a small industrial base; salience of 
economic inequality; suppressed political liberties; dependency on other states; and social upheavals. 
See Janos Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton UP, 1992) 23.      38 
 
Social Syncretism and the Classical System  
  In a remarkable essay entitled “Theses on the Syncretic Society,” Felip Garcia 
Casals aptly calls the empirical departures from classical Marxism “syncretic 
societies” or “premature socialism,” which combine and reconcile the impossible task 
of socialist construction in underdeveloped regions still in search of capitalist 
industrialization.
78 The international collision of underdevelopment and imperialism 
provided the backdrop to the emergence of premature socialism, offering a path to 
industrialization via Leninist revolutions.
79  
All social revolutions have instigated a process of centralization.
80 The initial 
revolutionary period involves a substantial redistribution of property and income, as 
well as waves of nationalization and socialization of the country’s wealth.
81 At the 
vanguard of this social revolution, the party-state directs the top-down transformation, 
merging political and administrative functions of the previous, repressive regime. 
Captured in the idea of bureaucratic collectivism, the second world aspired for “a 
                                                 
78 Felipe Garcia Casals, "Theses on the Syncretic Society," Theory and Society 9, no. 2 (1980). 
Elsewhere, Bauman, Socialism  9. calls state socialism “the abortive adventure into equality.” 
79 Casals, "Syncretic Society," 233-4. In Casals’ scenario, there have been three historical responses to 
imperialism: 
1.  resignation and the reproduction of underdevelopment; 
2.  opposition to imperialism through imitation (Reactionary reforms and defensive imperialist 
conquests); or  
3.  Leninist revolutions: negation of imperialism and capitalism (the abolition of the private 
ownership of the means of production.  
Industrialization may have taken one of two routes, through imperialist wars or Leninist revolutions. 
Casals argues, “At the beginning of [the twentieth] century, there was an economic convergence 
between national capitalism and foreign imperialism largely independent of political relationships. 
Under those circumstances, the Leninist strategy, seeking essentially to unite the anti-imperialist 
revolution with the anti-capitalist revolution, was a perfectly logical, if not the only, alternative to the 
perpetuation of underdevelopment. History has subsequently proven the foundations of this strategy to 
be sound. It has promoted the lasting elimination of external imperialist domination and of internal 
capitalist domination; it has promoted an accelerated industrialization; but it has not promoted the 
effective transition to a socialist organization of society.” 
80 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China 
(New York: Cambridge UP, 1979). Social revolutions imply a fundamental change in the social and 
political structures of society.  
81 Kornai, Socialist System  27.      39 
 
state-directed society which has sought to fuse all realms into a single monolith and to 
impose a common direction, from economics to politics to culture, through a single 
institution, the Party.”
82  
The high phase of communism, sometimes called classical socialism, describes 
a political structure and social system modeled on the Soviet Union under Stalin and 
China under Mao Zedong.
83 Scholars offer many interpretations of the socialist state,
84 
but its defining feature is the communist party. Every five years or so, a party congress 
elects a Central Committee, as well as the inner circle of party leaders for the political 
bureau, or politburo. In most cases, absolute power resides with a general secretary, 
who dominates political life of the party. The governing elite oversees a vast 
machinery that penetrates all aspects of socio-economic life. The party apparatus 
becomes inseparable from the bureaucracy, where administrative affairs of 
government reflect the political interests of the party. In time, the bureaucratic 
apparatus houses the power elite, promoting social mobility of party members. 
Keeping members in line, the principle of “democratic centralism” governs decision 
making and ostensibly promotes consensus-building in party deliberations. In practice, 
                                                 
82 Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1996) 14. 
83 For a positivist analysis of “actually existing” socialism—based primarily on the experience of 
Eastern Europe—see Kornai, Socialist System. 
84 In the academic literature, “actually existing,” “real,” and “positive” socialism all refer to the same 
state project of enforced industrialization under the guidance of a vanguard communist party.  Joseph 
Alois Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 3d ed. (New York: Harper, 1950) 167, 
provides the most succinct definition of positive socialism and its structure in practice: “an institutional 
pattern in which the control over the means of production itself is vested in a central authority… in 
which, as a matter of principle, the economic affairs of society belong to the public and not the private 
sphere.” For a normative interpretation of the possibilities of socialism, see Bauman, Socialism, who 
views socialism as the counter-cultural and alternative program to capitalism. For him, socialism 
presents an alternative social reality, as an “intrinsic criticism of the present, inseparable from its future-
orientation, which defies all attempts to describe socialism in terms of a specific social programme 
given once and for all.” Bauman, Socialism  50-1. The socialist utopia aims to redress inequality, 
poverty, and inequities. Bauman pejoratively calls the social programs in existential socialism “the 
abortive venture into equality” Bauman, Socialism  9. See also Robert W. Cox, ""Real Socialism" in 
Historical Perspective," Socialist Register  (1991): 170, who defines socialism “as an historical 
experience arose from a particular crisis of world order. It aspired to be at the same time a system of 
political rule and of production. The organization of production lies at the heart of socialist politics.”       40 
 
the principle effectively discourages dissent and ensures that all party cells faithfully 
obey party directives dictated by the leadership. 
A “siege mentality” besets the governing apparatus, which hides behind an 
“Iron Curtain” of international isolation and domestic terror.
85 The socialist state 
projects the illusion of perpetual war, so as to justify the police state.
86 Hence, the 
socialist command economy maintains a constant war footing, mobilizing the masses 
for the struggle against capitalist imperialism and demanding a collective sacrifice of 
personal savings in the name of rapid industrialization.
87  
Enforcing the state’s monopoly on violence, an elaborate police apparatus 
monitors political expression of the ideologically suspect and other subversive 
elements in society. In practice, socialism equates with totalitarianism, while its 
bureaucracy systematically acts above the law.
88 While progressive in its revolutionary 
transformation of society, premature socialism nonetheless exhibits feudal-like 
characteristics in its regression to authoritarian rule.
89 Social syncretism attempts the 
                                                 
85 In a remarkable speech entitled “The Sinews of Peace,” delivered on March 5, 1946 at Westminster 
College in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill inaugurated the Cold War by warning against the 
shadow of communism lurking behind a metaphoric “Iron Curtain” in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Although a call to arms against complacency in the aftermath of American victory, the speech also 
made a compelling case for a strong United Nations to enforce peace. The safety of Europe required a 
“special relationship” between the U.S. and the U.K., as well as the establishment of a durable world 
organization. Churchill inveighed, “We must make sure that [the United Nations’] work is fruitful, that 
it is a reality and not a sham, that it is a force for action, and not merely a frothing of words, that it is a 
true temple of peace in which the shields of many nations can some day be hung up, and not merely a 
cockpit in a Tower of Babel.” Winston S. Churchill, "The Sinews of Peace," in Winston S. Churchill: 
His Complete Speeches 1897-1963, ed. Robert Rhodes James (London: Chelsea House, 1964). 
86 Robert Skidelsky, The Road from Serfdom: The Economic and Political Consequences of the End of 
Communism (New York: Allen Lane, 1996) 102. 
87 The socialist command economy was not a technical solution to the problems of inadequate savings 
and investment, but rather “a device for maximizing and perpetuating the power of the state.” The 
command economy did not produce a totalitarian dictatorship; instead totalitarian control required the 
command economy. Ibid.  103. 
88 Kornai, Socialist System  41-7. 
89 Casal writes, “the State… assumes a charismatic and repressive legitimacy; it adds to the economic 
constraint a non-economic one aims to determine the productive tasks, and a price for labor power 
inferior to its real value. To this end it prohibits the producers from using any regular means of defense. 
All of these are profound traits of a specifically feudal character. Given the actual underdevelopment of      41 
 
impossible task of capitalist industrialization, while denying market relations and 
negating the very freedom that absolute democracy and communism have always 
envisioned.  
Communism amounts to government by decree with the overall objective of 
economic development and social security. By nature authoritarian, socialist regimes 
cultivate a well-defined ruling elite directing, if not altogether benefiting from, 
economy and society. The party controls the state and manages the economy, which 
exists to fulfill a central plan, rather than to satisfy market demand.
90 Once 
consolidated, classical socialism achieves the centralization of administrative and 
economic decision making, characterized by information hoarding, dominance of 
hierarchical dependence, and vertical control over horizontal authority.
91 Bureaucratic 
allocation, instead of market signals, determines the economic parameters of industrial 
output in state-owned enterprises. A hallmark of socialist production, state-owned 
enterprises exhibit “soft budget” constraints unburdened by the incentives of profit-
making.
92 As a result, chronic shortages of resources plague the entire system. In 
contrast to the capitalist economy, marked by demand-constraints, socialist production 
runs into perennial supply constraints, which account for its low level of efficiency.
93  
                                                                                                                                              
this society, its historical origin, and the specific potential of the coercive model of feudalism, the 
uncontrollable propensity toward this model confers to the political state power… of premature 
socialism its preponderant character.” Casals, "Syncretic Society," 239-40. 
90 Skidelsky, Road from Serfdom  96. 
91 Kornai, Socialist System  363. 
92 State-owned enterprises under “soft budget” constraints “are likely to over-expand, thus generating 
excessive demands for particular investment goods that in turn create chronic shortages. The result of 
shortages is that the production process continues, but by the mechanism of “substitutions.” If a firm 
does not find a raw material or spare part it will continue production by substituting it with the next 
available material or part. This inevitably will affect the quality of production. Although in areas of 
extensive growth, production in heavy industries, textiles, etc., may not be affected devastatingly, if 
production is in high technology it will.” See Ivan Szelenyi and Balazs Szelenyi, "Why Socialism 
Failed: Towards a Theory of System Breakdown - Causes of Disintegration of East European State 
Socialism," Theory and Society 23 (1994): 223. 
93 To the extent that the socialist economy relies upon a monetary system, the currency is non-
convertible with the capitalist world system. At the same time, perennial current account deficits rely      42 
 
In summary, social syncretism constitutes the historical manifestation of the 
socialist revolutionary project implanted upon underdeveloped regions. The system 
expresses the contradictions of socialism and underdevelopment: a communist utopia 
predicated upon abundance but uncomfortably confronted by an overwhelming 
privation and economic misery calling for the very capitalist development its ideology 
repudiates.
94 Reconciling these contradictions, the state ascends the commanding 
heights of the economy in a political reversion to feudalism, thus revealing the moral 
bankruptcy of the socialist enterprise and discrediting the Marxist law of history. 
Historical materialism and dialectical history were turned on their heads, while 
repression of liberty justified, in some tragic sense, the end state of democracy.
95  
Market Reforms and Post-socialism 
A communist country describes a polity organized around a Leninist party-
state, in which the organs of government and public administration appear inseparable 
from the organization of the ruling party and politburo. Leninist revolutions produce 
premature socialism in poor countries. The attempt to build socialism in backwards 
societies demands a stage of economic development and industrialization. The result is 
                                                                                                                                              
upon loans financed from the capitalist first world. Most countries of the socialist world belonged to the 
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which served to integrate their economies. 
94 Socialism in practice has meant the transformation of the mode of production from dependent 
capitalism to a social syncretism of incompatible parts: the premature elimination of private property 
and the negation of economics, on the one hand, and the search for capitalist industrialization rooted in 
capitalist exchange relations and private appropriation of the means of production, on the other. 
95 In a cruel twist of history, the construction of a socialist alternative destroyed the collective 
exploitation of individual bourgeois, only to inaugurate the unlimited exercise of collective brutality. 
The alienation of the capitalist production process was replaced by the iron cage of the socialist 
allocative system. The inequalities of capitalist economics were overwhelmed by the iniquities of a 
socialist bureaucratic apparatus. The hidden hand of the market was exchanged for the forceful fist of 
the planned economy. The private ownership of the means of production was merely surpassed by state 
ownership of mass terror. The capitalist creation of unequal wealth was enthusiastically cast aside for 
the collective redistribution of equal penury. Marxists confidently predicted that the administration of 
people under capitalism would make way for the socialist administration of things. Instead, the central 
allocation of things demanded the general domination of people. The bourgeois hegemony of a 
democratic myth was exchanged for an iron curtain concealing a bankrupt ideology. The irony was 
inescapable: a quixotic belief that ends justified the means without considering that the means might 
destroy any hope of ever reaching the ends.      43 
 
a syncretic system, unstable and transitory to the core.
96 Premature socialism 
systematically tampers and deliberately interferes with economic production and 
exchange for political purposes, thus creating disincentives to produce.
 97 Even the 
initial success of anti-capitalist industrialization portends a deeper and eventual crisis 
of premature socialism.  
Expanding on the transitory nature of state socialism, the literature on post-
socialism emphasizes the institutional failings of communism, which constitutes a 
closed system capable of sustaining itself only in the medium term. As long as the 
one-party monopoly remains in place, it is argued, economic restructuring and reforms 
to socialist production appear seemingly impossible.
98 Once the process of reform 
begins in a socialist country, the political and ideological hold of the party begins to 
erode.
99 Much of the literature posits the eventual weakening and demise of the 
                                                 
96 This syncretic society has the functional role of ensuring the capitalist industrialization under socialist 
planning. In the process, ownership of the means of production appears in limbo, lacking a well-defined 
status. In place of private property, premature socialism fails to create the rudimentary foundations for 
the social means of production. Without a firm status of the means of production, this social system can 
only be transitory. It is a passing society. As Casals reasons: 
the role of this syncretism is to ensure the simultaneous functioning and malfunctioning of the 
capitalist economic mechanisms needed for industrialization. The alternative which this regime 
offers to the absence of the private ownership of the means of production is another absence: 
that of the social ownership of these same means. In turn the state maintains the monopoly of 
control (not the ownership) of these means. This results in a vacuum of ownership, expressing 
in an absurd fashion the eminently transitional nature of this society. Casals, "Syncretic 
Society," 235-6. 
97 Ibid.: 248. 
98 Kornai argues,  
the system is incapable of stepping away from its own shadow. No partial alteration of the 
system can produce a lasting breakthrough. For that a change of system is required… Stalinist 
classical socialism is repressive and inefficient, but it constitutes a coherent system. When it 
starts reforming itself, that coherence slackens and its internal contradictions strengthen. In 
spite of generating a whole series of favorable changes, reform is doomed to fail: the socialist 
system is unable to renew itself internally so as to prove viable in the long run. So the time for 
really revolutionary changes does come in the end, eliminating the socialist system and leading 
society toward a capitalist market economy. Kornai, Socialist System  xxv. 
99 In János Kornai’s analysis of socialism, “The socialist system is not capable of renewal that could 
free it of its dysfunctional features while retaining the sole rule of the Communist party and the 
dominance of the state sector.” Ibid.  377.      44 
 
communist, one-party state.
100 Capturing the theme of post-socialism, Victor Nee and 
Peng Lian assert,  
 
The dilemma confronting the few remaining communist rulers is that to 
survive in a world of competing states, they are compelled to initiate and 
sustain market reform. Yet the spread of markets erodes commitment to the 
party and paves the way for regime change.
101  
 
In one conventional view, the deregulation of political, economic, and social life 
results in the loss of monopolistic control of state violence and leads, concomitantly, 
to regime change.
102  
These deterministic assessments dismiss, out of hand, the flexibility of Asian 
communism. As the argument runs, system collapse seems inevitable and unavoidable 
with market reforms; deeper economic transformations demand political reforms. This 
line of reasoning follows a circular logic. As a closed economic and political system, 
socialism has no capacity for reform or renewal; a lack of incentives towards private 
economic actors prevents the creation of economic rationality. According to these 
theorists, for countries defying this logic, e.g. China, their successful transformation to 
embrace a form of market economy effectively relegates them to the realm of 
capitalism, where they can contribute to no larger understanding of the communist 
program of government. This tautology is less than revealing. At worst, the analysis 
falls victim to what political scientists call “selecting on the dependent variable,” or in 
economic parlance “selection bias.”  
                                                 
100 See for example, Eyal, Szelâenyi, and Townsley, Making Capitalism without Capitalists: Class 
Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe.; Stark and Bruszt, Postsocialist 
Pathways.; Zweig, Internationalizing China. ; and Shirk, "China's Economic Reforms." 
101 Victor Nee and Peng Lian, "Sleeping with the Enemy: A Dyanmic Model of Declining Political 
Commitment in State Socialism," Theory and Society 23 (1994): 285. 
102 Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State, 
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (New York: Cambridge UP, 1999).      45 
 
Much of the literature on post-socialist transition betrays a Eurocentric 
worldview that fails to appreciate the adaptive capacity of Asian communism (not to 
mention Cuban resilience). Many self-described transitologists dismiss China and its 
Asia cousins as simply subverted forms of communism— more indicative of 
authoritarian regimes than ideological heirs to Marxist-Leninism. Governments in 
China and Vietnam, for example, are viewed as having given up the main institutions 
of the Leninist party-state and are thus discarded from comparative analysis. A lacuna 
exists in the larger understanding of socialist transformation, particularly in 
communist Asia. While the study of transitions continues to highlight failures and 
defects of the communist program, as well as its limited capacity for reform, little or 
no research explores institutional transformations that contribute to communist 
successes. 
In the case of the People’s Democratic Republic of China, the Soviet Union’s 
ideological competitor as heirs to Marxist-Leninism, the party-state remains 
unchallenged and has pragmatically wrapped itself around the red-flag of Chinese 
nationalism, while betting on economic success to legitimize its monopoly of political 
power. Far from falling by the dustbin of history as a system of government, the 
Chinese form of Marxist-Leninist not only thrives, but has now emerged as America’s 
strategic competitor. Why has Asian communism survived the transition where others 
have failed?  
The demise of communist Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War are 
better viewed as failures of Soviet communism, not the wholesale collapse of the 
socialist enterprise advocated by Marx and Engels and implemented by Lenin. As 
Daniel Bell perceptively observes, “What has been the most fateful fact of the 
twentieth century, a fact overshadowed by communism and fascism, has been the      46 
 
breakup of empire.”
103 1989 inaugurated the dismantling of the Soviet Empire; 1991 
saw its final demise. The Cold War is over. America has won. But communism is not 
lost.  
The term “socialist transformation” better captures the transition faced by all 
communist countries in the early 1990s. The socialist system, “actually existing” or 
otherwise, continues to transform itself under external threats to internal security. In 
Eastern Europe, that transformation led to collapse of the defining features of the 
Leninist party-state, while in East Asia and Cuba, state communism not only survives 
in some places, but actually thrives in others. The success of market mechanisms in 
communist Asia and its failure in Eastern Europe were the result, not the cause, of 
their divergent socialist trajectories. Yet, little of the academic literature focuses on the 
success of one, vis-à-vis the failure of the other.  
In Laos, a communist decline has clearly not transpired; but market reforms 
continue apace. The party-state continues to monopolize political power, while 
overseeing a more market-oriented economy. In the 1990s, annual economic growth 
averaged about 6% of gross domestic product, slowed down only by the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997.
104 The resilience of the party-state in Laos points to the 
limitations of much of the transition literature to explain the adaptability of Asian 
communism. In contrast to the major upheavals that engulfed all of Eastern Europe by 
the early 1990s, governments in Laos, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba experienced 
no such internal threats to their regimes. Although subjected to initial denunciation in 
world opinion, the Chinese communists, too, face few serious challenges to their 
monopoly on state violence. The strength and durability of Leninist party-states, 
                                                 
103 Daniel Bell, "The Resumption of History in the New Century," in The End of Ideology: On the 
Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001), xix-xx. 
104 For details on the Lao macroeconomy, see the Appendix.       47 
 
however questionable their ideological inclinations, cannot be explained away as mere 
exceptions that prove the rule. These political systems deserve to be studied in their 
own right, with due attention to local norms, values, and particular conditions which 
distinguish their socialist trajectories. The rest of this chapter examines the experience 
of Lao communism.  
Peripheral Socialism in the Lao PDR 
  No longer the forward march of history from irrational capitalism to equitable 
communism, socialist revolutions nonetheless provided underdeveloped regions the 
political capital to galvanize social movements in the name of national liberation. 
Democratic failings aside, socialism as a political program to gain power has 
nonetheless made possible the construction of development alternatives.
105 Although 
the abolition of private property under capitalism failed to remove the last vestiges of 
either privation or exploitation, and may have arguably increased both in relative 
terms, socialist revolutions provided a generation of would-be state builders an 
alternative to neo-colonialism. Its wider appeal derived from its perception as an anti-
capitalist and anti-imperialist path to national development and industrialization. In 
fact, communism did not as much constitute a higher stage of economic development, 
but rather an alternative route to modernization.
106 The socialist project of forced 
industrialization was thought to provide underdeveloped nations the means to catch up 
to advanced nations.
107  
                                                 
105 Richard R. Fagen, Carmen Diana Deere, and Jose Luis Coraggio, eds., Transition and Development: 
Problems of Third World Socialism (New York: Monthly Review Press (Center for the Study of the 
Americas), 1986). 
106 Bauman, Socialism  86. notes, “Russia, as well as Africa half a century later, embraced the socialist 
ideology not as an extension and negation of, but as the substitute for, liberalism as the cultural idiom of 
capitalism.” 
107 Skidelsky, Road from Serfdom  102.      48 
 
The Central March towards Socialism 
At the time of communist victories in Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975, the 
Pathet Lao (Lao freedom fighters supported by the communist block) gained full 
control of Laos and established the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) 
under the control of its political wing, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP). 
The Pathet Lao were not die-hard communist, per se, but rather nationalists using the 
propaganda of socialism to mobilize a military force able and willing to fight for its 
cause of national liberation. Under the leadership of its charismatic leader Kaysone 
Phomvihane, the new regime moved to enforce socialism on a predominantly natural 
economy.
108 In line with most modern revolutions, the communist takeover resulted in 
an initial period of centralization.
109 Local governments saw their previous powers 
severely restricted by a political regime instituting centralized planning.  
In the early years, the regime consolidated power and strengthened the war 
economy, based on forced procurement of commodities at administrative prices.
110 
                                                 
108 During the initial phase of the communist revolution in Laos, president Kaysone promoted the 
ideology of a “new socialist man,” enduring and embracing personal sacrifices to build the foundations 
of a communist utopia on the ruins of a predominantly rural society ravaged by war.  
109 Grant Evans, Lao Peasants under Socialism (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1990). He further explains, 
"The communist government [in Laos] has succeeded more than any previous government in sinking 
multistranded organizational roots in the villages and providing a credible nationalist ideology." In 
many ways, the experience in Laos follows the classic social revolution, as outlined by Skocpol, States 
and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Such a revolution 
results in a consolidation of state power– more centralized, bureaucratic, and autonomous– with 
political control over many aspects of socio-economic life. 
110 By socialist standards, the degree of nationalization in Laos ranked relatively low. The small change 
in property relations also reflects the small degree of prior capitalist development and penetration of 
foreign capital. Prior to the communist takeover in 1975, independent peasant production in a 
subsistence, or natural, economy accounted for over 80 percent of the population’s activity. 
Nonetheless, property formally belongs to the state, which then grants user-rights to the general 
populace. In a February 1988 speech, Kaysone clarified the meaning of landownership rights in Laos: 
“Under our new system, the entire land is the common property of the entire society with the state as 
the representative.” Quoted in Grant Evans, "Planning Problems in Peripheral Socialism: The Case of 
Laos," in Laos: Beyond the Revolution, ed. Joseph J. Zasloff and Leonard Unger (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1991), 108.      49 
 
Socialist law and justice described a government by decree.
111 Its bureaucracy asserted 
a monopoly over rice production and introduced an agricultural taxation.
112 By 
severely restricting inter-provincial travel, the regime also demanded self-sufficiency 
of local food production.
113 The state ran the industrial/service sectors and social 
services; controlled investment and production choices/quotas; and determined wages 
and prices for goods and services.
114 Throughout the late 1970s, severe drought 
compounded economic disincentives in rice production, which continued to stagnate. 
In a desperate bid to modernize the agricultural sector, the regime established 
cooperatives in 1978. Still, economic production stagnated, and the country remained 
underdeveloped. Economic hardship threatened political stability and forced the LPRP 
to make pragmatic adjustments. The difficulties of establishing political and 
administrative control over an ethnically disparate and geographically dispersed 
population severely hampered the march towards socialism. An extremely poor 
                                                 
111 In 1983, a Supreme People’s Court was established to handle important cases and legal disputes. 
Corresponding civil and criminal codes followed in 1989 and 1990. Prior to the adoption of the 
country’s constitution in 1991, Socialist justice “was meted out by ‘people’s tribunals’ in accordance 
with directives handed down by the Party. But as regional Party leaders were free to interpret directives 
as they saw fit, no uniform body of law applied across the country. Moreover apart from criminal cases, 
the principal purpose of ‘people’s tribunals’ was to suppress all opposition to the new regime.” Martin 
Stuart-fox, Politics and Reform in the Lao People's Democratic Republic, vol. Working Paper No. 1, 
Political Economy of Development (Williamsburg, VA: Program on Civil Society and Governance, 
College of William & Mary, 2004) 16. In 1983, a Supreme People’s Court was established to hand 
important cases and legal disputes. Corresponding civil and criminal codes followed in 1989 and 1990. 
In the meantime, the capricious nature of Party policy continued to characterize socialist law and justice 
in Laos. Energized by the New Economic Mechanism, the Party promulgated a series of laws aimed at 
building the foundations of a rule of law and, thus, attracting much needed foreign investment.  
112 During this period, sever weather compounded the economic disincentives in rice production, which 
continued to stagnate. In a desperate bid to modernize the agricultural sector, the regime established 
cooperatives in 1978. 
113 Bernard Funck, "Laos: Decentralization and Economic Control," in The Challenge of Reform in 
Indochina, ed. Borje Ljunggren (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard Institute for International Development, 
1993), 128. Accompanying these actions, the regime instituted "a series of jacobin-like measures such 
as the abolition of the monarchy, adoption of Lao as the country's official language, elimination of the 
Laotian honorific mode, simplification of the alphabet (to make it easier to spread to the non-Lao-
speaking ethnic groups), and the abolition of the system of village autonomy." 
114 Patrick Keuleers and Langsy Sibounheuang, "Central-Local Relations in the Lao People's 
Democratic Republic: Historic Overview, Current Situation and Trends," in Central-Local Relations in 
Asia-Pacific: Convergence or Divergence? ed. Mark Turner (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 201.      50 
 
transport and communications infrastructure contributed to weak central authority and 
a strong degree of regional autonomy, which continues to characterize the country’s 
political economy.  
The Local Retreat towards Capitalism 
Like other socialist regimes, the LPRP set out to stabilize postwar 
socioeconomic and political conditions. Building socialism would come later. In Laos, 
however, high communism lasted less than a decade. Peasant resistance and low 
productivity forced the government to cancel its first experiments with cooperatives.
115 
The half-hearted attempt to collectivize agriculture produced dismal results and forced 
the government to re-evaluate its socialist development model. As early as 1979, the 
government began to liberalize the economy, in efforts to raise agricultural output and 
stabilize the economy, whose worsening conditions contributed to the vast exodus of 
the population into Thailand. The regime was bleeding people through a porous 
“bamboo curtain” that allowed the relative ease of escape for those wishing to vote 
with their feet against the regime. From the regime’s victory up until 1980, an 
estimated one-tenth (some 300,000) of the Lao population fled the country. Fearing 
massive flight of a subjected people, the regime came to terms with the impossibility 
of totalitarian control 
116 and worked on cultivating its leading role in Lao society and 
legitimacy based upon economic performance and nationalistic defense of Lao culture. 
The challenge continues to this day. 
Perhaps unique among socialist countries, the Lao PDR began the market 
transition before the core features of the classical socialist system were firmly in place. 
                                                 
115 By creating disincentives for peasants to produce, cooperatives actually reinforced the natural 
economy. See Evans, Lao Peasants under Socialism. 
116 The mass terror of the Kmer Rouge in Cambodia was never a practical possibility in Laos—not so 
much because of the character of the regimes towards their subjects, but because of the porous nature of 
the “bamboo curtain,” which provided the relative ease of escaping communist Laos across the Mekong 
River into Thailand.      51 
 
The Soviet model of socialist planning was unceremoniously abandoned for 
administrative and financial autonomy at the subnational level. Socialist economics 
gave way to market-oriented reforms, although the party doctrine remained 
unchanged. Begun in 1986, The New Economic Mechanism (chin tanakaan mai) 
ushered in a period of sustained economic reforms to address the failures of 
centralized planning.
117 Thereafter, the Lao government has pragmatically shifted the 
country from a command-inspired economy to a market-driven one.
118 
 The regime bowed to internal pressure for more provincial discretion in 
economic affairs. Instead of a centralized bureaucracy under the direction of a 
vanguard party, the Lao party-state comprises, as the following sections reveal, strong 
provinces that resemble more a collection of regional interests than any sense of a 
unified political entity governed by central authority. Even in the early decentralized 
period, economic autonomy did not translate into political autonomy, however. Local 
party leaders still represented the LPRP and had a direct stake in the system’s 
survival.
119 Taking its lead from China and Vietnam, the LPRP "was prepared to 
encourage a free-market economy, but not political liberalization."
120 Economic 
                                                 
117 The New Economic Mechanism was introduced after protracted debate within the party. Eventually, 
Secretary-General (later Party president) Kaysone Phomvihan’s support pushed through the reform 
process. The internal debates followed what Stuart-fox calls the “two-line struggle.”  
118 By the late 1980s, the Lao PDR ruled over a rudimentary planned economy that contained a two-tier 
price system separating market prices from the lower official prices. In 1985-1989, about 90% of wages 
in the public sector came in the form of “salary coupons” redeemable only at government shops. 
Roughly 60% of all official purchases also required coupons honored at government or cooperative 
shops. 
119 As Stuart-Fox asserts,  
Paradoxically, … the high degree of provincial autonomy [prior to 1991] actually reinforced 
the importance of the LPRP as the only centrally structured and unifying organization in the 
country… The broad guidelines of the Party were put into effect throughout the country.  
Those who wielded power in the provinces did so by virtue of the positions they held in the 
Party.  Their loyalty was therefore to the Party, and this in itself acted as an important 
counterbalance to excessive regionalism. Stuart-fox, Buddhist Kingdom, Marxist State: The 
Making of Modern Laos  174.  
120 Stuart-fox, A History of Laos  203.       52 
 
autonomy did not threaten the legitimacy of the Lao government and may have  
strengthened the sustainability of this heterogeneous state.
121 
Nor has the later economic liberalization promoted political pluralism. In the 
1990s, market reforms instigated more centralized control over economic regulation, 
as well as a process of political consolidation. Central-local struggles over the control, 
pace, and scope of economic openness figure as the predominant focus of the party’s 
conflict over the direction of governance reforms.  
Domestic Restructuring and Market Reforms under State Guidance 
Laos exhibits a remarkable political stability, or perhaps inertia.
122 The 
exoticism of Buddhist traditions, the enticing flavors of Lao cuisine, and the relaxed 
atmosphere of the river valleys give an easy impression of an enchanting and 
charming culture, untroubled by the march towards modernity. To the foreigner 
visiting Laos, the capital Vientiane is a sleepy town, with few signs of economic, let 
alone political, life. At the Morning Market (thalaat saow) in central Vientiane, 
vendors linger patiently for the occasional transaction. Stall after stall of hand-made 
silk, cheap Chinese goods, pirated DVDs, and numerous other goods quickly 
overwhelm the infrequent shopper, who can’t help but wonder how anyone makes a 
profit with so little foot traffic. The seeming orderliness and stale atmosphere of 
thalaat saow, the largest of Laos’ markets, reflect an absence of the economic life that 
animates open markets in most developing countries. The chaos, odors, vibrant 
energy, and lively interactions that characterize marchés in West Africa, the bazaars in 
                                                 
121 Rani Jerndal and Jonathan Rigg, "From Buffer State to Crossroads State: Spaces of Human Activity 
and Integration in the Lao PDR" Lao Culture and Society  Grant Evans (ed) (Bangkok: Silkworm, 
1999) 42.  Regional autonomy implied only to the party leadership at the provincial level, not to any 
sense of self-determination.  In their analysis of Laos as an emerging crossroads state, Jerndal et al.  
write, "Local party leaders were permitted latitude in their economic dealings, but were still (central) 
party cadres who owed their positions to the leadership in Vientiane." 
122 Ivarsson, Svensson, and Tonnesson, The Quest for Balance  9.      53 
 
Morocco, or even the mammoth weekend market in Bangkok find little expression in 
Laos. Around Vientiane, stores and restaurants stand mostly empty, and the occasional 
Western backpacker has her pick of internet cafes, coffee shops, and guesthouses. In 
more ways than one, communism symbolizes the death of the market in Laos.  
In the evening, a midnight curfew guarantees the absence of indiscriminate 
frivolity, in efforts to stem the “moral decline” of an adolescent youth much seduced 
by Thai pop-culture. Meanwhile, across the Friendship Bridge in Thailand, the image 
of lazy, indolent, smiling, and passive Lao people—so prevalent in writings on Laos— 
quickly fades. Predominantly of the same ethnic make-up, the Thai-Isan people 
engage in vibrant commercial exchange, under capitalist excesses frequently 
denounced by Lao officials. Although an artificial barrier dividing the Tai-Lao 
peoples, the Mekong River nonetheless reinforces a genuine separation of two world 
views. The subdued eastern flank of the Mekong reflects not an endemic quality of 
Lao traditions, but rather the inescapable logic of communist rule.  
Structure of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party 
Even though few visible signs of the police state are immediately apparent in 
Laos, it would be a mistake to infer a lack of communist control. The party 
deliberately projects few public displays of its power. While the regime lightly touches 
many of the predominately rural population, the desolate streets and languid 
atmosphere of Vientiane hide a strong party apparatus that successfully pacifies and 
disciplines the populace.  
The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party monopolizes political ambition and 
regulates public life.
123 Party operatives penetrate all institutions of government and 
many areas of society. All organizations of the party-state (from the government 
                                                 
123 Initially called the Lao People’s Party, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party was founded on March 
22, 1955, four years after the dissolution of the Indochinese Communist Party. The party adopted its 
current name at the Second Party Congress in 1972.      54 
 
bureaucracy, the mass organization, to the military) implement party directives and 
administer its monopoly of power. Within the public administration, party cells figure 
prominently at all levels of government, from the central ministries to their provincial 
and local branches. Overlapping the government structure, the party organization 
ensures (in the words of late President Kaysone) "the party's all-round absolute and 
direct leadership over all links, from the mapping out of lines and policies, to the 
organization of execution and control."
124 To reinforce its control over the 
countryside, the LPRP developed an array of mass organizations. Current ones include 
the Lao Front for Construction, the Lao Women's Union, the Lao People's 
Revolutionary Youth, and the Lao Federation of trade unions. Still, outside the capital 
Vientiane, the party's strength quickly diminishes. At the village level of this sparsely 
populated country, the party's influence in some areas hardly seems relevant.
125  
The formal structure of the communist party in Laos mirrors the classic Leninist party-
state. See Figure 1. Representing the highest organ of the party, the Political Bureau 
(politburo) currently consists of ten members, chosen by and from the Central 
Committee of the LPRP. Convening every five years, a party congress determines the 
makeup of the Central Committee, thereby installing a new government. Held in 
March 2001, the Seventh Party Congress elected a Central Committee of 53 
members.
126 The latest party congress, slated to take place sometime this spring in 
Laos, expects to bid farewell to President Khamtay Siphadone, making way for 
Choummaly Sayasone, the current head of the military.  
                                                 
124 Evans, Lao Peasants under Socialism  184. 
125 Evans 184. In the mid-1980s, the party's faithful (as measured in membership) numbered only 
45,000 (or 1.3 percent of the population).   
126 Stuart-fox, Politics and Reform in Laos. With of the deaths of two members (Maj-Gen. 
Khamphouang Chanthaphomma, a former governor of Xiang Khuang province, and Lt Gen. Osakhan 
Thammatheva, a member of the Politburo) in November 2002, the committee now stands at 51. Before 
Osakhan’s death, the Politburo comprised 11 members, but his position remains unfilled, at least until 
the Eighth Party Congress scheduled for March 2006.       55 
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Figure 1. Structure of Lao People’s Revolutionary Party 
 
Drawn from the military, the president commands ultimate authority over the 
party and state. He delegates authority to the Cabinet of the Central Committee, along 
with the Standing Member of the Politburo, who preside over day-to-day affairs of the 
party.
127 This body heads a vast party apparatus that reaches down to the village level. 
Although the chart reveals no influence from geography, we know that far from the 
capital, local power remains concentrated in the office of provincial governors, who 
oversee all government activities in their respective regions. As representatives of the 
government and party at the local level, provincial governors enjoy tremendous 
authority. Headed by governors, provincial party committees control and secure the 
remote countryside. Reporting to the party organization in the provinces, districts and 
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some villages have similar party committees managing and monitoring government 
activities in their locale. In communist Laos, horizontal lines of provincial control 
override vertical lines of central authority. For a communist country, Laos remains 
highly decentralized. 
Appointed by the president, governors hold ministerial rank and are 
accountable only to the Central Committee, not to the vertical line ministries under the 
Prime Minister. Currently, all 18 governors, but only some of the 13 ministers, serve 
on the 53-member  Central Committee, enabling their arbitrary use of power at the 
local level. For the most part, governance in Laos is negotiated within the Central 
Committee, and governors have overall responsibility of administering their respective 
provinces. Although circumscribed since constitutional reforms in 1991, provincial 
authorities hold the levers of power outside the capital. Regional ties remain strong, 
and reforms to central-local relations have dominated government deliberations on the 
market transition.  
Drawn from just over one percent of the population, party members number 
about 65,000. Most work as civil servants, leaders in mass organizations, military and 
police personnel.
128 Party membership promotes upward mobility and career 
advancement within the government bureaucracy.
129 To improve the quality of the 
public administration, the LPRP actively encourages educated civil servants to join the 
party as a way to advance their careers.
 130 By invitation only, membership in the 
LPRP usually follows a number of years of initiation. Party cadres selected for special 
                                                 
128 Party members make up just over one percent of the country’s population. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the number of party members drawn from the private sector remains low. Jacquelyn 
Chagnon et al., "Looking Back to See Forward: Consultations About Good Governance and 
Participatory Development in the Lao PDR,"  (Vientiane, Lao PDR: Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency, 2002), 29. 
129 By some estimates, only about 20% of party cadres have strong technical competence.   
130 Chagnon et al., "Good Governance in Laos," 29.      57 
 
administrative and political training at the party’s Tha Ngon Administration School 
usually anticipate an impending government or party promotion. All middle and 
upper-level party cadres receive political indoctrination in Marxist-Leninism. More a 
formality than consequential examination of Marxism-Leninism in the Lao context, 
the training at Tha Ngon nonetheless symbolizes the party’s enduring commitment to 
one-party rule, however suspect its ideological faith in communism. Through this 
ceremonial indoctrination, party cadres begin to identify with the system’s survival.  
The military has a strong showing in the party. In fact, all military personnel 
enjoy party membership.
131 The Ministry of Defense operates separately from the 
government. The Military Committee of the Party controls national defense under the 
overall guidance of the president of the party.
132 The army dominates the highest ranks 
of the Politbureau and Central Committee. Arguably, the army, as in China, will 
guarantee that Laos preserves a one-party state.
133 This alliance plays out behind 
closed doors in deliberations of the Central Committee.
134 As with provincial 
authority, the military enjoys considerable autonomy and economic power.
135 At the 
                                                 
131 The government maintains a standing army of 29,100 soldiers, supplemented by a local militia 
numbering about 100,000. As cited in Clay Wescott, ed., Key Governance Issues in Cambodia, Lao 
PDR, Thailand, and Viet Nam (Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2001) 24. 
132 Stuart-fox, Politics and Reform in Laos  10. 
133 Ibid. Four members of the Politbureau have military credentials: the party and State president 
(Khamtay Siphandone), president of the National Assembly (Samane Viyaketh), State vice-president 
(Choummaly Sayasone), and the prime minister (Bounnyang Vorachit). The rest of the Central 
Committee contain only four military offices.  
134 As Stuart-fox observes, “as both the Party and the Army in Laos are highly secretive organizations, 
neither of which is transparent in the way it arrives at decisions, any discussion of the relationship 
between them must be largely speculative. No channels of communication between the Army and the 
Party are made known to the public.” Ibid.  11. 
135 As Stuart-fox observes, the “influence of the Army on the Party is exercised through a 
quintessentially Lao network of personal relationships that is almost impossible to pin down. It is 
reinforced by the external links the Army fosters, especially with the Vietnamese military. But how 
long the Army’s current level of influence can be maintained remains to be seen.” Ibid.  11-2.      58 
 
local level, for example, military conglomerates have exploited regional monopolies 
of the lucrative logging industry.
136 
  The party-state has yet to relinquish meaningful control over the pace and scale 
of economic, let alone political, restructuring. Its powers are multiple and appear 
unchallenged—from the president's appointment of regional governors and the party’s 
screening of legislative candidates, at the central level, to the concentration of regional 
authority in staff committees and the party’s guidance of village elections, at the local 
level.
137 Power remains centralized in the hands of the LPRP, which faces little 
opposition to its one-party rule. Economic reforms continue to take place under the 
direction and control of a united and strong party. In numerous speeches, President 
Khamtay voices the official line: “the party leadership commands historical events” 
and provides the only guarantee for “national independence and unification, political 
and social stability, and national development.”
138 
The Lao PDR, like all communist states, fuses the party with the government. 
As the central policy-making body of the government, the Cabinet or Council of 
Ministers comprises eighteen members including heads of the ministries, the State 
Bank, and the State Planning Committee. The council carries out party directives 
throughout the vast apparatus of government. Each ministry contains a parallel party 
structure that regulates party policies for that sector.
139 Every ministry has a vice-
president who co-ordinates party activities and ensures that the agency follows party 
                                                 
136 As the largest military conglomerate, Phoudoi comprises 58 companies spanning travel, hotels, 
construction, logging, and other enterprises. Also known as Bolisat Phattana Khet Phoudoi (or 
Development Company of Phoudoi district), Phoudoi operates out of central Laos. See  International 
Monetary Fund, "Lao People's Democratic Republic: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix,"  
(Washington, DC: IMF, 2002), 10. 
137 Under the guidance of the party, village leaders are elected from a screened list of pre-approve 
candidates. The majority of elected village leaders are party members. 
138 Quoted in Ivarsson, Svensson, and Tonnesson, The Quest for Balance  46. 
139 At the National Tourism Authority, for example, 13 of the 40 staff members are party affiliates, who 
meet once a month to set the office's agenda.      59 
 
guidelines. Once a month, this vice-president presides over staff meetings for party 
cells at the ministry’s headquarters in the capital. They discuss the party’s agenda and 
activities in the ministry for the upcoming month. 
With a strong influence over the central government, the party sets the political 
agenda and broad aims of state policies, leaving the public administration and National 
Assembly the responsibility of carrying out its directives. Despite external assistance 
to rationalize the bureaucracy, the politburo continues to bypass the formal structure of 
the public administration in approving all choices for non-elected senior and decision-
making government positions. The party also gives clearance on all candidates put 
forward for elections in the National Assembly. Throughout the public administration, 
at least one of the two highest decision-makers at each government level has party 
affiliation.
140  
Constitutional Reforms and Political Consolidation 
At the Fifth Party Congress in 1991, then party leader Kaysone Phomvihane 
consolidated his grip on power. The newly elected Central Committee abolished the 
Secretariat position, formerly reserved for the party secretary-general. Thereafter, the 
party leader has doubled as the president of Laos. The party congress also 
promulgated the regime’s first constitution, 16 years after taking power.
141 While re-
affirming the LPRP’s leading role in society, the law of the land oddly makes no 
mention of “socialism” or “communism.” Nonetheless, the constitution recognizes the 
                                                 
140 The only exceptions occur in some rural communities. Chagnon et al., "Good Governance in Laos." 
141 For a thorough review of the Lao constitution, including changes to draft forms of the document, see 
Martin Stuart-fox, "The Constitution of the Lao People's Democratic Republic," Review of Socialist 
Law 4 (1991). Manynooch N. Faming, "An Interpretation of the Constitution of the Lao People's 
Democratic Republic," in New Laos, New Challenges, ed. Jacqueline Butler-Diaz (Temple, A.Z.: 
Arizona State University, 1998), provides the actual text of the constitution. See also MacAlister Brown 
and Joseph J. Zasloff, "Government and Politics," in Laos: A Country Study, ed. Andrea Matles Savada 
(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1995).      60 
 
LPRP as the only acceptable political party in the country.
 142 The party’s power and 
functions, however, escape constitutional checks. Although all communist states 
operate behind the cover of democratic and collective leadership, only the Lao PDR 
formally endorses the principle of “democratic centralism” in its constitution.
143   
The restructuring of intra-governmental relations figured prominently in 
constitutional reforms. While establishing the basis for law and order in the country, 
the constitution also redressed the problem of excessive local autonomy by 
recentralizing financial and budgetary prerogatives. Since 1991, economic 
restructuring has resulted in more centralization of administrative control and 
economic regulation. In the process, governors have been gradually disempowered, 
while central ministries have reasserted control over their line ministries.  
Centralization has been slow and incomplete, however. Although the 
constitution recognized a recentralized form of government, change has been resisted 
by provincial governors, who still exert considerable influence over line ministries in 
their jurisdictions.
144  
The constitution also strengthened the legislative body, which received 
enhanced powers to monitor and regulate the activities of the government and 
judiciary. On the recommendation of the prime minister, the National Assembly 
appoints all ministers in the public administration. Each minister, in turn, submits his 
                                                 
142 Article 3 reads: “The people’s national ownership is practices and ensured by the political 
functioning system and led by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party.” 
143 As stated in Article 5, “The National Assembly and all other government organizations are 
established and function according to centralized democratic rules.” Some observers believe that 
principle of democratic centralism fits naturally into Lao political culture, which stresses collective 
decision making and a public display of unity. 
144 For example, fiscal recentralization has meet with resistance from governors reluctant to give up 
their financial autonomy. For the most part, governors still have considerable authority over provincial 
branches of line ministries. The actual influence of governors varies from province to province and 
depends on their political clout and relative position in the Party hierarchy.       61 
 
senior staff for approval by the party leadership.
145 Controlled by and drawn from the 
party apparatus, members of the National Assembly are formally elected for a five-
year term.
146 The Party screens and approves all candidates, and every citizen has a 
legal obligation to vote. In the most recent elections of 2002, 166 candidates ran for 
109 seats, up from 99 spots in 1997. All but one elected official belongs to the 
party.
147  
  The National Assembly meets twice a year, for sessions extending two to three 
weeks, when it formally considers new laws; oversees law enforcement; sets 
budgetary priorities; and presides over the judiciary and law enforcement. However, 
power and autonomy of the legislative body appear limited.
148 In practice, the National 
Assembly rubber stamps policies determined by the party and its administrative 
organs. While the constitution formally inaugurated a country under the rule of law, 
the authority of the President and Politburo ensure the extension of a government by 
decree. Behind the scenes, party resolutions continue to dictate government policies. 
Until recently, central ministries, aided by foreign consultants, drafted most of the 47 
laws promulgated by the National Assembly.
149 Even with these regulations, the rule 
of law has yet to take firm hold in Laos.
150 The adoption of laws without 
                                                 
145 Stuart-fox, Politics and Reform in Laos  9. 
146 The 4
th Legislature assembled in 1997, the 5
th in 2002.  
147 Women make up one-fifth of the total, while the ethnic Lao continue to demonstrate their political 
dominance within the government. Over the last two elections, their representation in the National 
Assembly has grown from two-thirds to a whopping four-fifths of all members. Chagnon et al., "Good 
Governance in Laos," 42. 
148 S. Gopalan, "Report on the Review of the Oversight Process in the Lao National Assembly,"  
(Vientiane, Lao PDR: GPAR, United Nations Development Programme, 2001). 
149 In the coming years, legislative members anticipate more participation into the legislative process, 
where the content of new laws may possibly contain more of their input. Chagnon et al., "Good 
Governance in Laos," 42. 
150 In Stuart-fox’s assessment of the rule of law in Laos, 
Part of the problem is that while an independent judiciary exists in theory, in practice the 
unchanged Article 5 of the 1991 constitution still applies. This enshrines democratic centralism 
as the guiding principle in the functioning of all the organs of the state. This has officially      62 
 
implementation and enforcement achieves little. High-ranking party officials concede 
that few of these laws ever find legal enforcement.
151  
Political Culture and Regional Networks of Patronage 
With no due process before the law, political patronage and corruption 
inevitably took root.
152 A clan patronage system, blurring the lines between party, state 
and army, characterizes the political culture.
153 By many accounts, the march towards 
capitalism has created new space for graft, bribery, kickbacks, and other informal 
methods of influencing public policy. By most accounts, corruption pervades all areas 
of government.
154 The party controls access to power and wealth in Laos. Through 
economic privileges and social mobility within the government, membership confers 
the possibility of rank, prestige, and wealth. In southern Laos, for example, the family 
of President Khamtay Siphadone has amassed a fortune in a construction business that 
enjoys monopolistic control sanctioned by the government. Closely tied to the 
Siphadone clan, the Daoheuang family also figures prominently in southern Laos, 
                                                                                                                                              
defined as ‘working and taking decisions as a committee, while accepting individual 
responsibility, with the lower levels dependent on the higher levels’ (within the organization). 
In fact, democratic centralism is not the mode of functioning of the state, but of the 
organization not mentioned in the Constitution at all – the LPRP. While democratic centralism 
applies, an independent judiciary and rule of law remain chimeras, for its application rests on a 
system of rewards and punishments that are extra-legal. Stuart-fox, Politics and Reform in 
Laos  18. 
151 According to Stuart-fox, laws and regulations are not well known, even by those responsible for 
applying them. Ibid.  17. 
152 Patronage aside, public awareness of laws and regulations appears low outside the urban areas, 
where the dominant language is typically not Lao, the country’s official language. According to some 
district officials, public awareness of the legal system varies widely, with the most lawfully conscious 
areas in direct relation to their level of development assistance in legal education and advocacy. See 
Chagnon et al., "Good Governance in Laos," 44. 
153 Ivarsson, Svensson, and Tonnesson, The Quest for Balance  16. 
154 The president of the National Assembly reportedly received a cash payment of US$ 5 million for his 
approval of a construction project in southern Laos. Meanwhile, political expediency recently required 
that law enforcement officers drop charges of drug trafficking against the son of the Prime Minister. 
Lower in the chain of command, staff secretaries hold access to high ranking officials and frequently 
place a value on available appointment time. And the cash cow of the US$ 1 billion Nam Theun 2 dam 
project figures to provide a bounty for astute and well-connected government officials and party 
leaders.      63 
 
where its conglomerate spans many areas of the local economy, such as trade in 
import/export, forestry sector, and various other businesses. Increasingly, personal ties 
of marriage and patronage have strengthened regional alliances.
155 One of the 
wealthiest families in Laos, the Phomvihanes (of the late president Kaysone) possess 
vast economic holdings throughout the country. One of Kaysone’s sons is currently 
married to one of the Ithavong’s, a family symbolizing wealth and power under the 
Royal Lao government.  
As some argue, Lao culture exhibits an enduring strength of clan patronage, 
which has characterized politics and government since the country’s independence 
from France in 1954.
156 In the Lao form of clientelism, political power and prestige 
derive more from family politics and personal connections than from unbending 
adherence to ideology.
157 Increasing evidence points to a growing overlap between a 
revived business elite and the party leadership.
158 By one estimate, a list of the twelve 
wealthiest families under the Royal Lao government contains six families which also 
                                                 
155 Stuart-fox observes, ““senior Party members soon began to dispense patronage in the traditional Lao 
way, rewarding extended family members and loyal retainers with favors and jobs, for which they were 
often poorly qualified, in order to build a political support base… Ironically, this process of political-
economic elite formation was powerfully assisted by the introduction of the economic reforms of the 
1980s, known as the New Economic Mechanism (NEM).” Stuart-fox, Politics and Reform in Laos  6. 
156 Stuart-fox, "Politics and Patronage in Laos," 3. 
157 In a recent political essay widely influential within the development community, the Lao historian 
Martin Stuart-fox goes so far as to claim that the political culture in Laos has changed very little in 
modern times. According to his observations, the brief phase of high communism only superimposed a 
superficial communist superstructure upon traditional Lao statecraft, characterized by personal 
connections and loyalties in running the affairs of government. In the current transition phase to 
capitalism, this political culture supposedly helps to explain the government’s slow pace of economic 
reforms, the rent-seeking proclivities of its public servants, and limited capacity for organizational 
change within the public administration. Stuart-fox, Politics and Reform in Laos. Initially 
commissioned by the World Bank to examine the political roots of the slow pace of economic reforms, 
this political report has gained traction within the development community in Laos—in part due to its 
stinging indictment of Lao political culture, but mostly because of a lack any contemporary writing of 
the Lao party-state. The World Bank has quietly distanced itself from the report, since its initial public 
airing.  
158 Evans, "Planning Problems in Laos," 125.      64 
 
figure among the wealthiest in contemporary Laos.
159 The small Lao elite cement their 
ties through regional alliances of business networks, family relationships, and party 
patronage.
160 
Legitimacy and Lao Traditions 
A tension exists within the party about the value of Marxist-Leninism. While 
the government adheres to a Leninist party structure, the rhetoric of socialism has 
quietly receded. The only English daily newspaper in Laos, the Vientiane Times, a 
veritable mouthpiece of the regime, systematically expunges any mention of the word 
“socialism” in reference to contemporary Laos.
161 Repeated in many official 
documents, nonetheless, the party’s slogan still extols the virtues of communist 
dictatorship: “The Party leads, the State implements, and the people are the owners.” 
Once defiantly boasting the ideas of “Peace Independence Unity and Socialism,” the 
official emblem of Laos now reads “Peace Independence Democracy Unity 
Prosperity.” Struggling to define its leading role in society, the party, in the meantime, 
boasts its nationalistic credentials as defender of Lao traditions.  
                                                 
159 These families include the Sisombaths, Ithavongs, Bouphas, Souvannavongs, Rasphol, and 
Choulamanys.  Personal communications with U.S. State Department officials.  
160 As Stuart-fox observes, “although the LPRP has taken China and Vietnam as models for economic 
liberalization along with tight political control, the political culture of the Party in Laos, because it is so 
much smaller and because it draws on traditional Lao values and modes of social interaction, depends 
on a far greater extent on personal and family relationships and patronage. This is also the case in 
comparison with other Southeast Asian countries (with the obvious exception of Brunei). The political 
culture of the meuang depended entirely on personal relationships (within the meuang, and between 
lesser and more powerful chao meuang). Politics under the Royal Lao regime was just as much a matter 
of personal family alliances, often reinforced through marriage. And the same is true of the LPDR.”  
Stuart-fox, Politics and Reform in Laos  7. Emphasis in original.  
161 The Vientiane Times is devoid of any negative press about the country, however minor or apolitical. 
Acting as an arm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (although technically within the Ministry of 
Information and Culture), the daily paper is sprinkled with diplomatic niceties of an, at times, awkward 
English and palatable more for diplomatic digestion than public consumption. Incidences of robberies, 
accounts of road accidents, or tales of ethnic insurgencies hardly receive mention in the national 
newspaper, whereas the latest development projects to win approval make for bland front-page 
headlines. The vast majority of Lao anyhow find little leisure in reading Lao texts, much less the 
English Vientiane Times. Unlike the Chinese or Vietnamese, the Lao lack a culture of reading.       65 
 
Since the New Economic Mechanism, the regime has gradually erased the 
edifice of communist traditions. Visible signs of communism eventually disappeared 
from public life. Billboards that once depicted the building of socialist man have given 
way to commercial signs extolling the virtues of multinational consumption. 
Loudspeakers that forcefully blared propaganda calling for personal sacrifice in the 
name of a multi-ethnic state have fallen silent. In its place, public celebrations of 
Theravada Buddhism, long subdued in the early years of communist rule, have 
spearheaded a public revival of Lao traditions. Exploiting these popular festivities, the 
regime has opportunistically embraced all things traditionally Lao— save the 
monarchy.   
Even a one-party state requires legitimacy.
162 Since the collapse of its Soviet 
benefactors, the Lao PDR moved to re-legitimize itself through the public 
endorsement of traditional cultural practices initially suppressed in the excitement of 
the socialist triumph. The failures of communist-inspired development plans forced 
the government to change course. This move occurred in the economic realm,
163 but 
slowly and unavoidably in the cultural sphere as well. As Grants Evans documents, 
state-sponsored “revival of tradition” in Laos today points to a socialist government in 
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search of legitimacy.
164 The usual cultural trappings and symbolic rituals of socialist 
nationalism have lost their relevance. The monotonous procession of socialist parades, 
the cavalcade of used Soviet military, and other symbolic rituals of communist self-
glorification gave way, as Evans documents, to the rich and vibrant traditions of 
Theravada Buddhism.
165  
Instead of building “socialist man,” as Kaysone once romanticized, current 
communist leaders have staked their claim to rule on a revival of Lao traditions, the 
patrimonial defense of a Lao culture, and state-directed economic development. In the 
process, socialist rhetoric has disappeared from public discourse, making way for 
traditional Lao politics based upon clan patronage.
166 All the while, the government 
has moved to consolidate its grip on power.  
Territorial Organization of Laos 
Closely linked to party reforms, the territorial organization of the country has 
undergone a wave of consolidation, driven by the fear of communist collapse. The Lao 
government emphasizes territorial state control for political stability and national 
unity. Prior to the reform era, the Lao PDR comprised five tiers of government: central 
government, provinces, districts, sub-districts (tassengs), and villages. As re-organized 
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in the constitution, the government structure no longer recognizes sub-districts. In 
efforts to control a geographically dispersed countryside, the regimes abolished the 
popular elected People’s Councils at the district and village levels. Since 1991, local 
administrative committees came under the direct control of provincial party 
committees.  
  Outside the central government, the Lao PDR currently organizes local 
administration into three levels: 16 provinces and two regional equivalents (Vientiane 
Prefecture and Xaysomboun Special Zone); 141 districts; and 11, 293 villages.
167 In 
this “unitary, deconcentrated state,” local power resides within the office of provincial 
governors. Territorial re-organization mostly affected district governments, which now 
constitute the basic level of state administration. Where once district administrations 
oversaw 12-15 tassenges, now they monitor up to 200 villages.
168 Through continuing 
reforms to the apparatus of government, the party hopes to make local governments 
more systematically accountable to the center. Only with direct threat to the country’s 
security has the central government exerted direct control over the provinces. For 
example, Xaysomboun Special Zone, long the locus of the ethnic Hmong resistance to 
communist rule, falls under the direct control of the Party Central Committee and the 
supervision of the Ministry of Defense.
169  
The potential for social unrest quickly provokes a strong military presence. 
During the border conflict with Thailand in 1984-1986, the government managed 
Xayabury province directly from Vientiane, and the army controlled various parts of 
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the region. In 1992, security concerns on the borders with Thailand also led to direct 
central government oversight of Hongsa and Xienghone districts in Xayabury 
province. With security issues resolved, these districts reverted back to provincial 
control in 1994.
170 Thereafter, the army set about pacifying the restive countryside. 
Ostensibly aimed at developing the rural areas, the controversial “focal sites” plan 
resettles, sometime forcibly, remote villages (predominantly from the mountainous 
areas) into development clusters (usually in the low-laying regions). Promoted to 
alleviate poverty by bringing poor villagers closer to social services, focal sites also 
help the government control areas with a history of social unrest and hostility to 
communist rule.
171    
Overall, the market transition has instigated a process of territorial 
consolidation, with powers strengthened at the central and provincial levels. Salient 
weaknesses of local autonomy forced the central government to undertake radical 
changes in the spatial organization of its administration, in order to reinforce economic 
liberalization. Since the collapse of state communism in Eastern Europe, the 
government in Laos has strived to create a stronger unitary state, with more oversight 
in all spheres of Lao society. The government fears losing political authority and 
social control to exogenous forces that accompany economic liberalization.  
  The general process of territorial consolidation is far from complete, however. 
In many areas of the country, the tassengs still provide a vital link between district 
administration and outlying villages. As of 2000, 143 out of 912 tassengs continue to 
function, evidence of the difficulties in consolidating control over the scattered 
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countryside.
172 Nonetheless, territorial state control greatly influences the market 
transition of this highly devolved state. 
Peripheral States and the Centralist Ethos of Government Power 
Aiming to integrate the whole of Lao society and project its influence deeper 
into the village level, the government has transformed central-local relations to reflect 
this project of consolidation. The political agenda of centralization traces a 
recognizable trajectory for small and poor countries struggling to create the rudiments 
of a unitary state. In the market transition, Laos resembles more a typical developing 
country, rather than a communist state. As in many developing countries, a weak 
central government in Laos struggles to command allegiance in the face of traditional 
political authority. As further explored in the following two chapters, the Lao 
government actively promotes political, administrative, and economic centralization 
over regionally dispersed and fiscally independent provinces.  
In Laos, this centralization has occurred in direct response to the collapse of 
the Soviet second world. Yet, its bureaucratic rationale also fits a pattern for peripheral 
states. As some argue, states exhibit a characteristic tendency towards 
centralization.
173 State restructuring in Laos reveals on a small scale, but often in 
exaggerated form, many of the difficulties of national development for states carved 
out of imperial ambitions. As with many ex-colonial states, Laos owes its modern 
existence to the historical rivalries of competing centers of power. Like other colonial 
outposts, the political boundaries of the country reflect neither the natural movement 
of peoples, languages, or cultures. As a consequence, the Lao situation resembles what 
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Joel Migdal elsewhere calls “strong societies and weak states.”
174 Attempting to 
transform this dynamic, centrality follows an organizational dynamic common to 
many modernizing states.
175  
Generalizing from his analysis of the Tanzanian experience, David Slater 
observes, “since the peripheral state has often assumed its form through a process of 
decolonization, following an external logic, rather than acting to the internal growth of 
centres of hegemonic power, its capacity for intervening in a process of social 
transformation has been limited.”
176 The centripetal bias of national development thus 
gravitates towards centralization, particularly in efforts to foster a durable sense of 
territorial unity. Slater calls this process the “centralist ethos of state power.”
177 His 
reading of the territorial reorganization in Tanzania also applies to the Lao case: “The 
rationalization and consolidation of state power lay at the roots of the spatial 
restructuring of state power.”
178 While vastly incomplete, centralization characterizes 
the process of state restructuring in Laos as well. 
Although central planning has roundly been discredited as a way to manage an 
economy, evidence suggests that centralization offers an appropriate policy at Laos’ 
level of development.
179 Marketization in Laos had entailed building a national 
economy, where fragmented and regional economies once dominated. In the transition 
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process, a strong central government capable of regulating and enforcing economic 
governance has gradually eroded the traditional autonomy of Lao provincial authority. 
Political and economic restructuring continue to emphasize stability and cautious 
reforms under the guidance of the party-state.  
The Lao PDR demonstrates a willingness to engage in economic reform but 
shows no readiness to relinquish control of political power. As with all remaining 
communist regimes, “an important objective of reforms is to strengthen the credibility 
of the party and state as legitimate forces of modernization.”
180 Democracy is not on 
the agenda— or even radar screen— for political and economic elites in the country. 
Either for fear of reprisals or in expression of genuine doubts, intellectuals and civil 
servants convey little enthusiasm for democracy. Building its legitimacy on social 
stability, the Lao PDR promotes its nationalistic credentials in areas of territorial 
security, defense of Lao traditions, and economic development. All the while, the 
party upholds the social order and its leading role in society.  
Governance is negotiated behind the bamboo curtain of Lao communism, and 
regional allegiances remain strong. A weak center oversees a highly devolved state. 
Power and authority of the government diminishes quickly outside Vientiane. 
Legitimation in the socialist system in Laos derives, in Weberian terms, from a 
mixture of charismatic leadership and Buddhist traditions, while a modern legitimation 
has yet to find legal-rational expression.  
In summary, peripheral socialism in Laos describes a political system blending 
a feudal-like structure characterized by overlapping sovereignties and regional 
economies, with a pre-capitalist economic base attempting to industrialize along 
capitalist lines towards a vague understanding of socialism that, for all intents and 
purposes, even party leaders themselves have abandoned. What remains is an empty 
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shell of a Leninist party structure, an elite party membership that bestows privileges 
and rank, and a rural hinterland reluctant to embrace the nation building project of a 
distant center. Through a network of regional alliances and, increasing, centralization 
of state administration, the party controls and tightly monitors the structure of 
government. By streamlining its administrative functions, centralizing party authority, 
and expanding its control over a remote countryside, structural reforms aim to 
reinvigorate the party, rejuvenate its moral image as defender of Lao society, and thus 
strengthen the state apparatus. In dismantling centralized planning, the Lao PDR 
resorted to the limited role of managing the macroeconomy, which reinforced, as the 
next chapter elaborates, the party’s original goal of centralization.      
73 
Chapter III 
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS AND STATE RESTRUCTURING IN LAOS 
 
Bureaucracy and the Socialist Transformation 
The development of market capitalism goes hand in hand with the 
rationalization of government activities. The transition to capitalism has everywhere 
required the rationalization of a functioning bureaucracy.
181 To this end, public 
administration plays a forceful role in shaping political and economic trajectories of 
transitioning societies. As a communist state, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
(Lao PDR, or Laos) constitutes a polity organized around a Leninist party-state. 
Organs of government and public administration are inseparable from the organization 
of the ruling party and politburo. As in all communist states, the Lao PDR fuses the 
party with the government.
182 Government agencies compose the executive organ of 
this regime.
183 The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) directs the party-state in 
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Laos. Typical for a communist state, this vanguard party thoroughly penetrates the 
government. Of the approximately 65,000 Party members, most serve as government 
functionaries, leaders in mass organizations, or military personnel.
184 This bureaucracy 
houses the power elite of the socialist system.
185 Many civil servants and citizens 
make no distinction between the Party and state, referring to the Party as “pak-lat” (or 
party-state).
186  
In a socialist system, the bureaucratic state apparatus promotes social mobility 
of party members. A weakening of this function may signal a political decline of the 
communist regime. For many scholars of post-socialism, departures from central 
planning reallocate resources and redirect opportunities, while ushering in a process of 
political change.
187 Although these predictions fail to explain developments in Asian 
communism, the focus on government institutions provides a useful method to explore 
a key aspect of the socialist transformation in Laos, public administration. 
To many observers, the Lao bureaucracy is hopelessly weak. For a weak state, 
the Lao PDR nonetheless exhibits a surprising resilience. Its remarkable political 
stability baffles many.
188 After the collapse worldwide of state communism, the Lao 
                                                                                                                                              
national defense and security, and foreign affairs. Government of Lao PDR, "Law on the 
Government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic,"  (National Assembly, 1995). 
184 Chagnon et al., "Good Governance in Laos," 29. Party members make up seven percent of all 
salaried civil servants.  
185 Kornai, Socialist System  41. 
186 Chagnon et al., "Good Governance in Laos," 28. 
187 See Walder, Waning of the Communist State. In this edited volume, the essays examine the ways in 
which departures from the practices of central planning (by altering control over property and 
opportunity) have brought about political change. While many observers concede that economic 
reforms lead to political changes, few agree about how. The authors claim that changes in economic 
institutions bring about a steady political decline of state power, irrespective of the success of economic 
policies. Departures from central planning “set in motion a chain of consequences, usually unintended, 
and if the departures are extensive enough, they eventually alter political institutions and relationships 
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state accelerated economic reforms and restructured its public administration, in 
accommodating market capitalism. Unlike the experience in Eastern Europe, 
economic restructuring in Laos has taken place without the need for a political one. 
Why have economic reforms in the public administration not contributed to erosion of 
central authority of the Lao state? In addressing this question, this chapter analyzes the 
structure of the government, the management of its bureaucracy, and challenges to 
administrative reforms. Several related questions motivate this work: In what ways, 
and to what extent, does the party impinge upon the functioning of government? How 
has the party’s embrace of market capitalism transformed the apparatus of 
government, while still providing an avenue for social mobility of party members? 
What are the changing patterns of authority in government bureaucracies, in relation to 
either its respective line ministries or traditional local authority? What role does the 
international development community play in governance reforms?   
In tackling these questions, the chapter focuses on central-local relations, 
which remain a source of ongoing discussions within the government.
189 I analyze the 
intersections of vertical and horizontal lines of authority, in relation to the organization 
and management of government ministries.
190 This chapter draws heavily from an 
assessment of the Governance and Public Administration Reform (GPAR) program 
between the Lao government and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP).  
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If the market transition in Laos reveals the challenges of a typical developing 
country, as the previous chapter suggests, then the public administration may also 
follow a pattern familiar to peripheral states. The first section sketches an outline of 
what this modernizing project is likely to produce in Laos. The second section briefly 
reviews the history of public administration in Laos prior to constitutional reforms in 
the early 1990s. The next documents the organization of the public administration in 
contemporary Laos. Focusing on inter-governmental relations, the fourth section 
examines the challenges to administrative reforms posed by the march towards market 
capitalism. A study of governance in developing countries cannot escape a discussion 
of corruption, and the fifth section presents its various interpretations in Laos. Efforts 
by some donors to assist government restructuring then come under close scrutiny in 
the fifth section. I draw contrasts between the political realities of administrative 
reforms in Laos, premised on increasing state control, and attempts by some donors to 
push a world-wide agenda of government restructuring, galvanized under the banner 
of “decentralization.” As advanced by the GPAR program in Laos, this misplaced 
agenda reveals that development agencies de-politicize public administrative reforms, 
while—ironically—pushing their own political agenda. Nevertheless, the party, aided 
and abetted by foreign aid, retains a strong hold on the machinery of government and 
still provides a strong avenue of social mobility. The concluding section bears out 
these claims. By pushing their own development agenda in disregard of political 
limitations for reforms, the development community in Laos, implicitly or explicitly, 
contributes to the consolidation of state power.   
Peripheral States and Centralization 
According to James C. Scott, the state-building project strives for 
“simplification, legibility, straight lines, central management, and a synoptic grasp of      77 
 
the ensemble.”
191 Modern states create and expand state spaces that contain both 
legible and concentrated populations. In the move from indirect to direct rule, state 
bureaucrats aim to organize their subjects in various ways to create a unified socio-
economic space that imposes a common language, shared religion, standard 
currencies, consistent legal regulation, and unified systems of trade, transportation, 
and communication.
192 The concentration of state authority derives from this 
immanent drive to impose direct rule.  
From an administrative standpoint, centralization follows an organizational 
logic for modernizing states. In this “centralist ethos of state power,” the bureaucratic 
development of the state provides a powerful impetus for centralization.
193 As Brian 
C. Smith observes, the “rationing, procurement and contractual functions of the state 
tend towards centralization.”
194 Rushing to influence the trajectory of national 
development, Western donor agencies, seduced by a confidence in the transformative 
power of their assistance, often fail to recognize the central bias of state restructuring. 
Their programs, specifically those inspired by the idea of “decentralization,” in many 
instances provide a cloak for increasing central state control.
195 As the rest of the 
chapter hopes to prove, this scenario has reproduced the disconnect between state 
rationality and development agendas in Laos.   
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Communism and Central Planning, Lao Style 
The victory of communism in Laos ushered in an opening period of central 
planning. Since 1975, the government has periodically transformed the structure and 
organization of its public administration. Initially, the government apparatus 
comprised 18 line ministries and central agencies, which housed a total of 99 
departments.
196 Responsibility for legislation ostensibly fell to the Supreme People’s 
Assembly, which in practice rubber-stamped decrees handed down by the Party. As 
the executive arm of the regime, the government only enacts party policy and rarely, if 
ever, acts independently of party directives. The Ministry of Justice held judicial 
authority, along with the powerful Ministry of the Interior. With the consolidation of 
government, responsibilities of the state sector soared, accommodating the socialist 
command economy. The number of ministries increased from 18 to 32, with a total of 
103 departments. These agencies contained roughly 106,000 civil servants.
197  
In terms of personnel, the new regime faced the difficult task of creating a 
socialist bureaucracy to administer its central plans. In the early 1980s, Laos lacked a 
coherent and functioning public administration. Exacerbating these problems, the 
emigration of roughly ten percent of the population, mostly of the educated urban 
class, robbed the country of qualified personnel necessary to modernize the state.
198 
The vast exodus of the educated population, as well as the deportation of many others 
to re-education camps, left a vacuum in the public administration, which had to make 
do with Pathet Lao, party cadres fresh out of the mountains and lacking administrative 
and technical skills to build a functioning bureaucracy. As a consequence, the small 
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pool of qualified public servants assumed countless administrative responsibilities not 
readily delegated to party appointees, whose position owed more to their revolutionary 
allegiance than to technical ability.  
A low-level of competence derives from these historical factors and is also 
linked to clan-patronage. The legendary first leader of the country, Kaysone 
Phomvihane, often decried the lack of qualified personnel in the public administration. 
In his report to the Fourth Party Congress in 1986, he scolded high ranking officials 
who gave "preference only to (their friends) or those from the same locality or race; 
paying attention to only their birth origin, habits and one particular sphere of 
education."
199 
The reality of a small, war-ravaged country placed severe limits on the 
construction of classical socialism modeled after the Soviet Union. Central planning in 
Laos never fully materialized.
200 Outside the capital, party-appointed governors 
controlled access to power and wealth. The weak infrastructure linking the provinces 
to the capital allowed provincial governors to determine party policies at their own 
discretion. In the early years of independence, de facto devolution characterized the 
Lao state. Kaysone once lamented that Laos did not possess a unified, national 
economy.
201 Instead, he conceded that Laos contained a central economy connected 
loosely to local economies.  
As the economy collapsed in the late 1970s, the central government demanded 
self-sufficiency of the provinces. Consequently, the provinces gained a higher degree 
of political and economic autonomy. A siege mentality pervaded the party, and 
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governors severely restricted access to their provinces. Acting as quasi-feudal lords, 
governors monitored the movement of people, finances, and goods in their territories. 
During this period, central government officials and their guests had to obtain 
permission from governors before being allowed to travel anywhere in their 
provinces.
202  
The provinces maintained their own administration and budgets, funded 
through transfers from the state budget and operational surpluses of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) under their jurisdiction. Regional loyalties remain strong, even to 
this day, and provincial governors jealously guard their presumed right to rule over 
their territory. To this day, they hold ministerial rank and remain accountable directly 
to neither central ministers nor the Prime Minister. For the most part, party rank and 
the internal politics of the Central Committee determine the limits of provincial 
authority, rather than the formal organizational lines of the government. Loyalty to the 
party seemingly hold the governors in line. The pretense of strong central authority 
has always been maintained, but only, it would seem, for the sake of appearances and 
party unity.
203 
Anticipating the transformation in other communist governments, the Lao PDR 
instituted a series of economic and political reforms that culminated in the New 
Economic Mechanism (NEM) in 1986.
204 The NEM involved a liberalization of 
internal and external trade, as well as the initial privatization of SOEs, which led to the 
formal devolution of powers to the provinces. De facto devolution became de jure. 
Diminished government resources, the failures of collectivization, and economic 
paralysis conspired to limit the reach of central authority. Provinces were required to 
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be self-sufficient in food production and the general administration of government. In 
time, provincial governors expanded their powers. They controlled expenditures and 
revenues, and few resources were transferred to the distant central government.
205 
State employees outside the capital depended on provincial authorities to pay their 
salaries. As a result, government policies lacked uniform interpretation and execution, 
reflecting the regional interests of governors, instead of national priorities of central 
ministries. These reforms handed the government’s public administration outside the 
capital to provincial authorities. In effect, horizontal lines of control superseded the 
vertical ones.  
In line with these reforms, the government reduced the number of central 
ministries and ministry-equivalent organizations from 32 to 18, eliminating many 
departments and a quarter of its workforce in the process.
206 Many of the remaining 
civil servants were transferred to the local level to help carry out decentralization 
efforts. The provinces functioned as de facto mini-states, conducting their own foreign 
policy and setting fiscal and monetary policies, irrespective of—and sometimes in 
competition with— other provinces. Provincial branches of the state bank acted 
independently of the center, setting their own exchange rates and controlling local 
investment decisions.  
With the NEM, the central government handed more economic control to the 
governors, further entrenching the regional power structure. Power was a zero-sum 
game; devolution strengthened the horizontal lines of local authority at the expense of 
the vertical ones projected from the capital. Provincial governors held complete 
control over the hiring and financing of their personnel, whose political loyalty 
                                                 
205 Sida, "Study of Financial and Administrative Systems in Lao PDR,"  (Vientiane, Lao PDR: Sida, 
2003), 18. 
206 Government of Lao PDR, "Background Paper on Governance," 16. From a high of 106,000, the 
number of civil servants shrank to an estimated 76,000.       82 
 
mattered more than their administrative competence. Central ministries commanded 
no authority over technical services at the subnational levels and faced difficulties 
enforcing national policies and addressing inefficiencies in the delivery of public 
services.
207 
While autonomy of the provinces and the SOEs at first remedied the principal 
failures of the previous command economy, the fragmentation of local prerogatives 
later became an obstacle to the ongoing process of economic reforms. In time, major 
weaknesses of this pure devolution became apparent. As a result of local autonomy, 
financially instability increased, quality of public service delivery further declined, 
regional disparities widened, and physical infrastructure deteriorated for lack of 
maintenance.
208 A shortage of qualified civil servants further exacerbated financial and 
economic mismanagement.  
Public Administration in Contemporary Laos 
Local autonomy in the late 1980s led to sharp regional disparities and 
hampered government attempts at national unity and economic integration. Gradually, 
the central government moved to regain the economic and administrative initiative. 
Since the early 1990s, the central government has made a concerted effort to unify and 
expand administrative controls.  
Promulgated in 1991, the Lao PDR’s first constitution not only established the 
basis for law and order in the country, but also offered a platform to advance the 
party’s agenda of political consolidation and administrative centralization. In addition, 
the document provides the basis for the rational functioning of government 
                                                 
207 As Keuleers and Sibounheuang observe of the period,  
Weaknesses in the implementation of national policies, lack of norms and standards for 
minimum service delivery and shortage of technical and institutional capacities at the centre 
(and at the provincial level) led to the development of inequitable and fragmented service 
delivery systems across the country. Ibid., 206. 
208 Keuleers and Sibounheuang, "Central-Local Relations," 205-7.      83 
 
organizations and adopts the principle of a centralized, deconcentrated state 
organization.
209 The struggle to implement national policies and enforce uniform 
standards throughout the country continues to this day, 15 years laters. In 2003, the 
National Assembly approved amendments to the constitution which reinforced 
centralization policies. The new Article 18 reads, “The state, by law, manages the 
economy according to the market mechanism where the state adjustment system exists 
and pursues the combination of centralized and unified management of the central 
sectors and the allocation of responsibilities to localities.”
210 
Figure 2 below shows the formal structure of the Lao government. Solid lines 
connect direct levels of authority, and dotted lines indicate loose coordination. As the 
head of government, the president defers to the Prime Minister for day-to-day affairs 
of the country.
211 Direct lines of communications link the Prime Minister’s Office to 
that of the President, whose office approves all major decisions on economic and 
social policies. The President also heads the shadow government of the Politburo and 
Central Committee, which possess all meaningful authority over the government and 
the military. The next section examines the links between the Prime Minister’s Office, 
which oversees the central ministries and the vertical lines of control, and the office of 
provincial governors, who control the horizontal lines of authority outside the 
capital.
212   
                                                 
209 Laos may be the only communist country formally to adopt the Leninist principle of democratic 
centralism in its constitution.  
210 Government of Lao PDR, "Consitution of the Lao People's Democratic Republic,"  (1991 (2003)). 
211 According to the amend Constitution (2003), the National Assembly elects the president and the 
prime minister, but only after consultation with, and recommendation of, the president. In reality, the 
party congresses install a new government every five years. See Chapter 2 for more details on the 
structural of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party.  
212 In 1996, the UNDP and the Lao government published a report describing the formal functions of 
the central government and its ministries. The report presents a bland catalogue of government 
responsibilities and, by failing to discuss the role of the party, provides few insights into the real 
functioning of government. See United Nations Development Programme, "Organization of the 
Government of the Lao P.D.R.,"  (Vientiane, Lao PDR: UNDP, Public Administration Reform Project, 
1996).      84 
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Organization of the Prime Minister’s Office 
At the head of the executive branch, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) co-
ordinates government activities and oversees the implementation of government 
policies in the provinces. This office has two parts, the Cabinet of the PMO and 
agencies of national importance. See Figure 3 below. The executive branch remains 
the driving force behind administrative reform.
213 The Prime Minister’s Office defers 
major decision making to the president, who has final authority over government 
policies. The president approves all major policies; the PMO does not act 
independently.
214 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Structure of Prime Minister’s Office, Lao P.D.R. 
 
                                                 
213 As Chagnon et al., "Good Governance in Laos," 31. observe, “Although the National Assembly and 
the judicial courts are developing, the political prowess of the executive branch dominates government 
and is the main force behind [public administration reform].” 
214 Communication between the Prime Minister’s Office and that of the President is constant. Officials 
at the Prime Minister’s Office must seek approval for all important government policies.        86 
 
Within the PMO, the Department of Public Administration and Civil Service 
(DPACS)  plays an important role in governance reforms. The agency handles overall  
human resource development, establishes broad guidelines on the management of civil 
servants, and monitors the implementation of government policies.
215 To underscore 
the importance of organizational reforms, the government recently elevated the role of 
DPACS. The head of this department now has ministerial rank, on par with other 
ministers and provincial governors. In collaboration with the UNDP (under their joint 
Governance and Public Administrative Reforms (GPAR) program), DPACS studies 
the structure of government and recommends organizational reforms. Much of the 
derives from research material and data provided by the GPAR program, reports and 
statistics from its information center at the PMO, and interviews with senior staff and 
international consultants.   
Organization of Government Ministries 
Since the 1990s, the government again centralized its public administration, 
this time not for the march to a dubious socialism, but the road to an uncertain 
capitalism. Henceforth, local administration was to reflect the policies of the central 
government. In line with these reforms, Resolution 21 of the Politburo clarified the 
roles and responsibilities of central ministries in relation to their field offices and local 
authorities. The government re-attached all provincial and district technical staff to 
their respective national ministries. Currently, the Lao government comprises 13 
central ministries and three ministry-equivalent organizations, administering a total of 
                                                 
215 The work of DPACS applies only to technical positions of civil servants. Higher positions in the 
government are positions of authority and, thus, political appointments. The Central Committee for 
Organization and Personnel appoints and manages these positions of leadership. Government of Lao 
PDR, "Background Paper on Governance," 23.      87 
 
164 departments across the country.
216 Figure 4 below shows an organizational chart 
of a typical ministry.  
The Prime Minister, upon recommendation of the President, appoints all 
ministers to their posts. The term of a minister corresponds to that of the government, 
five years. These ministers represent their sectors at the Meeting of the Government, 
held every month in the capital Vientiane. A number of vice-ministers and deputy-
generals of departments support the work of the ministers. Below the vice-presidents, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Structure of Typical Ministry, Lao P.D.R. 
                                                 
216 The thirteen ministries include Foreign Affairs; Agriculture and Forestry; Public Security; Defense; 
Commerce; Communications, Transport, Posts & Construction; Education; Finance; Industry & 
Handicrafts; Information and Culture; Justice; Labor & Social Welfare; and Public Health. The three 
ministry-level organizations include the Committee for Planning and Co-operation; the Bank of the Lao 
PDR; and the Prime Minister’s Office. The number of central ministries is down from 23, following 
public administrative reforms in the early 1990s.       88 
 
 
each ministry contains a number of staff departments, operational divisions, and 
research institutes. Staff departments oversee the management of personnel, planning, 
and budgeting,
217 while operational units have responsibility for implementing the 
organization’s policies. Research institutes co-ordinate with the other departments to 
examine ways to improve the functioning of the ministry.  
Departments in the capital have parallel structures in the field offices. The 
vertical lines of authority run, in principle, from the central ministry to the provinces, 
and finally down to the district offices, which oversee field work in the villages.  
The Enduring Strength of Provincial Authority 
Intersecting the vertical structure of national ministries and departments, 18 
provinces, 141 districts and 11, 293 villages compose the horizontal line of command. 
Blurring the entire organizational structure of government, provincial governors 
control the purse strings outside the capital, effectively managing local staff 
departments and directing policies at the operational departments and research 
institutes. Local power remains concentrated in the office of the governor. Headed by 
governors, provincial party committees run the provinces, bypassing the formal 
organizational lines of vertical ministries. Districts and some villages have similar 
party committees managing and monitoring government activities in their locale. 
Appointed by the President, governors hold ministerial rank and, as Figure 1 shows, 
are accountable only to the Central Committee, not the PMO. Currently, all 18 
governors, but only a few of the 13 ministers, enjoy high rankings in the Central 
Committee.  
                                                 
217 Staffing departments typically include the Office of the Minister, Department of Planning, 
Department of Inspection, and Department of Organization and Personnel. The Office of the Minister 
has the general responsibility of overseeing the ministry and co-ordinates government activities with 
organizations and ministries. Staff issues fall to the Department of Organization and Personnel. See 
Government of Lao PDR, "Background Paper on Governance," 19-21.      89 
 
In principle, local staff report to their central ministries back in the capital but 
are managed by provincial staff departments.
218 In practice, governors exert 
tremendous influence on all government activity in their territory. This curious 
structure places severe limits on administrative reform. In most cases, the higher party 
rank of ministers, vis-à-vis governors, determines the effectiveness of central policies 
on the local level.
219 
Centralizing and Rationalizing the Public Administration  
Departmental and human resources are low. The public sector in Laos remains 
weak, and challenges to its reforms many.
220 Inspite of 15 years of attempts at 
increasing its authority, a weak center oversees a highly devolved state. As evidence 
suggests, the challenges to building and consolidating a modern Lao state lie with 
redressing the entrenched powers of regional interests, who mostly resent central 
incursions in their domain. Power and authority of the government diminishes quickly 
outside Vientiane. Since the early 1990s, the government has moved towards more 
central control of political and economic administration of the country. The party 
recognizes that regional autonomy hampers efforts to rationalize the public 
administration. A rare Politburo guideline on public administration reads, “reforms 
must proceed step by step in careful, firm manner and based on the principles of 
efficiency, effectiveness, rationality and political stability.”
221 Officials concede that a 
                                                 
218 For background on the Lao civil service, see the Appendix. 
219 Relative position within the Central Committee better reveals the extent of power and authority than 
the formal organizational chart of the government. The Minister of Finance, for example, cannot easily 
dictate tax policies to the Governor of Savannakhet, whose rank supersedes his. Yet, this important fact 
of communist government escapes comprehension for many in the development community. 
220 As Joseph J. Zasloff, "Political Constraints on Development in Laos," in Laos: Beyond the 
Revolution, ed. Joseph J. Zasloff and Leonard Unger (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 30. argues, 
“Among the serious problems confronting the nation, however, are mismanagement, poor planning, and 
lack of trained personnel and funds. Most serious is the lack of motivation pervading the entire system, 
affecting workers, peasants, and civil servants.” 
221 Government of Lao PDR, "Summary of the Guidelines Issued by the Politiburo on the 
Implementation of Public Administration Reforms," ed. Politburo (1998).      90 
 
strong center is required to maintain effective control of public revenues, expenditures, 
and instruments of law enforcement. At the 7
th Party Congress in March 2001, 
Khamtay Siphadone, the party leader and state president, reiterated the state’s 
centralization policies: 
 
We will continue to improve the administrative machinery at the central, local 
and grassroots level. State management must be centralised in order for our 
economic reforms to properly benefit the people. Ministries should concentrate 
their efforts on studying and formulating strategic plans, projects, and policies 
for the development of the sectors under their responsibility. They must 
monitor, guide and control each economic sector in accordance with their 
management responsibilities.
222 
 
As long as local power is concentrated at the provincial level, however, efforts to 
establish a unified and functioning public administration will continue to disappoint. 
This section examines the difficulties confronting administrative reforms, dividing the 
issues into three broad and inter-related levels for discussion: institutional, 
organizational, and human resource.   
Tensions in Central-local Relations 
Reform efforts continue to infuse a sense of bureaucratic rationality to the Lao 
government, in pursuit of systematic control and oversight at the central level. Since 
the early 1990s, major reform measures resulted in the following initiatives: 
 
•  guidelines for public administration reform; 
•  Central Committee for Government Organizational Improvement; 
•  National Audit Office (1998); 
•  Prime Minister’s Order of 1999 on Anti-corruption; 
•  restructuring of central agencies and ministries (1999-2000); 
•  transfer of personnel management from the Party to DPACS; 
•  review of civil service wage structure; and 
•  development of performance evaluation for civil servants (2000-2002).
 223  
                                                 
222 Quoted in Phonekeo  Vorakhoun, "Party Congress Re-Elects Khamtay as President," Vientiane 
Times, Mar 16-9 2001.  
223 Chagnon et al., "Good Governance in Laos," 19.      91 
 
The central government established national procedures for budgeting, planning, 
procurement, personnel management, and public service delivery. With donor 
assistance, operational and financial control systems have been introduced, such as the 
Supreme Audit Authority and the State Inspection Authority. Linked to this modern 
drive, a recentralization of economic control has moved in parallel with a 
deconcentration of administrative functions. 
In principle, central ministries have the following responsibilities: 
 
•  strategic planning in setting national goals and priorities;  
•  delivery of public service in their sector; 
•  regulation of state policies and project implementation; 
•  coordination with other government agencies; and 
•  monitoring and evaluation of impact of stated policies.  
 
Even though centralization aimed to remedy the weaknesses of regional autonomy of 
the 1980s, its implementation has so far been slow and incomplete. Challenging the 
authority of central ministries, a tradition of regional autonomy hinders administrative 
rationalization. Because governors and central ministers enjoy equivalent rank, 
organizational lines of responsibility in government are not well articulated. 
Consequently, national policies and regulations are selectively enforced at the local 
level. 
The failure to implement constitutional reforms reveals the strong influence of 
governors and the lack of accountability or legal enforcement of central directives. 
Complicating lines of authority, the Prime Minister’s Instruction 01 on central-local 
relations has done little to clarify roles and responsibility of subnational units of 
government.
224 Dated March 11, 2000, instruction 01 begins as follows: "Advisory 
                                                 
224 During the 6
th party congress of the LPRP in 1996, the government made pronouncements about 
central-local relations, which later evolved into the notorious instruction 01. Government of Lao PDR, 
"Instruction of the Prime Minister Regarding the Policies to Building the Province to Become the 
Strategic Unit, the District as Budget-Planning Unit and the Village as the Implementation Unit, No. 
01/Pm,"  (Prime Minister's Office, 2000).      92 
 
note of the Prime Minister regarding the policies to building the provinces to become 
the strategic unit, the district as the budget-planning unit and the village as the 
implementation unit." The instruction broadly speaks of bringing administration closer 
to the people and making subnational government more responsible for state 
management. The practical meaning of this advisory note varies widely. To officials in 
the capital, the policy recognizes lower units of government as instrumental to 
enacting national policies—in efforts to broaden the reach of the national government. 
By delegating responsibility to various levels of government, the advisory note 
facilitates the implementation of-- as well as disseminating information on-- 
government policies and regulations. Meanwhile, regional authorities view the 
instruction as legitimizing de facto autonomy and fiscal independence. In the 
continuing tensions of central-local relations, both sides have used the decree to 
reinforce their claims to authority.  
In attempting to clarify the aims of government restructuring, in April 2003 the 
government promulgated its first policy on governance reform, which promises 
“empowerment in the government system to the lower or local levels of government 
organisation.”
225 In the paper, the government recognizes that governance reforms 
require a re-definition of central-local relations. Mindful of the ambiguity of the term 
“decentralization,” the government’s position reads as follows:   
 
The redistribution/clarification of responsibilities at the central and local levels 
in matters of development planning, management and implementation- often 
called ‘decentralisation’, in want of a word more appropriate to reflect our 
priorities- represents possibly the most challenging task ahead of us, but one 
that we are nonetheless committed to achieving over the next ten years. We 
know we will have to face many hurdles, the greatest of which is perhaps 
                                                 
225 Government of Lao PDR, "Public Service Reform, People's Participation, Rule of Law and Sound 
Financial Management: A Policy Paper of the Government of Lao PDR on Governance Issues,"  
(Vientiane, Lao PDR: 2003). Emphasis in original.       93 
 
wide-spread lack of capacity to implement such a programme, especially at the 
local level.
226 
 
Irrespective of national policies to the contrary, provincial authorities still exert 
considerable control over line ministries in their jurisdiction. The party has yet to 
strike a balance between the need to centralize control over finances and resources, on 
the one hand, and vested economic and social interests of local power holders, on the 
other. In a continuing re-assertion of regional authority, provincial officials fail to 
enforce national policies and regulations uniformly. Invariably, the balance of power 
still favors regional discretion. The overriding factor appears to be the degree of 
political influence each governor has in the affairs of the state.
227  
Organizational Dysfunctions 
Tensions in central-local relations reflect on-going struggles for centralized 
political administration and financial planning and management. Competing 
government authority in Laos has created organizational dysfunctions and 
compounded bureaucratic inertia. Overlapping jurisdictions among the different 
ministries and within the ministries themselves contribute to varying interpretation and 
implementation of government policies. These difficulties reflect the general 
inefficiency of the public administration and poor co-ordination within the 
government. Inertia, lack of transparency, and waste of limited resources pervade 
much of the system. Complicating these reforms, a lack of resources hampers 
government operations and public service delivery. The distribution of resources 
rarely satisfies organizational needs, and agencies seldom share information or 
coordinate activities.  
                                                 
226 Government of Lao PDR, "Background Paper on Governance," 8. Emphasis added.  
227 Such influence also has bearings on budgetary allocations, which are negotiated on an iterative 
process between the central government and provinces. For a larger discussion of fiscal reforms, see 
Chapter 6.       94 
 
Even though field staff of government ministries fall under the central, vertical 
command, they report instead to provincial officials. Governors have final authority 
over government affairs in their territory. They control personnel issues and salary of 
all civil servants in their territory. This situation has long characterized public 
administration in Laos. As a result, local staff usually obey their provincial 
paymasters, who control recruitment and promotions. This discretionary power results 
in hiring practices based on criteria other than merit, reinforcing the highly politicized 
nature of public administration and the fusion between party and state.  In many 
instances, political considerations lead to interferences in recruitment, promotion, and 
transfer of civil servants. In this environment, conflicts of interests and nepotism 
heighten regional differences, strengthen ties of clan-patronage, and reinforce 
traditional forms of political authority.  
Human Resource Constraints 
At the individual level, hiring practices frequently hinge on factors other than 
competence. The politicized bureaucracy looks down upon individual initiative, 
discouraging the limited, talented, and otherwise over-stretched staff. In this 
environment, technical competence matters less than political loyalty. The office 
culture frowns upon the open expression of personal frustration, promotes collective 
consensus in decision making, and often marginalizes competent staff, most of whom 
lack proper party credentials. Taking unorthodox positions in government carries 
many political risks. Junior civil servants rarely make independent decisions without 
higher authority. Outspoken officials have occasionally been arrested on trumped up 
charges of corruption or ideological deviation.
228 As a result, most civil servants 
possess little motivation to work effectively at their jobs.  
                                                 
228 Savada, ed., Lao Country Study  228.      95 
 
Because of the politicized nature of the public administration, decision making 
remains concentrated in the hands of high government officials, who determine 
policies with little or no input from subordinates. Below positions of department 
chiefs, few civil servants have input into ministerial decision making at all.
229 In every 
level of government (president, prime minister, ministers, provincial governors, and 
district chiefs), at least one of the two highest decision-makers has party affiliation.
230 
Although government officials claim that the low number of qualified staff prevents a 
stronger delegation of decision making and responsibility to lower-ranking civil 
servants, a lack of party affiliation for many also precludes a delegation of authority. 
As a result, time-consuming procedures overwhelm a top-heavy bureaucracy.
231 Party 
membership promotes social mobility, and only party members have the prospect of 
moving to positions of power and influence. Hence, the government actively 
encourages educated civil servants to join the party, as a way to advance their 
careers.
232  
  Compounding bureaucratic inertia, insufficient training and education make 
many in the public administration unqualified for their assigned jobs. By all accounts, 
the quality of government personnel remains low. As the government readily 
acknowledges, many public employees lack basic skills in general office management, 
computer literacy, and project implementation.
233 As a consequence, the state 
                                                 
229 Government of Lao PDR, "Background Paper on Governance," 26. 
230 Chagnon et al., "Good Governance in Laos," 29. Some exceptions occur at remote, rural 
communities.   
231 As Evans notes of the system at the early 1990s, “Centralization was undoubtedly partly a result of 
these same scarcities, in that only a very small number of people were sufficiently competent to make 
the decisions demanded by the system. Information therefore flowed towards the pinnacle of the 
bureaucracy, where it became ensnared in bottlenecks. The structure therefore had a self-reinforcing 
(self-defeating) logic.” Evans, "Planning Problems in Laos," 98. 
232 Chagnon et al., "Good Governance in Laos," 29. 
233 Government of Lao PDR, "Background Paper on Governance."      96 
 
bureaucracy suffers from a simultaneous over-supply and under-supply of personnel. 
Political appointees overwhelm a weak public administration bereft of skilled 
personnel. Inefficient and redundant staff overloads administrative and support 
services.
234  Meanwhile, important positions in technical areas, such as research and 
analysis, monitoring and evaluation, and general project implementation, go unfilled. 
Although donors in Laos have long complained of the need for government officials to 
delegate more authority to subordinates, the political nature of the bureaucracy 
mitigates against such diffusion of power. To the extent that the party permeates the 
public administration, real power remains the privilege of politically astute 
government officials. 
Making matters worse, low remuneration provides little incentive for public 
officials to work towards stated missions of their organizations. Adjusted for inflation, the 
purchasing power of salaries has changed little through the years.
235 Substandard pay 
fuels organizational lethargy, mitigated seemingly only by the prospect of informal pay. 
Aware of the difficulties of maintaining a competent and motivated staff, the government 
informally supplements the base salary with a variety of fringe benefits and subsidies.
236 
The top grade recognizes positions of high leadership. Management positions also come 
                                                 
234 Ibid., 28. By 2005, the government aims to reduce the total workforce by 5 %, eliminating the vast 
number of non-performing and unqualified staff. 
235 Salaries for government officials have yet to match their purchasing power prior to the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. According to government figures, in 1999 salaries were increased by 25%, still well 
below the rate of inflation. In 2002, wages of civil servants were increased by 30%, followed by another 
18% increase in 2003. Even with these increments, average salaries fall below the purchasing power of 
pre-1997 figures. See Ibid., 34. For background on the state of the civil service, see the Appendix.  
236 In the salary structure, government officials fall into one of five grades, depending on their level of 
education. Each grade has 15 levels, corresponding to a matching salary, small allowances, and possible 
benefits. Government of Lao PDR, "Decree on Civil Service of the Lao PDR (Decree 82/Pm),"  (Public 
Administration and Civil Service Authority, Prime Minister's Office, 2003), articles 5-7. Workers rise 
one level for every two years of service. Allowances, and in some instances overtime payments, depend 
on position or professional category. See Government of Lao PDR, "Background Paper on 
Governance," 33. Heads of state, from the President, Prime Minister, and President of the National 
Assembly fall into category one, while the principle of a primary school has category ten.       97 
 
with special allowances, divided into one of ten categories.
237 A benefits package, 
depending on the position, may comprise housing, gasoline, free schooling for children, 
cell phones, cars, and bikes.
238 Other incentives come from controlling technical resources 
of a department, such as office equipment, computers, and various other hardware. The 
government also appears to assist public officials on a case-by-case basis.
239 Rules and 
regulations governing these benefits remain opaque and outside any formal review.  
Even with government benefits, salaries fall short of meeting basic subsistence 
needs. Most civil servants rarely survive on government work alone and rely on 
secondary income and family support networks to sustain a livelihood. When asked 
about state of government remuneration, a senior Lao official lamented: 
 
My family does not live on my salary. We regard it as a bonus, every 3 to 6 
months, not as a means of support. That is why everyone has extra-curricular 
jobs – farming, family businesses, renting houses, trade, sideline consultancy 
work. Otherwise, we would starve. All of this extra work eats away time and 
energy from our government work, compromising quality and sometimes good 
work habits.
240   
 
In a popular refrain first echoed in many former socialist countries, Lao officials 
cynically lament the dismal state of wages, “We pretend to work, and the government 
pretends to pay us.”
241  
                                                 
237 Government of Lao PDR, "Decree on the Administrative Positions of Civil Servants in the Lao PDR 
(173/Pm),"  (Prime Minister's Office, 1993). These allowances supplement the base salary to provide an 
additional incentive to officials in prioritized areas. For example, the Ministry of Public Health provides 
a bonus of 18,200 kip per month for medical personnel working with patients, and 15,200 kip for those 
working with chemicals. Teachers and medical workers in remote areas of the country receive hardship 
allowances up to 25% of base salary. See Government of Lao PDR, "Decree on the Administrative 
Positions of Civil Servants in the Lao PDR (173/Pm).", Government of Lao PDR, "Background Paper 
on Governance," 33-4.  
238 In-kind benefits for high ranking officials can be extensive. The office of provincial governors, for 
example, comes with free housing and cars.   
239 Officials with non-working spouses or school-age children can receive social benefits from the 
government. Allowances for maternity and parental leave are also granted. See Government of Lao 
PDR, "Background Paper on Governance," 34. 
240 Quoted in Chagnon et al., "Good Governance in Laos," 55. 
241 Ibid.      98 
 
In summary, the public administration in Laos confronts many daunting 
challenges. See Figure 5 for a general overview. At the institutional level, vaguely 
defined and weakly enforced laws have intensified competing centers of power and 
authority. While the constitution formally recognizes a consolidated state structure, its 
legal enforcement has met with resistance from powerful governors. The Lao 
government has not adequately addressed the underlying tensions of central-local 
relations, rooted in the enduring strength of the provinces. Nor has it clarified the roles 
and responsibilities of the intersecting lines of authority. Although a bit exaggerated, 
the following UNDP statement captures the discretionary and negotiated nature of 
governance in Laos: the Lao state’s “basic regulatory frameworks continue to evolve 
virtually from day to day.”
242  
At the organizational level, competing staff loyalties hamper operational 
efficiencies. Irrespective of national decrees to the contrary, government staff in at the 
local level (outside central ministries in the capital) fall under the sway of provincial  
governors. This situation blurs the lines of authority within government agencies and 
among the different levels of government. In terms of personnel management, central 
ministries set hiring standards, but provincial authorities recruit and hire local staff at 
their own discretion. In the absence of clear and unified rules, civil service 
management at the local level remains highly opaque and ad-hoc. Government hiring 
practices, rules of employment transfers, and promotional incentives follow no formal 
regulations. In the public administration, political loyalties still matter more than 
technical competence. Throughout, a lack of transparency pervades the system, 
obscuring the arbitrary use of government authority.
                                                 
242 United Nations Development Program, National Human Development Report, Lao PDR 2001: 
Advancing Rural Development (Vientiane, Lao PDR: UNDP, 2002) 100.      99 
 
Organizational Dysfunctions 
 
•  Local officials accountable to central ministries but managed by governors. 
•  Government activities complicated by overlapping jurisdictions within 
ministries and among levels of government. 
•  Bureaucratic lethargy marked by red tap, inefficiency, lack of 
transparency, and waste.  
•  Staff loyalty divided and biased towards provincial authority. 
•  Recruitment and promotions based on factors other than merit.  
•  Politicized public administration beholden to party apparatus.  
•  Lack of tradition of inter-agency information sharing inherited from 
communist legacy of secrecy.  
Human Resource Constraints 
 
•  Many civil servants unqualified in positions. 
•  Information hoarded and provided as a service.  
•  Low morale, inefficiency, and petty corruption attributed to insufficient 
remuneration.  
•  Individual initiative frowned up.  
•  Decision making authority deferred to high ranking officials, usually 
party members. 
•  Social mobility promoted by party membership. 
•  Corruption endemic.  
Tensions in Central-local Relations 
 
•  Public administration recentralized in constitution. 
•  Central authority challenged by legacy of regional autonomy. 
•  Provinces autonomous and fiscally independent. 
•  Equivalent rank given to both central ministers and governors.  
•  Governors held accountable to only to Central Committee.  
•  Role of party not well articulated in government structure.  
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Many government staff lack motivation to perform their jobs efficiently. Some 
observers mistakenly attribute the bureaucratic lethargy to Lao culture alone.
243 
Rather, the inability or unwillingness of lowly-paid public servants to take initiative 
may have other non-cultural roots, as this section demonstrates.  
Socialist practices continue to disrupt the rational development of the public 
administration in various ways. First, the communist victory in 1975 initiated a vast 
exodus of the urban, educated middleclass, emptying out the public administration in 
the process. This void in the civil service persists, compounded by hiring practices that 
hinge on factors other than competence. Second, the socialist regime generates a 
culture of fear and secrecy not only in society at large, but also in its machinery of 
government.
244 Monitoring and sanctioning civil servants, disciplinary committees 
                                                 
243 As Savada, ed., Lao Country Study  228, comments: 
The lethargy of the bureaucracy is understandable within the cultural context of Laos. As a 
peasant society at the lower end of the modernization scale, the LPDR has adopted few of the 
work routines associated with modern administration. Foreign aid administrators frequently 
point out that Laotian administrators have difficulty creating patterns or precedents, or learning 
from experience. Laotians are known for their light-hearted, easy-going manner. This bo pinh 
nyang (never mind--don't worry about it) attitude is reflected in the languid pace of 
administration. Official corruption has also been acknowledged as problematic.  
Stuart-fox, Politics and Reform in Laos, makes a similar claim about Lao political culture in the public 
administration. He argues that the public administration in Laos suffers from a political culture unique 
to Laos. He essentializes this political culture, which he wrongly views as having persisted through the 
various upheavals in modern Laos, from civil war to the socialist experiment in collectivization. He 
argues, “With no tradition of bureaucratic administration (as in China and Vietnam), politics in Laos 
reverted to networks of influence and patronage (of the kind elsewhere described as clientelism, or 
crony politics)” (Ibid., 6). In this primordial culture, personal ties and patronage contribute to opaque 
rules of decision-making, inexorably linked to the practice of the meuang system of traditional Lao 
statecraft. However, Stuart-fox contradicts himself. Elsewhere in his political report, he writes, “Non-
transparent, top-down decision making and obsessive secrecy were two elements that the Pathet Lao 
brought with them into government” (Ibid.). 
244 The socialist bureaucracy relies on consensus, and individual initiative is frowned upon. As Dakin 
observes of the Lao National Tourism Authority, "At the office, anyone who openly expressed a 
personal opinion usually stood alone. He had little chance of receiving support from colleagues, even 
those he considered close friends." Supposedly, it is the Lao character not to protest. He describes the 
Lao culture in the following manner: 
Laos was certainly a laid-back place to live. But beneath the surface, a deeply ingrained culture 
of fear pervaded government and society. To comment publicly on an issue, to express an 
opinion, or even to acknowledge a problem that everyone already knew existed, was to be 
avoided at all cost. People may have been relaxed, but they were afraid. And not only of the 
big guys who flew down Lan Xang Avenue behind the tinted windows of their Mercedes      101 
 
(present in every government agency) enforce party discipline and contribute to this 
culture of fear. Third, the logic of towing the party line and “patriotic” discipline 
discourage independent thinking, and the principle of democratic centralism pervades 
government agencies. Group-think prevails, and individual initiative is frowned up in 
the name of socialist solidarity and consensus building. Fourth, the secretive nature of 
the party creates a culture of information hoarding mirrored in its public 
administration, where information sharing occurs reluctantly and on a need to know 
basis. To this day, government departments jealously guard their information from 
each other, in defense of turf and scarce resources. Fifth, dismal remuneration 
contributes to worker apathy and provides little incentive to work efficiently. In real 
terms, salaries have changed little over the past two decades. These characteristics of 
the socialist bureaucracy continue to stifle individual initiative, creativity, and 
independent decision making within the machinery of government. Civil servants 
express an aversion to take risks, actively evade responsibility for decisions, or hoard 
information to their perceived advantage. These various factors, rather than the biased 
images of lazy Lao people, shape the depressing state of civil service. 
Corruption in Laos 
Coupled with a communist legacy of secrecy and fear, low remuneration 
contributes to low morale, little motivation to work efficiently, a reluctance to assume 
responsibility, and an overall lethargy of a lumbering bureaucracy. In this organizational 
environment, corruption quickly takes root.   
                                                                                                                                              
sedans, sirens blaring. Or of the policemen who blew their whistles and stopped traffic to le the 
officials through. They were also afraid of one another. There was little trust, and even among 
friends it was too risky to speak your mind. Brett Dakin, Another Quiet American: Stories of 
Life in Laos (Bangkok: Asia Books, 2003) 203-4.      102 
 
Corruption and the Lao Bureaucracy 
By all accounts, corruption is widespread in the Lao government.
245  Without a 
doubt the most non-transparent of all informal methods of surviving on the public dole, 
corruption and graft enable civil servants to stretch the purchasing power of government 
positions. According to many observers, corruption occurs up and down the entire chain 
of command.
246 In its reforms to embrace market capitalism, the government has 
promoted a “centralized, de-concentrated” state with more delegation of authority. This 
administrative restructuring may have actually increased the scope of corruption. As the 
sphere of decision making increases, so do the opportunities for graft and wrongdoing. 
During the 1990s, public graft and corruption mostly likely increased, particularly at the 
provincial and district levels.
247 In many instances, government officials charge for work 
that would otherwise fall under the rubric of public service. Civil servants have limited 
resources, and departmental data, however incomplete, translates into a commodity not 
freely released without tangible benefits. In a public administration bereft of basic 
resources, information and access of any kind constitute privileges jealously guarded and 
reluctantly provided. For Lao civil servants, granting access to information is not a public 
service—as this researcher has frustratingly learned— but a private incentive.  
                                                 
245 Sida, "Financial and Administrative Systems," 4.. There also seems to be a concerted effort by the 
government to address the problem. For a good overview of the challenges posed by corruption in Laos, 
see Patrick Keuleers, "Corruption in the Lao PDR: Underlying Causes and Key Issues for 
Consideration,"  (Bangkok: UNDP, Bangkok SURF, 2002). 
246 The president of the National Assembly recently reportedly received a cash payment of US$ 5 
million for his approval of a construction project in southern Laos. Meanwhile, political expediency 
recently required that law enforcement officers drop charges of drug trafficking against the son of the 
Prime Minister. Lower in the chain of command, staff secretaries hold access to high ranking officials 
and frequently place a value on available appointment time. And the cash cow of the US$ 1 billion Nam 
Theun 2 dam project figures to provide a bounty for astute and well-connected government officials and 
party leaders. 
247 Sida, "Country Analysis, Laos PDR,"  (Vientiane, Lao PDR: Embassy of Sweden, Vientiane, 2004).      103 
 
Corrupting Development 
As with bureaucratic lethargy, the roots of corruption and bureaucratic inertia 
have been attributed to the Lao culture alone, when more recent administrative 
deformities of communism, in fact, better account for organizational dysfunctions.
248 
In a recent political essay widely influential within the development community in 
Vientiane, Martin Stuart-fox, an observer of contemporary Laos, attributes the lack of 
transparency in the political economic system to the exigencies of rent seeking.
249 
According to his observations, the brief phase of high communism only superimposed 
a superficial communist superstructure upon traditional Lao statecraft, characterized 
by personal connections and loyalties in running the affairs of government. In the 
current transition to capitalism, this political culture supposedly helps to explain the 
government’s slow pace of economic reforms, the rent-seeking proclivities of its 
public servants, and limited capacity for organizational change within the public 
administration. This rather deterministic assessment dismisses, out of hand, the 
upheavals brought about by a generation of civil war, the failed road to socialism, as 
well as the current march towards market capitalism. Although revolutions bring about 
                                                 
248 Keuleers, "Corruption in Laos," 4., makes the following claim: 
the Lao society is characterized by soft social controls, inspired by tolerance, compassion, 
respect for authority and seniority, loyalty to kinships and confrontation-avoidance. In 
addition, the Lao have a reputation of being most interested in living their lives with minimal 
disruption and interference by the government. All this directly impacts on the society’s 
opinion on and action against corrupt behavior and the government’s ability to take harsh 
decisions in this area. 
249 Stuart-fox, Politics and Reform in Laos. Initially commissioned by the World Bank to examine the 
political roots of the slow pace of economic reforms, this political report has gained traction within the 
development community in Laos—in part due to its stinging indictment of Lao political culture, but 
mostly because of a lack any contemporary writing on the Lao party-state. The World Bank has quietly 
distanced itself from the report, since its initial public airing. On corruption, Stuart-fox writes, 
Party officials, and non-Party government bureaucrats too, use their political and 
administrative power to economic advantage in order to supplement salaries eroded by 
inflation. Otherwise there would be little attraction in becoming a Party member or an 
underpaid civil servant. So reform has been piecemeal and reluctant, undertaken only under 
considerable pressure from international institutions, notably the IMF. Stuart-fox, Politics and 
Reform in Laos  26.      104 
 
major upheavals while also retaining a semblance of social continuity, this 
deterministic assessment fails to appreciate the level of social disruption brought about 
by the communist regime. In his portrayal of a primordial, political Lao culture, 
Stuart-fox concludes that even increases in public expenditures and higher salaries for 
civil servants would fail to mitigate the culture of corruption.
250 As the previous 
section documents, a variety of factors overdetermine the bureaucratic culture in 
Laos—linked to the secretive nature of the party-state and on-going struggles for 
scarce public resources.  
Although Stuart-fox’s analysis provides some useful insight into the 
functioning of the Lao government, his recourse to a primordial political culture sheds 
few light on contemporary problems facing governance in Laos. This political paper 
has gained wide currency within the development community, due less to the veracity 
of its claims than the Western biases and prejudices it reinforces. By depicting 
corruption as a disease of the local culture, Western observers and international 
development professionals, in general, continue to “orientalize” non-western cultures 
amenable to the enduring civilizing mission of the Christian world.
251 Capturing the 
                                                 
250 He argues,  
It is doubtful, however, whether corruption could be eliminated in Laos just by offering very 
much greater salaries. This is because Lao political culture rests on acquiring resources for 
patronage (as well as for family consumption), and a quid pro quo for the exercise of political 
influence is expected.” Stuart-fox, Politics and Reform in Laos  27. 
251 See Edward W. Said, Orientalism, 1st Vintage Books ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). 
Orientalism describes a system of knowledge about the Orient. In this important- but rather inaccessible 
text- Said criticizes Western scholarship on the Orient, or the Arab Middle East, and unpacks the 
complex of power and knowledge in the discourse of orientialism. Based on liberal human,  
professional science of Orientalism, whose function in nineteenth-century culture had been the 
restoration to Europe of a lost portion of humanity, but which had become in the twentieth 
century both an instrument of policy and, more important, a code by which Europe could 
interpret both itself and the Orient itself. Said, Orientalism  253. 
Elsewhere, he writes, 
all cultures impose corrections upon raw reality, changing it from free-floating objects into 
units of knowledge. The problem is not that conversion takes place. It is perfectly natural for 
the human mind to resist the assault on it of untreated strangeness; therefore cultures have 
always been inclined to impose complete transformations on other cultures, receiving these      105 
 
predisposition of the development community in Laos, a cultural anthropologists 
makes the general observation, “The conventional framework of development studies 
and reports invokes essentially the same stereotypes of lazy, inefficient, or corrupt 
natives who must be brought to self-sufficiency that one encounters in nineteenth 
century discourse.”
252  
While the civilizing mission of a self-righteous development industry continues 
unabated, the Western discourse on corruption egregiously ignores the ways in which the 
development community is itself complicit, if not altogether culpable, in organizational 
dysfunctions of the public administration in Laos. The development industry has 
contributed to this informal public economy in a variety of ways. At the macroeconomic 
level, the Lao government commits itself to monetary stability by controlling public 
expenditures. Formal budgetary constraints force the government to provide 
undocumented benefits to employees. These budgetary constraints derive, in part, from 
the structural adjustment programs imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as 
expressed in Article IV of the Articles of Agreement with the Lao government. By 
demanding decreased public expenditure, the IMF magnifies the distorted structure of the 
pay scale. Its insistence on fiscal austerity pushes the true value of public wages and 
salaries to the informal sector. As noted above, reports on public expenditures only 
consider cash payments for salaries and wages, while the complete benefits package and 
other informal ways to sustain a living go unrecorded.  
At the project level, many development organizations set up project management 
units that oversee the life cycle of development projects. Headed by a Lao national, these 
units typically hire local staff and foreign consultants on a yearly basis and often select 
                                                                                                                                              
other cultures not as they are but as, for the benefit of the receiver, they out to be. Said, 
Orientalism  67. 
252 Michael Herzfeld, Anthropology: Theoretical Practice in Culture and Society (New York: 
Blackwell, 2001) 162.      106 
 
public contracts on criteria other than competitive bidding. This seemingly progressive 
idea to infuse a sense of local ownership and responsibility to development projects, in 
fact, creates new avenues for corruption and kickbacks. Further, donor organizations 
distort incentives in the public administration by siphoning off the best and the brightest 
of the small pool of educated Lao. Wages for Lao staff employed by donor aid agencies 
frequently range 10 to 50 times higher than comparable government positions.
253 To the 
extent that donors compete for limited human resources, the Lao government struggles to 
attract competent staff on a shoe string budget. The large disparity between public and 
private remuneration creates incentives for various informal practices. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that Lao nationals working on foreign-funded development projects 
pay a percentage of their monthly salary to government staff overseeing the project.
254 
While the wage gap presents many challenges to civil service wage reform, many donors 
in Laos refuse to interfere with government salary matters, thus perpetuating a corrupt 
development environment.
255 
As one of the most highly aid-dependent countries, Laos relies heavily on foreign 
assistance. Donors play a prominent role in Laos. Over 50 development agencies 
currently work in Laos, supporting the operations of practically every government 
                                                 
253 Security guards at aid agencies make roughly US$ 140 per month, receptionists about US$ 300, 
administrative officers US$ 425. Management positions come with higher wages, in the range of US$ 
500 per month. As noted above, the typically Lao civil servant has a dismal monthly (base) salary in the 
range of US$ 25-50. This data derives from completed questionnaires submitted by seven aid agencies 
working in Laos. See Stephen Rozario, "Report on Staff Compensation and Benefits Survey,"  
(Vientiane, Lao PDR: World Vision, 2000). 
254 Keuleers, "Corruption in Laos," 14. 
255 For their part, donors have failed to press their Lao counterparts on the issue of salaries and incentive 
structures, claiming that “the matter is the government’s business, not ours.” As quoted in Chagnon et 
al., "Good Governance in Laos," 56. Many in the donor community argue that subsidizing salaries in 
the context of a particular project would create challenges to sustainable development, eventually 
generate donor-government disunity, and institutionalize inequitable patterns of incentive that usually 
favor the educated and better off.       107 
 
ministry.
256 In the recent past, annual foreign aid has accounted for about one-fifth of the 
country's gross domestic product and constitutes the principle source of finance for public 
investment.
257  Commenting on Lao socialism, a Lao scholar observes, “The system, 
which derives so heavily from foreign sources, tends to reduce motivation, create 
discontent, and erode the legitimacy of the government” 
258 More generally, the agenda of 
“capacity building” promoted by the international aid community may actually have the 
opposite, perverse effect of  “capacity sucking out.”
259 By crowding out, rather than 
complementing weak state capacity, development agencies stifle reforms of local 
institutions.
260 Worse still, some donors in Laos seem to promote their own political 
agenda of government restructuring and consequently fail to understand, let a lone 
address, the underlying problems and constraints of public sector reforms. The next 
section scrutinizes the failings of the GPAR program.  
The Push for Decentralization of Development in Laos 
As the preceding sections demonstrate, the challenges of government 
restructuring derive from the difficulties of redressing the highly devolved and 
                                                 
256 The Lao government relies heavily on foreign aid to mitigate its current account deficit. A 
flourishing "development industry" has taken root in Laos, with the approval of the government but 
strict control over the kinds of interventions allowed.  
257 At current prices, the country's gross domestic product equals $1.45 billion, with a current account 
deficit of $121 million. Lao People' Democratic Republic, Foreign Aid Report 1999-2000  (Vientiane, 
Lao PDR: State Planning Committee, 2001) and World Bank, World Development Indicators 
(Downloaded Sep 2001, http://www.worldbank.org). 
258 Zasloff, "Political Constraints on Development in Laos," 31. He alludes to Laos’ dependence on the 
communist block, but his comments could easily apply to the current situation of aid-dependency.  
259 Quoted in Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2004) 103. 
260 In Fukuyama’s assessment, 
The international community, including the vast numbers of NGOs that are an intimate part of 
it, comes so richly endowed and full of capabilities that it tends to crowd out rather than 
complement the extremely weak state capacities of the targeted countries. This means that 
while government functions are performed, indigenous capacity does not increase, and the 
countries in question are likely to revert to their former situations once the international 
community loses interest or moves on to the next crisis area. Ibid.      108 
 
politicized nature of the Lao state. Powerful pockets of entrenched, regional interests 
resist change. The persistence of strong regional power helps to explain the weak 
nature of the Lao government. While blurring central-local relations, vague lines of 
authority have frustrated donors, which have either tried to influence their trajectory or 
work outside them altogether. Clear decision making still remains ad-hoc, but Lao 
officials emphasize the importance of centralization and the need to make local 
authority more systematically accountable to the centre.   
The transition entails a comprehensive overhaul and modernization of the Lao 
government. Administrative reforms in Laos, as elsewhere, seek to find the most 
appropriate size and scope of units of government with both the capacity to handle 
specific tasks and the resources to address public objectives. This process has 
necessitated administrative centralization.  
Against these political realties, some donors in Laos mistakenly promote an 
agenda of decentralization. One might expect pro-market institutions to be at the 
vanguard of this representation of Laos. In their reports and in discussion with their 
economists, however, the international financial institutions (i.e., the World Bank, 
IMF, and Asia Development Bank) seldom refer to the idea of “decentralization” in 
their depiction of economic and structural reforms in Laos, except perhaps in relation 
to microeconomic behavior and direct economic production. Rather, the agenda of 
decentralization is found elsewhere.  
G.P.A.R. and a Rights-based Approach to Development 
Organizations less identified with markets and de-regulation have taken the 
lead on decentralization. The UNDP, supported by the Swedish government and its 
bilateral development arm Sida (Swedish International Development Agency), has 
been the strongest advocate of smaller central government and more local autonomy in 
Laos. As a way to increase local accountability and decision making, these agencies,      109 
 
along with others in the donor community in Laos, continue to infuse more 
participatory practices into their portfolio of programs. They assume that more local 
accountability can increase the performance of development interventions. These 
participatory approaches favor a devolution of power, or democracy through a 
representative form of government characterized by universal suffrage. Because the 
latter will remain improbable into the near future for Laos, donors have logically opted 
for decentralization, however defined.   
The Swedish government aid agency, Sida, emphasizes a rights-based 
approach to its policies on international development, and the general idea of 
decentralization broadly complements this agenda. In an important statement on its 
role in promoting democratic governance, Sida declares: 
 
Support for decentralisation should rest on the extent to which government 
devolves sufficient powers and funds to decentralised bodies, the existence of 
mechanisms are truly accountability and transparency at the local level, and 
whether participatory mechanisms are truly legitimised by the people.
261 Its 
development cooperation in Laos aims to reduce poverty in the context of 
fostering the foundations of democracy and respect for human rights.
262  
 
                                                 
261 See Sida, "Digging Deeper, Four Reports on Democratic Governance in International Cooperation, 
Summary,"  (Stockholm: Department for Democracy and Social Development, Division for Democratic 
Governance, 2003). 
262 In their Country Strategy for Development Cooperation, the Swedish government promotes pro-poor 
and environmentally friendly policies. As this document states, “Sida will apply a rights-based approach 
perspective in all its analyses, preparatory work and interventions.” Specific to Laos, this strategy aims 
to strengthen conditions for democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights. See Government of 
Sweden, "Country Strategy for Development Cooperation, Laos, January 2004 - December 2008," ed. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003). This country strategy governs Sweden’s programs of development 
cooperation in Laos. It provides guidelines on the sorts of programs open to Swedish support, how they 
should be implemented, and the results to be achieved. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs jointly prepares 
this report with the regional Asia Department of Sida and the Swedish Embassy in Vientiane—all 
ostensibly in close cooperation with representatives of the Lao government. 
In another recent statement of its policies, Sida declares “Development cooperation will promote and be 
characterized by respect for human rights, democracy and good governance, gender equality, the 
sustainable use of natural resources and protection of the environment, economic growth and social 
development and social security.” See Government of Sweden, "Development Responsibility: Sweden's 
Policy for Global Development,"  (Government Bill 2002/03: 122, 2003). This document presents the 
government’s direction for Swedish development cooperation.      110 
 
The framework guiding United Nations development cooperation in Laos also 
incorporates this agenda. In Laos, the United Nations Development Assistance 
Framework provides the guiding principles for UN cooperation. According to this 
document, all UN organizations in Laos should “apply human rights-based approach 
to development that 
 
•  focuses on people as holders of rights, as well as duties and responsibilities; 
•  adopts the fundamental principles of non-discrimination; 
•  prioritizes needs of the most disadvantaged and vulnerable; 
•  reiterates that development is a human right; and 
•  targets the goal of poverty eradication by addressing structural inequalities that 
cause poverty.”
263  
 
The rights-based approach boasts worthy goals of popular participation, 
accountability, transparency, the rule of law, gender equality, and human rights.  
Inspired by this agenda, the Governance and Public Administration Reform 
(GPAR) program since its inception in 1997, has strived to increase decentralization, 
in an overall push to improve democratic governance.
264 The goals of GPAR have 
                                                 
263 See Lao PDR United Nations Country Team, United Nations Development Assistance Framework 
(Undaf): 2002-2006, for the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Vientiane, Lao PDR: United Nations, 
2002). 
Specific to the UNDP, its Practice Note on Public Administration clearly demostrates the organization’s 
commitment to a rights-based approach. The document states, “UNDP’s focus on public administration 
is not only informed by, but also derives from its commitment to a rights-based approach to 
development.” The document goes on to read,  
one area in which a human rights approach has been successful is in Public Expenditure 
Management. This has been approached from a purely technocratic perspective that 
emphasises moderation and control of finances. However, a ‘rights’ perspective, which focuses 
on an individual’s claim on the state, can advance a pro-poor and gender-equitable outcomes in 
the budget process and support accountability to the citizen. 
See United Nations Development Programme, "Practice Note-- Public Administration Reform,"  (New 
York: UNDP, 2003). 
264 The overall strategy of the program advances the idea of “good governance” in promoting efficiency, 
economy, and transparency in government operations. For an early formulation of the GPAR strategy, 
see Governance and Public Administration Reform, "Governance and Public Administration Reform in 
the Lao PDR: Programme Concept and Overall Strategy,"  (Vientiane, Lao PDR: UNDP (GPAR), 
Prime Minister's Office (Department of Public Administration), 1997).      111 
 
wide-ranging political implications.
265 Sida-funded and UNDP-managed, the program 
assists the Lao government in streamlining its public administration. Governance 
reports by both organizations point to the government’s policies on decentralization as 
the rationale for pushing the idea of decentralization. In a biased reading of the 
government’s notorious Instruction 01, for example, donors have seized on the 
policy’s language to create their own discursive myths about “decentralization.” The 
entire six-page advisory note fails to mention the word "decentralization" and simply 
reiterates government policies, beginning in the early 1990s, to recentralize and 
deconcentrate central authority.
266  
In various donor documents and reports on government reform, however, 
Instruction 01 appears as a decree, and the restructured role of subnational 
governments automatically counts as “decentralization.” In the development discourse 
of government reform, this instruction gradually crystallized into the “decentralization 
decree.” The unquestioned acceptance of the idea of “decentralization” underlies much 
of inter-governmental reforms in Laos.
 Taking an anti-centralist stance, many donor 
reports either ignore the government’s push to centralize or quickly dismiss it as a 
transitory period to much needed decentralization.  
                                                 
265 Strategies for GPAR include:  
1.  redefinition of the role and culture of government; 
2.  re-structuring and rationalizing of the machinery of government; 
3.  reform of the authority and accountability structures; 
4.  strengthened decision making and decision support structure; 
5.  redeployment of civil service and reduction of public expenditures; 
6.  innovation and adaptation of modern management. Ibid., 7. 
266 One of the main objectives reads:  
to transmit the Party's policies and state plans implementing units at the local level and 
elaborate the policies into guidelines for the formulation of plans and budgets, starting from 
the grassroots level, by promoting the population and family units who process the production 
as well as their services, enabling them to increasingly participate in the initiating and 
implementation of planning and budgeting process. Government of Lao PDR, "Instruction 01," 
part I.      112 
 
On the government side, the discourse on state restructuring is strikingly 
different, matching the centralizing attempts reviewed earlier. Lao officials understand 
administrative reforms broadly in technocratic terms, usually capacity training. 
Governance in Laos evolves through secret, internal negotiations within the Central 
Committee. Larger issues of organizational restructuring remain clouded by the black 
box of Party policies and generally insulated from Western influence. Nonetheless, 
available evidence (from public documents and decrees on local administration and 
reform) reveal that the government has made no recent effort to relinquish central 
authority, either at the organizational or institutional level. From my analysis and in 
discussion with keen observers, I conclude that the party does not support 
decentralization, much to the chagrin of donors. The government rarely uses the word 
“decentralization,” which anyhow has a decidedly political meaning in the Lao 
language,
267 and continually re-iterates its commitment to building a “centralized, 
deconcentrated state.”
268 As late as 2001, many high ranking party and government 
officials either failed to grasp the meaning of decentralization or else believed the term 
inappropriate to describe the intent of government reforms.
269  
                                                 
267 In the Lao language, “decentralization” translates into “diffusion of power” (kan kayai omnaat). The 
word’s political intent is inescapable, conjuring up imagines of glasnost, political pluralism, and regime 
change. Hence, government documents steer clear of the loaded term and generally avoid any 
discussion of direct political change in the reform process.  
268 Decentralization, if it can be said to exist in an already highly fragmented Laos, as a policy of the 
state, finds expression only as a deconcentration of state authority that has delegated to subnational 
units the responsibility of implementing centrally determined policies. 
269 Attended by vice-ministers and vice-deputies of government ministries and provincial governments, 
a UNDP sponsored governance workshop on April 23-24, 2001, discovered that most participants did 
not fully understand the meaning of decentralization. Once educated, many believed that the term failed 
to capture the appropriate intent of government reforms, which do not aim to give more power to local 
units of government. Governance and Public Administration Reform, "Report of the National 
Workshop on Towards Better Governance (23-24 April 2001),"  (Vientiane, Lao PDR: GPAR, 
Department of Public Administration, Prime Minister's Office, 2001), 9.       113 
 
Development Myth of Decentralization  
A policy of decentralization in Laos is a development myth. Nonetheless, the 
discourse on decentralization has real effects in the development industry— for the 
very reason that international advisors read the same reports and regurgitate the same 
rhetoric with shocking regularity. The important re-centralizing trend of government 
policies clearly stand at odds with the broader goals of GPAR. Project documents 
reflect a fundamental misreading, if not willful neglect, of political realities and 
current inter-governmental relations. The country’s historically weak center and de 
facto devolution suggest that a development agenda of decentralization makes little 
sense. In promoting such an agenda, donors fail to consider local norms, values, and 
circumstances which inform the transition to market capitalism.
270 Despite the vast 
amount of resources brought to bear, public sector reforms in the Asia Pacific region 
continue to fall short of expectations, in part due to the failure of donors to 
acknowledge the highly political nature of civil service reforms.
271 Moreover, the 
development community also reveals a professional bias for an administrative science 
applicable from one development setting to another.
272 In this light, the distortion of 
                                                 
270 Fukuyama makes a sensible argument that development projects aimed at improving administrative 
capacity needs to emphasize the local context:  
The local character of the knowledge to design a wide variety of good administrative practices 
suggests that administrative capacity isn’t actually transferred from one society to another by 
developed-world administrators sitting around lecturing their less-developed counterparts 
about how things are done in their country or in a mythical “Denmark.” General knowledge of 
foreign administrative practices need to be combined with a deep understanding of local 
constraints, opportunities, habits, norms, and conditions. This means that administrative and 
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government restructuring in Laos is not only comprehensible but also perhaps 
necessary. Naturally then, how these agencies frame problems reflects the sort of 
solutions they can proffer.
273 The complex reality of government structuring reduces 
to a simple process of “decentralization.” Such oversimplification leads to a host of 
generic solutions that deny politics and the social context within which government 
restructuring actually takes place.  
Expectations of the development community about government restructuring 
have met with harsh realities. In authoritarian Laos, GPAR has produced mixed 
results. To the dismay of many Lao officials, for example, consultants on one pilot 
governance project have spent months fastidiously devising, apparently with little 
input from government staff, hundreds of job descriptions for the provincial office of 
Luang Prabang. Many Lao officials fail to see the usefulness of this exercise, which 
anyway fails to translate the job descriptions into the Lao language. Attempts to refine 
job descriptions of Lao civil servants and match work skills with staffing requirements 
have met with little support from provincial authorities and created friction between 
them and the project team. This seemingly technocratic exercise in administrative 
engineering ran up against the political limitations of standardizing job descriptions 
across the vertical line ministries.  
                                                                                                                                              
(Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Univ. Press, 1975), who argues that development organizations have a 
corporate interest in their own survival. In this development culture, development professionals tend to 
reduce uncertainties while pushing money.  
273 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic 
Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) 69-70. Here, Ferguson claims 
that development agencies are in the business of selling these standardized packages of projects. 
Similarly, Escobar argues that  
Development proceeded by creating "abnormalities"… which it would later treat and reform.  
Approaches that could have had positive effects in terms of easing material constraints 
became, linked to this type of rationality, instruments of power and control… these refined 
specifications did not seek so much to illuminate possible solutions as to give "problems" a 
visible reality amenable to particular treatments” Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: 
The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History 
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Many GPAR consultants have ignored politics in the vain embrace of 
administrative science and appear genuinely baffled as to why their efforts to infuse a 
sense of rationality into something as routine as job descriptions would encounter 
local opposition. However, the exercise of creating job descriptions was untaken in the 
context of the myth of decentralization and failed to consider, let alone take into 
account, government restructuring towards centralized state control. While the project 
team continued to draw up job descriptions for staff members of line ministries, it 
failed to grasp the extent to which personnel matters fall under the office of the 
governor. Subordinate local officials have limited political authority to implement 
many of the program’s sensible plans to streamline government bureaucracy. Anyhow, 
some observers question the government’s commitment to implementing a 
standardized job classification system.
274 Writing in a different context, James 
Ferguson makes a critique of development organizations that resonates with 
administrative reforms in Laos: "Where "bureaucracy" is seen as a problem, it is not a 
political matter, but the unfortunate result of poor organization or lack of training. 
Organizational reform and education are the remedies."
275 When questioned about the 
political implications of their work, some development professionals in Laos respond 
credulously that politics is not their concern and that they only do “development” – as 
if somehow the allocation of their limited resources escapes public scrutiny or 
organizational conflict. 
Development as the Anti-politics Machine 
The proper execution of GPAR’s plans would have required a political 
realignment of inter-governmental relations, which exceeds the scope of any 
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development project. Hidden behind the bamboo curtain of Lao communism, on-going 
negotiations of central-local relations remain insulated from Western influence. In a 
country where social and economic expressions have political significance, technical 
and managerial solutions to bureaucratic reforms cannot readily be divorced from the 
political context conditioning the scope of local autonomy and openness.  
Development organizations, as colorfully described by Ferguson, evoke 
images of an anti-politics machine, cheerfully uninformed of the larger political 
fallouts of their resource allocations while pushing, paradoxically, their own political 
agenda.
276 In surveying the development scene in Lesotho, he comments on the 
apparent contradictions in the role of development agencies: 
 
On the one hand, they are supposed to bring about "social change," sometimes 
of a dramatic and far-reaching sort. At the same time, they are not supposed to 
"get involved in politics" – and in fact have a strong de-politicizing function. 
But any real effort at "social change" cannot help but have powerful political 
implications, which a "development project" is constitutionally unfit to deal 
with. To do what it is set up to do (bring about socio-economic 
transformations), a "development" project must attempt what it is set up not to 
be able to do (involve itself in political struggles).
277 
 
The applicability to GPAR is striking. Without the support of local officials and armed 
only with the standard development package of technical assistance, the GPAR project 
has failed to catalyze democratic transformations in a bureaucratic structure 
entrenched with the principle of democratic centralism. For all its technical expertise, 
the program had no ability to bring about a political-economic transformation which 
decentralization actually entails. Justifiably, the central government expressed little 
interest in following this logic of decentralization to its post-communist conclusions. It 
was in the process of wrestling control back from the provinces.  
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Party policies set by the Central Committee determine the limits of government 
reform, rather than the resources of donor-driven projects that ignore politics in the 
vain embrace of administrative science. To the shock of GPAR consultants, 
development decentralization seems only to produce disorganization and disarray. 
Progress has been slow in reaching program objectives, due in no small part to a 
mismatch of goals and objectives between donors and the government. While donors 
focus more on institutional and organization changes with the aim of improving “good 
governance” (i.e. local participation in decision making; public accountability; internal 
transparency; and overall predictability, efficiency, and rationalization of public 
administration), government officials view administrative reforms almost entirely at 
the individual, human resource level.  
Whereas GPAR strives to produce real changes in terms of the structure and 
function of government, Lao officials see the program in terms of organizational 
outputs, increased capacity, and staff training. For Lao officials, public administrative 
reform aims primarily to improve organizational performance, as well as the 
efficiency and effectiveness of government operations
278 The Lao government 
generally views governance reforms from the perspective of organizational 
management and personnel, not of institutional design amenable to deeper structural 
(and hence political) reform. In the area of human resources, reforms strive to improve 
quality of staffing through training, study-tours, and incentives for educational 
advancement. In efforts to streamline ministerial functions, administrative reforms 
continue to redefine the missions, roles, and organizational structure of the various 
agencies. Lao officials generally seem satisfied with the capacity building component 
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of GPAR and have expressed a desire for continued support of training activities, 
technical assistance, and office equipment in the next phase of the program.
279  
Not content with these successes, an appraisal of the GPAR phase II project 
calls for a more systematic application of the rights-based approach as a prerequisite 
of future Sida funding.
280 The report urges, “Due to the prevailing restrictions on 
democracy and human rights in Laos, international donors have a huge responsibility 
in fostering these values in any way they can.”
281 In assessing the first phase of the 
project, evaluators (at the urging of Sida officials) advise for an even stronger 
application of a rights-based approach: “In order for [donor] support to be effective, 
there is a need to give more attention to central values such as tolerance, transparency, 
representation, and accountability.”
282 
                                                 
279 Evaluators of GPAR Luang Prabang observe, 
There is a general content among stakeholders in Luang Prabang with the first phase of GPAR. 
Training activities, job descriptions and technical equipment are most often referred to as 
successful activities/inputs… There is a widespread belief and hope among Lao stakeholders 
that the second phase of the project will be a continuation of the first phase. Very few show an 
understanding of the need for important reforms of the public administration system, beyond 
mere training and capacity building. Thus, local commitment and ownership of the reforms 
envisaged in the GPAR programmes is not yet deep enough… [T]here is high expectations that 
additional technical and material support will be an important part of phase II. Thus, there is a 
need for further awareness raising among stakeholders on the new, more reformist, aspects of 
phase II.  
See Einar Braathen and Par Skold, "The Right Road to Reform? Appraisal of Gpar Luang Prabang 
Phase Ii (Draft Report),"  (Oslo and Goteborg: Swedish International Development Agency, 2004), 26. 
280 According to evaluators, the pilot GPAR project in Luang Prabang lacks a strong emphasis on a 
rights-based approach to development:  
The project as it is designed is not a technically adequate solution to the development problem 
at hand, as it is more aimed at the symptoms than the real problem. To a large extent, central 
issues for good governance like transparency, accountability, integrity, anti-corruption and 
meaningful participation are avoided. This has resulted in a project characterised by a very 
technical approach. Ibid., 25. 
281 Ibid., 19. 
282 Ibid. Elsewhere, they write,  
A major problem is the lack of a rights based approach to development… The project as it is 
designed is not a technically adequate solution to the development problem at hand, as it is 
more aimed at the symptoms than the real problems. To a large extent, central issues for good 
governance like transparency, accountability, integrity, anti-corruption and meaningful      119 
 
Under Sida guidance, the second phase of the GPAR project, approved in late 
2005, figures to intensify the misguided drive for democratic decentralization. Going 
forward, GPAR not only seeks to assist local administration but also strives to 
engender real political restructuring. Behind the technocratic language of 
implementing “a better governance system, featuring accountability, predictability, 
sound public sector management, optimized service delivery, participation and 
transparency, in order to provide cost-effective services to the public,”
283 lays a human 
rights agenda in Laos.  
The GPAR program presents a microcosm of the development industry in 
Laos. Agencies like Sida and the UNDP attempt to influence development policies and 
hold leverage with their purse strings but can provide, for the most part, only technical 
and managerial solutions to intensely political issues. At the same time, these agencies 
have inserted themselves into a political process, with the very intent of promoting 
their cherished causes, irrespective of the political environment circumscribing any 
push towards a de-centering of power. The irony is inescapable. While attempting to 
de-politicize governance reforms justified by administrative science, donors advance 
their own political agenda in blissful ignorance of the development setting. So long as 
donors pursue their own political objectives in righteous disregard of political realities, 
development failures will continue to characterize the industry.  
The neglect of politics in the program’s implementation gives way to a 
normative image of a rationalized government. See Figure A12 in Appendix. In this 
odd organizational chart, developed by GPAR and cited frequently in development 
reports, the National Assembly mistakenly stands above the president of the party and 
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state, while the dual structure of authority reveals few insights into how the party 
impedes the functioning of government. The chart presents a normative vision of a 
Lao government restrained by the rule of law, rather than accurately linking the party 
to the state. In its links, the judiciary and executive branches report to the National 
Assembly, when in fact the legislative body acts as a rubber stamp of government 
policies dictated by the party and, by and large, the president. This widely-referenced 
flowchart reflects a general misreading of Lao politics within the development 
community, compounding an already complex process of development assistance.  
To be sure, a clearer picture of the relationship between the party and its 
apparatus of government would contribute substantially to a better understanding of 
the public administration, enhancing donor coordination and implementation of 
development programs. For the most part, the development community neglects, or 
fails to consider, the role of the party in the management of the Lao government. 
Development reports and project documents generally say very little about politics in 
Laos, except for an occasional paragraph in the background section. This ignorance 
manifests itself in many development projects which set up parallel structures of 
authority that attempt to by-pass the government altogether.
284 
As this chapter demonstrates, the Lao government aims to rein in the power of 
provincial authority; the party has shown no commitment to the idea of devolution. In 
fact, the country is de facto already highly devolved! As the reality of this project of 
nation building grows more credible, the rhetoric heard from development 
professionals is that, well, effective decentralization in Laos can only work once 
strong centralization takes place. Come again? This mystifying logic says less about 
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the reality of administrative reforms and more abut the agenda of particular 
development organizations. Instead of aiming for conceptual clarity as a basis for 
effective action, some donors promote obscure ideals while reasserting institutional 
norms and recycling development policies. The emphasis on rights-based development 
will, in all likelihood, contribute to familiar development failures in Laos. But 
governance reforms disappoint for other reasons. By de-politicizing public 
administration and its reform, donors fail to recognize or take account of the ways in 
which the Lao government is an instrument of party policies. 
Administrative Restructuring and State Control 
The lofty—albeit sanctimonious— agenda of some development agencies 
would not otherwise seem so troubling, except that donor attempts to infuse a sense of 
democratic governance into an authoritarian state may have the perverse effect of 
strengthening its grip on power. The following section claims that, however weak its 
public administration, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party retains a strong hold on 
the machinery of government. By ignoring Lao politics in the romantic pursuit of 
democratic governance, donors unconscionably contribute to the logic of government 
restructuring and state consolidation. The experience of decentralization efforts in 
other developing countries justifies this concern.  
Development Decentralization: Swimming against the Current 
The rhetoric of decentralization conveys a mosaic of meaning and masks a 
variety of objectives. As David Slater perceptively observes, the agenda of 
decentralization often confronts the reality of centralization.
285 In his examination of 
the Ujamaa projects from the 1970s in Tanzania, Slater reveals that the attempt to 
promote decentralization produces the opposite effect of its stated objective. In 
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Weberian terms, Slater notes, “The internal logic of the bureaucratic development of 
the state has been a powerful factor of centralization.”
286  
More recent research on decentralization reinforces his initial findings: 
programs of administrative decentralization often strengthen the ability of central 
authorities to exercise top-down dominance and control. That is, projects to advance 
administrative decentralization, in practice, promote centralization.  
For the most part, programs of decentralization do not, in fact, increase local 
participation and self-determination. Instead of improving participation from below, 
these initiatives increase the scope of central domination from above. Nor do they 
appear to promote democracy. World Bank reviews of decentralization initiatives from 
around the world fail singularly to make a link between efforts to institute 
decentralization and democracy.
287  
As evidence suggests, the experience of state restructuring in Laos, since the 
early 1990s, diverges little from this state logic of consolidation, not because of any 
pre-determined outcome of decentralization projects, but because in many developing 
countries, a weak central government struggles to command allegiance in the face of 
traditional political authority. As a result, the centripetal bias of national development 
gravitates towards centralization, particularly in efforts to foster a durable sense of 
territorial unity.
288  
The goal behind the Tanzanian government’s attempt at spatial restructuring 
resonates strongly with inter-governmental reforms in Laos. Referring to the 
experience in Tanzania but providing insight for the Lao case, Slater claims “The 
rationalization and consolidation of centralized authority lay at the roots of the spatial 
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restructuring of state power, so that decentralization was more illusion or myth than 
hard institutional reality.”
289 He goes on to write,  
 
Decentralization… extended and consolidated the regional and local power of 
the state in a situation where a growing proportion of the rural population was 
being resettled, often coercively, in so-called “development villages.” Within 
these villages, where bureaucratic staff and local Party leaders were politically 
dominant, the organization of agricultural production showed few signs of 
being restructured in accordance with a strategy of collectively managed 
socioeconomic transformation. The decentralization programme did, however, 
provide a cloak for increasing state control, combined with a growing reliance 
of foreign aid, including World Bank funding for export-oriented agricultural 
projects. In addition, from the point of view of the central government, the 
advantage of such a programme is that its power is safeguarded, whilst 
responsibility for implementation can be blurred whenever necessary.
290 
 
These findings provide a cautionary note to governance reforms in Laos. Efforts to 
democratize the Lao state in ways that fail to address the political constraints of public 
administrative reforms risk reinforcing the regime’s hold on the government. Because 
of the conflicting governance agendas between donors and Lao officials, continuing 
reforms efforts will most likely result in unintended consequences unpopular with the 
development community. If donors fail to accommodate to the political realities of 
government reforms, the logic of state restructuring may overwhelm donor efforts to 
push a political agenda to the contrary. The next section explains why.  
Fusion of Party and State 
The political reality of centralization follows the administrative logic of 
rationalization for a small and poor country struggling to create the rudiments of a 
market society. Evidence suggests that the Lao government places a high priority on 
territorial control in determining policies for administrative reforms. The party 
controls and regulates most government activities. The siege mentality of the last 
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communist holdouts seems to have strengthened, and Laos is no exception.
291 The 
party-state has no intention of relinquishing its control of the machinery of 
government. Mindful of the regime-destroying thrust of liberalization undertaken by 
its erstwhile communist brethren in Eastern Europe, the political elite in Laos fear 
losing political authority to exogenous forces that accompany the market transition. 
Economic instability caused by local autonomy in the 1980s forced the central 
government to take a stronger role in economic management, in order to reinforce 
economic liberalization a decade later.  
Since the early 1990s, economic reforms have resulted in more centralization 
of administrative control and economic regulation. In the process, governors have 
been gradually disempowered, while central ministries have reasserted control over 
their line ministries. In contrast to the general trend in post-communist countries, 
political and economic restructuring in Laos has not led to a devolution of 
administrative control. In tandem with market restructuring, the state has continued to 
penetrate further into the village by promoting a deconcentrated state organ of a highly 
centralized bureaucracy.  
Persistent tensions in central-local relations should in no way obscure the fact 
that the communist regime in Laos faces no threat to its monopoly of political power. 
Governors represent the Lao state. In public administration, the party strives to make 
provincial administration more tightly bound to national economic planning and has 
gradually transformed the provinces from quasi-sovereign states to local 
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administration of the central government. For example, Politburo resolution of 17 
November 2003 gave specific central ministries and organizations responsibility over 
the provinces. Table 1 below presents these linkages. What this administrative 
arrangement implies in practice remains unclear. Hardly anyone outside the 
government has a firm grasp of what this reorganization hopes to achieve. But the fact 
that central ministries have been given oversight of provincial activities can only 
imply a further consolidation of central authority and less autonomy for the provinces.  
  Through the entire reform process, the party continues to exert a firm control 
on the apparatus of government. The party and local government structures are 
irrevocably intertwined. Subnational levels of government not only organize 
administrative units but also mirror political divisions of the state. Governors have 
extensive authority as representatives of the state. 
The communist party in Laos effectively controls the public sector, in part 
because access to career opportunities remains open for talented and politically astute 
party members. The party monopolizes political ambition and regulates public life. 
From the government bureaucracy, the mass organization, to the military, public 
organizations implement party directives and monitor its monopoly on power. Party 
cadres penetrate all institutions of government and operate within all levels of 
government, from the central ministries to their provincial and local branches. Despite 
strengthening the role of the National Assembly in public administration, the party 
leadership continues to approve all senior government staff. The process is highly 
opaque and deeply politicized. By all accounts, party membership still promotes 
upward mobility and career advancement within the bureaucracy. In numerous 
examples, educated and highly experienced staff have been overlooked for promotions 
in preference for less qualified candidates with party credentials. If social mobility 
within the apparatus of government helps to explain the enduring strength of a       126 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Central Government Oversight of the Provinces 
by Government Agency, Lao P.D.R. 
 
Central Ministry or Organization            Province 
National  Assembly          Î Savannakhet 
Office of the President           Î Borikhamxay 
Prime Minister’s Office and Ministry of Justice    Î Luang Prabang 
Committee for Planning and Cooperation and 
The Propaganda and Training Board of the LPRP CC  Î Bokeo 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs          Î Xayabury 
Ministries of National Defense  
and Public Security                      Î Xieng Khuang and  
ÎXayxombun Special  
   Region 
Ministry of Education and Lao Youth Union     Î Phongsaly 
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare      Î Attapeu 
Ministry  of  Commerce     Î Uodomxay 
Ministry of Communications, Transport, Posts  
 and  Construction      Î Luang Namtha 
Ministry of Finance and Bank of the Lao PDR    Î Huaphanh 
Ministry of Industry and Handicrafts       Î Khammuane 
Ministry of Information and Culture        Î Saravane 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry       Î Champasack 
Ministry of Public Health          Î Sekong 
Organization Board of the LPRP CC  
and Office of the LPRP CC        Î Vientiane City 
Lao Front for National Construction     
  and Lao Women’s Union        Î Vientiane Province  
 
Source: Stuart-fox, Martin. Politics and Reform in the Lao People's Democratic 
Republic. Vol. Working Paper No. 1, Political Economy of Development. 
Williamsburg, VA: Program on Civil Society and Governance, College of William & 
Mary, 2004, pp. 40-1, footnote #18. 
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communist government, then a weakening of this function may signal the demise of 
the party-state.
292 If, however, social mobility continues to depend on party affiliation, 
as in Laos, then the waning of the communist state demands other considerations. 
Although remuneration remains low, government work continues to attract a modicum 
of educated Lao to the public sector, drawn in large measure by a nationalist fervor to 
develop the country and the prospect of upward mobility to positions of authority. For 
many, civil service jobs are still considered respectable and desirable. Excluding 
military personnel, staff numbers have remained fairly constant through the years, 
peaking at around 100,000. 
At the structural level, the secular religion of communist provides the venue to 
negotiate inter-governmental relations. At the organizational level, party committees 
enforce party policies and regulate departmental activities. At the human resource 
level, loyalty to the party ensures job security and social mobility. Keeping everyone 
in line, the principle of democratic centralism steers the process of decision making in 
all state organizations.
293  As enshrined in the constitution, the administration of the 
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293 In principle, state policies are deliberated and ironed out through a consultative process at various 
levels of government and society at large In its paper on governance, the government characterizes the 
principle of democratic centralism in the following manner: 
We consider the process of decision-making as democratic because wide-ranging 
consultations are undertaken with many different groups in order to achieve consensus on an 
issue before a decision is taken. The process is centralised because once consensus has been 
reached on an issue, the decision is signed by a single person with the appropriate authority. 
Wide-ranging participation and expression of opinion are the underlying principles of 
centralised democracy. 
Democratic centralism within the Government is also supported by the principles of collective 
leadership, unitary leadership and individual responsibility as specified in the foundation 
decree of each ministry. Collective leadership refers to the way that decisions are taken 
collectively by all concerned authorities on the basis of mutual consensus. In order to ensure 
that the decision-makers are held responsible for their decisions, the principle of collective 
leadership is applied hand in hand with that of unitary leadership—where one individual alone 
signs the decision. Once a decision is taken, each person involved in the decision in 
individually responsible for the outcome—the principle of individual responsibility.      128 
 
Lao government follows the Leninist principle of democratic centralism.
294 In theory, 
state policies are deliberated and ironed out through a consultative process at various 
levels of government and society at large. Thereafter, public policies reflect consensus 
within the government, and all involved are responsible for carrying out party 
directives. Open dissent limits career advancement of party officials. In this 
communist logic, the state is democratic, by allowing voice, and centralized under the 
leadership of a vanguard party.
295 In reality, high ranking members of the party dictate 
many of the policies for the government to execute.  
State Restructuring and the Logic of Centralization in Laos 
In post-communist countries, pre-existing institutions strongly shape domestic 
politics and determine the direction of global integration.
296 In Laos, a historically 
weak center provides a starting point from which to consider possible paths out of 
socialist serfdom. The recent history of government restructuring reveals a party 
apparatus pragmatically adjusting to economic constraints, while consolidating its 
power base, unifying the country, and exerting its centralizing influence on an 
ideologically indifferent countryside.
297 To the extent that donors ignore the political 
                                                                                                                                              
Democratic centralism means essentially that a collective view is adopted on a given problem, 
or policy, once all concerned parties have given their opinion, advice and suggestions. See 
Government of Lao PDR, "Background Paper on Governance," 17. Bold type in original.  
294 Article five of the 2003 amended constitution reads, “The National Assembly and all other state 
organizations are established and function in accordance with the principle of democratic centralism.” 
Government of Lao PDR, "Constitution of the Lao People's Democratic Republic,"  (National 
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the Party hierarchy], with the Central Committee assuring the direction of the Party.” Kaysone 
Phomvihan, La Revolution Lao (Moscow: Edition du Progres, 1980) 170. 
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rationality of government centralization, their foreign assistance risks contributing to 
the Lao state building project, premised on strengthening control over an ethnically 
diverse and geographically disparate populace.  
By and large, the post-socialist transition everywhere has involved the retreat 
of the state from direct management of the economy. Although the push for 
decentralization may be strong throughout the world, the experience of government 
restructuring in Laos suggests caution. In the market transition of this nominally 
communist country, the Lao government seeks political, administrative, and economic 
centralization over regionally dispersed and fiscally independent provinces. Against 
the trend of public decentralization in the transition process, Laos provides a strong 
case for the important role of governments in establishing a market economy on the 
foundations of a natural one.  
Since the 1990s, the market transition has intensified political and 
administrative consolidation of a weak, central bureaucracy. Constitutional reforms 
provide the rationale for the central government to assert its authority in the name of 
national unity, security, and development. However, the limited power and reach of 
the state ensures the continuation of traditional patterns of political authority. 
Local power remains concentrated in the office of provincial governors. A lack 
of clear lines of authority among the various government organs complicates reforms 
to rationalize the public administration. These institutional obstacles prevent the 
establishment of a standardized system of job classification for departmental personnel 
at all levels of government. In the face of unclear rules and responsibilities, low 
remuneration provides little incentive for individual initiative or efficient work. In this 
                                                                                                                                              
Undoubtedly this attempt to rationalize administration is aimed at placing more cadres in the 
villages and promoting growth there as well as consolidating the [district] organization of the 
party. In this way the LPRP hopes to retain control over the direction of social, economic, and 
political development of the countryside. Evans, Lao Peasants under Socialism  200-1.      130 
 
environment, coordination problems balloon, duplication of work persists, and 
informal work incentives multiply.  
The state bureaucracy runs poorly, due in part to its highly politicized nature. 
An opaque government structure hinders reform efforts. A strong party structure 
parallels the public administrative and significantly influences government operations. 
A clearer articulation and delineation of roles and responsibilities within public 
agencies, as well as among the various levels of government, would improve efforts to 
streamline government operations. This politically sensitive reform agenda requires a 
concerted push to distinguish the Lao state from party. Because such a separation has 
resulted in regime change in much of the communist world, this slow reform will 
remain ad-hoc, piece-meal, and far from complete into the foreseeable future.  
Into this foray, donors have a different interpretation of the challenges 
confronting development in Laos. For the most part, donors perceive government 
structuring through ideological lenses, imposing not only a set of generic values but 
also standard development practices from one country to the next. Moreover, Western 
donors react uncomfortably to the idea of a communist country centralizing political 
authority and consolidating a national economic space with their assistance. Out of 
this unease, a myth of decentralization has engulfed the industry, distorting 
meaningful development dialogue and presenting a striking example of how 
development agendas overwhelm complex local realities. The clout and financial 
resources of donors allow them to advance their own political objectives, while also—
ironically— pushing development in apolitical terms.  
In summary, the weak public administration of the Lao PDR has gone through 
several phases of bureaucratic rationalization and reform to inter-governmental 
relations. Earlier reforms actually produced a weak center, in contrast to the 
experience of other peripheral countries. However, as the market transition unfolds,      131 
 
economic restructuring in Laos encounters development problems typical of poor 
countries. At which time, the centralist ethos of state power searches for rational 
expression in administrative centralization. In so far as the communist government 
effectively limits other avenues for social mobility, the rationalization and 
consolidation of the weak public administration help to explain, in part, the resilience 
of an otherwise unremarkable state. Where communist states in Eastern Europe 
devolved socio-economic control to their political demise, the Lao PDR, for a variety 
of factors explored above, has managed a gradual market transition that emphasizes 
political stability and economic development under the direction of stronger central 
control.  
Despite these concentrated strategies of national development, some donor 
agencies in Laos view challenges to development in terms of improving economic 
governance, subsumed under the theme of “decentralization.” The consequences of 
this mismatch between donor agendas and the Lao government’s objectives have 
produced a situation in line with experiences elsewhere in the global South. That is, 
decentralization programs provide a cloak for increasing state power. With the 
assistance of the development community itself, reform geared towards state 
concentration is nowhere more evident than in Lao fiscal restructuring, which is the 
topic of the next chapter.      
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Chapter IV 
THE FISCAL SOCIOLOGY OF THE LAO TAX STATE 
 
As the previous two chapters emphasize, decentralization does not feature in 
the government’s reform agenda. The Lao political elite appear unenthusiastic about 
following decentralization, presumably in part to avoid the collapse and the post-
communist conclusions in Eastern Europe. Administrative centralization, as detailed in 
Chapter III, follows from the political one documented in Chapter II. Where the 
previous two chapters explored political and administrative reforms intended to 
enhance central state control, this chapter explores the centralization trend in the 
planning and budgetary process; tax and customs administration; and management of 
state revenues and expenditures in the treasury.  
Given the history of Laos, and the status of its politics and public 
administration, one might expect great difficulties reconciling demands of 
decentralization with the fiscal needs of central authorities. In this chapter, I begin 
with a look at the country’s crisis of revenues and then examine attempts at central 
control. To evaluate alternatve responses to the situation on continuing fiscal crises in 
Laos, I employ a modeling procedure that allows for the comparison of competing 
policies. The model, an analytic hierarchy model (or AHP), will explore all the 
relevant factors and interrelate them in a systematic manner and consistent framework. 
I examine three alternatives, in order to explore the factors that drive decision making 
within the Lao government: (1) accepting the international proposals for 
decentralization, (2) maintenaining the status quo of a state-party alliance, and (3) 
taking a “developmentalist” path of centralization. My hypothesis, generated from 
analysis of the history, political, and (in this chapter) fiscal situation, is that the only 
likely solution will be through further political and fiscal centralization. As the AHP      133 
 
model suggests below, although this scenario may offer the best possible path towards 
the country’s modernization, the policy is wrought with difficulties.  
I begin the chapter by emphazising the importance of the study of public 
finances to the overall understanding of state capacity. In surveying the fiscal crisis of 
the Lao state in detail, the second section describes the allocation of public 
expenditures and the tax structure. The third section explores fiscal reforms in the 
budget planning process, tax and customs administration, and deficit management. As 
with challenges of administrative restructuring discussed in the previous chapter, 
entrenched political interests at the local level continue to hinder fiscal reforms and the 
rationalization of financial management. Success in fiscal reforms, thus, requires 
strong central control over regionally autonomous and fiscally independent provinces, 
and the fourth section describes several strategies explored by the Lao government. 
The fifth section places fiscal reforms in international perspective and goes into detail 
on the AHP model, in order to examine competing policies of fiscal management. In 
the conclusion, I claim that the fiscal experience in Laos is not an isolated 
circumstance of peripheral socialism, but rather a general case of a post-colonial state 
struggling to modernize a country in the face of traditional sources of political and 
economic authority.  
Finances and the Making of the Modern State 
Benjamin Franklin derisively comments, “In this world nothing can be said to 
be certain, except death and taxes.”
298 Finances have created the modern state.
299 As 
                                                 
298 Benjamin Franklin, "Letter to Jean Baptiste Le Roy, 13 November 1789," in Works of Benjamin 
Franklin (Philadelphia: William Duane, 1818). 
299 Back in the 16
th century, the French philosophy Jean Bodin called finance “the nerves of the state.” 
As quoted in Meredith Woo-Cumings, ed., The Developmental State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1999) 
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Joseph Schumpeter notes, “Fiscal demands are the first signs of the modern state.”
300 
The emergence of the state as a separate and real power coincided with the distinction 
between private and public law.
301 Out of this division, the state acquired a solid 
framework with its own organs and powers separate from private authority. In time, 
financial obligations of the state expanded, most importantly in warfare, and became 
one of the driving forces of the modern state.
302 As outlined by Max Weber, the state 
constitutes a special type of ruling political organization, one which possesses 
legitimate use of force and a bureaucracy to administer its monopoly on violence. 
Weber singles out the use of violence to characterize a state because its other 
characteristics, e.g. “national interests,” could not be universally applied.
303 Even 
                                                 
300 Joseph Alois Schumpeter, "The Crisis of the Tax State," International Economic Papers 4 (1954): 
19. He goes on to write, 
It goes without saying that there is more to the state than the collection of taxes necessitated by 
the common need that was their origin. Once the state exists as reality and as a social 
institution, once it has become the centre of the persons who man the governmental machine 
and whose interests are focused upon it, finally once the state is recognized as suitable for 
many things even by those individuals whom it confronts—once all this has happened, the 
state develops further and soon turns into something the nature of which can no longer be 
understood merely from the fiscal standpoint, and for which the finances become a serving 
pool. If the finances have created and partly formed the modern state, so now the state on its 
part forms them and enlarges them—deep into the flesh of the private economy. Schumpeter, 
"Crisis of Tax State," 19. 
301 Schumpeter, "Crisis of Tax State," 11. Definitions of states always depend on distinguishing it from 
society. See Timothy Mitchell, "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics," 
American Political Science Review 85, no. 1 (1991). 
302 As Schumpeter argues, “without financial need the immediate cause for the creation of the state 
would have been absent… Taxes not only helped to create the state. They helped to form it. The tax 
system was the organ the development of which entailed other organs.” Schumpeter, "Crisis of Tax 
State," 16-7.  
303 See Max Weber, "Politics as Vocation," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. Hans 
Heinrich Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford UP, 1958). For a discussion of Weber’s 
political sociology, see Richard Swedberg, Max Weber and the Idea of Economic Sociology (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton UP, 1998) Chapter 5. Expanding upon Weber’s classical foundation, Charles Tilly 
observes that over the past two hundred years a concentration of capital and means of coercion, in 
tandem with preparation for war and relative position in the international system of competing polities 
appear to have driven the process of state formation and consolidation in Western Europe. Tilly, 
Coercion, Capital, and European States  14-5.      135 
 
without a broader framework of state function, nevertheless, finances determine the 
limits of state capacity.
304   
Capital accumulation constitutes one of the primary tasks of the state.
305 In 
order to realize public goals, to fulfill its obligations, and to reduce its debt, the state 
needs finances.
306  The types of revenue available and the ability to extract resources 
help to shape the size and scope of nations.
307 Theoretical perspectives of the state, 
thus, remain incomplete without a fiscal sociology, the study of the modern tax 
                                                 
304 As Schumpeter points out, “the state has its definite limits. These are, of course, not conceptually 
definable limits of its field of social action, but limits to its fiscal potential. These vary considerably in 
each specific case according to the wealth or poverty of the country, to the concrete details of its 
national and social structure, and to the nature of its wealth.” See Schumpeter, "Crisis of Tax State," 20.  
305 In general, states must guarantee conditions that enable the society to fulfill two contradictory 
functions: accumulation and legitimation. While maintaining the conditions for capital accumulation, 
the state must also sustain the conditions for social harmony. See James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of 
the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973) 6. Emphasis original. As first outlined by O’Connor, the 
thesis of accumulation and legitimation reads: 
the capitalist state must try to fulfill two basic and often mutually contradictory functions—
accumulation and legitimation. This means that the state must try to maintain or create the 
conditions in which profitable capital accumulation is possible. However, the state also must 
try to maintain or create the conditions of social harmony. A capitalist state that openly uses its 
coercive forces to help one class accumulate capital at the expense of other classes loses its 
legitimacy and hence undermines the basis of its loyalty and support. But a state that ignores 
the necessity of assisting the process of capital accumulation risks drying up the sources of its 
own power, the economy’s surplus production capacity and taxes drawn from this surplus (and 
other forms of capital). 
This central dilemma applies not only to capitalist states, but to all states that purport to take a directive 
role in economic management and development. Elaborating on state functions, Bell notes, “Each state 
has to balance the calculation of capital accumulation (and the restriction of consumption) against the 
social needs and demands of the population.” Daniel Bell, "The Public Household: On "Fiscal 
Sociology" and the Liberal Society," in The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York: Basic 
Books, 1996), 231. 
306 Theda Skocpol makes the case that answers to questions about financial capacity “provide the best 
general insight into the direct or indirect leverage a state is likely to have for realizing any sort of goal it 
may pursue. A state’s means of raising and deploying financial resources tell us more than could any 
other single factor about its existing (and its immediately potential) capacities to create or strengthen 
state organizations, to employ personnel, to co-opt political support, to subsidize economic enterprises, 
and to fund social programs.” Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in 
Current Research," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and 
Theda Skocpol (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 17. 
307 D.  Friedman, "A Theory of the Size and Shape of Nations," Journal of Political Economy 85 
(1977).      136 
 
state.
308 In examining the economic capacity of the state, fiscal sociology provides a 
window unto the functioning of states.
309 Public finances determine the capacity of 
states to realize such public objectives as allocation, redistribution, economic 
stabilization and growth, and overall guidance of the economy.
310 Fiscal sociology 
studies the nature, form, and fate of the state from the financial side. This method 
recognizes the centrality of the state budget, focusing on the process of formulating 
expenditures and efforts to expand the tax base.
311 In political struggles over the 
content and structure of the public economy, a “fiscal crisis” inevitably confronts the 
state.
312 Public demands for state resources far outstrip the state’s capacity to generate 
commensurate revenue, and fiscal sociology examines how states mitigate fiscal 
crises, while supporting the broader goals of accumulation and legitimation.  
A study of public finances is particularly important in understanding the 
trajectory of socialist transformations.
313 As Schumpeter argues,  
                                                 
308 Fiscal sociology, as Schumpeter argues, provides a fruitful perspective for the theory of the state. 
Schumpeter, "Crisis of Tax State," 19. According to O'Connor, Fiscal Crisis  3, fiscal sociology deals 
with fiscal politics and aims “to discover the principles governing the volume and allocation of state 
finances and expenditures and the distribution of the tax burden among various economic classes.” In 
challenging orthodox (predominantly economic) theories of public finance, O’Connor goes on to argue, 
“Particular expenditures and programs and the budget as a whole are explicable only in terms of power 
relationships within the private economy” (Ibid., 5). 
309 I use the term “modern tax state” to refer to what theorists of public finance call “the public 
household,” or the management of state revenues and expenditures. Fiscal sociology examines the 
struggles over the composition of public expenditures and revenues. See Bell, "Public Household." For 
the best known treatise on public finance, see Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance: A 
Study in Public Economy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959).  
310 As Bell, "Public Household," 225. argues,  
The direction of the economy has been a central government task. Government spending 
controls the level of economic activity; tax and monetary policies direct the timing of 
investment; transfer payments effect the partial distribution of incomes through social security, 
subsidies, revenue sharing, and the like. In general, all modern polities are involved in the 
functions of allocation, redistribution, stabilization, and growth. 
311 As Schumpeter observes, “the budget is the skeleton of the state stripped of all misleading 
ideologies.” Schumpeter, "Crisis of Tax State," 6. Bell notes, more recently and less elegantly, “the 
major aspect of the public household is the centrality of the budget, the level of government revenues 
and the expenditures, as the mechanism for reallocation and redress.” Bell, "Public Household," 226. 
312 O'Connor, Fiscal Crisis. 
313 According to Schumpeter,       137 
 
 
The public finances are one of the best starting points for an investigation of 
society, especially though not exclusively of its political life. The full 
fruitfulness of this approach is seen particularly at those turning points, or 
better epochs, during which existing forms begin to die off and to change into 
something new, and which always involve a crisis of the old fiscal methods.
314 
 
The collapse of state socialism by the early 1990s constitutes such a critical juncture in 
world affairs, and an examination of public finances provides an important insight into 
the transition process. According to Robert Skidelsky, the proximate cause of the 
wholesale collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was the system’s inability to 
generate sufficient revenue to cover the cost of maintaining and reproducing the 
defining institutions of the Leninist party-state.
315 The former Soviet Union 
experimented with devolution in the late 1980s. These reforms resulted in a loss of 
fiscal control in Moscow, depleting the central treasury and contributing to the 
collapse of Soviet communism. In decontrolling production and decentralizing 
management tasks from the government to the enterprises, the Soviet Union under 
Gorbachev lost the power to control the economy. Economic reforms shifted political 
power to the republics, in the process draining the state budget of revenues.
316 
Devolution energized regional powers to act autonomously. In the absence of military 
intervention to the contrary, state collapse and regime change eventually ensued.  
In Laos, the communist regime survives unchallenged, and an examination of 
state finances can shed light on the capacity of the government to control the terms of 
                                                                                                                                              
An enormous influence on the fate of nations emanates from the economic bleeding which the 
needs of the state necessitates, and from the use to which its results are put. In some historical 
periods the immediate formative influence of the fiscal needs and policy of the state on the 
development of the economy and with it on all forms of life and all aspects of culture explains 
practically all the major features of events. Schumpeter, "Crisis of Tax State," 6-7. 
314 Ibid.: 7. 
315 See Skidelsky, Road from Serfdom, esp. chapter six “Why did the Soviet Communism Collapse?” 
He notes that the “proximate cause of the collapse of the Soviet Empire was state bankruptcy.” See 
Skidelsky, Road from Serfdom  96-116.  
316 See Skidelsky, Road from Serfdom  96-116.       138 
 
market freedom (perestroika) in the absence of political openness (glasnost). As this 
chapter demonstrates below, the Lao party-state actively promotes policies to 
consolidate economic and political authority.  
Historically, Laos has been highly dependent on foreign aid. This dependency 
continues to characterize Laos, whose public economy suffers from persistent fiscal 
crises.
317 How does the Lao government mitigate the perennial fiscal crises? How 
sustainable is the public debt? And what efforts are made to control public 
expenditures and to expand the tax base? To address these questions, I draw from 
recent government budget publications and from an assessment of tax and customs 
reform projects at the Ministry of Finance (MoF). For this analysis, I use documents 
and data on laws and regulations relating to financial and monetary affairs; staff 
reports issued by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in support of Article IV 
consultations; public expenditure reviews undertaken by the World Bank; and 
economic reports published by MoF.  
Fiscal Crisis of the Lao Tax State 
By most Western standards, Laos typifies a poor country. In 2003, economic 
output equaled 21,500 billion Kip (roughly US$ 2.1 billion), or a per capital GDP of 
US$ 370, one of the lowest in the world.
318 The low level of development fuels a crisis 
of capital accumulation for the Lao state. The country’s small economic base 
translates into a weak public economy; government operations remain poorly funded. 
Over the past decade, public expenditures have ranged from 20 to 25 percent of gross 
                                                 
317 For an historical overview of finances in modern Laos, see Appendix A7. This chronicle of the tax 
state calls attention to the economic dependency of successive regimes in Laos and persistent problems 
of fiscal crises. As a political-economic entity, modern Laos lacks financial sovereignty; external 
finances have propped up various regimes throughout the country’s turbulent past.  
318 For detailed data on the Lao economy, see the Appendix.       139 
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domestic product (GDP), while revenues cover only two-thirds the cost of keeping the 
government running (Figure 6).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Table A12, Appendix A8. 
Figure 6. General Government Budget Balance (Percent of GDP) 
Lao PDR, 1984-2004      140 
 
The interminable fiscal crises of the Lao state stem from its chronicle failure to 
match budgetary expenses with revenues. In any give year, budget deficits have  
 ranged about 5-15% of GDP, with major improvements on the balance sheets 
occurring after 1998. In a recurring pattern of fiscal profligacy, the Lao government 
consistently spends more in expenditures than it can conceivably generate in revenues. 
The following section describes the state budget in detail, examining the composition 
of public expenditures, the structure of revenues, and the sources of deficit finance.  
Composition of Public Expenditures 
The Lao PDR follows a comprehensive budgetary planning process that guides 
economic output and sets targets for revenues and expenditures. The Lao national 
budget has two components, recurrent and capital.
319 Current expenditures include 
salaries and benefits for civil servants, subsidies to state-owned enterprises, operations 
and maintenance of government facilities, repayment of loans and interests on public 
debt, and other recurrent expenditures.  
Capital expenditures comprise domestic and foreign expenses for development 
finance. In any given year, capital expenditures consume over half of all public 
expenses.
320 Since 1994, public expenditures have ranged about 18-24% of GDP 
(Figure 7). 
 
                                                 
319 The process of preparing both budgets occurs separately. For details on the budget planning process, 
see Appendix A9. 
320 Each year, MoF submits a forecast of total public capital available for the upcoming fiscal year. 
Based on these capital projections, CPC then drafts a preliminary budget, taking into consideration 
current priorities and the viability of on-going projects. This draft budget provides a project-by-project 
breakdown of funds tentatively allocated for existing medium and large projects. Concurrently, the 
ministries and provinces draft their own investment plans for proposed and on-going projects. At a 
series of regional planning meetings, officials discuss these separate PIPs and eventually reconcile them 
with the preliminary draft. In cooperation with MoF, CPC combines the various investment plans into a 
national PIP, which then goes before the National Assembly for the ceremonial stamp of approval. The 
final PIP is presented in two volumes, one for projects administered by the provinces and the other by 
central line ministries. MoF then takes responsibility for disbursing project funds. See Sida, "Financial 
and Administrative Systems."      141 
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Source: Table A12, Appendix. 
Figure 7. Composition of Public Expenditure (Percent of GDP) 
Lao PDR, FY 1994/05-2003/04* 
Note: *Figures for FY 2003/04 are planned estimates. 
 
In fiscal year ending 2003, the latest for which figures are available, the cost of 
running the Lao government reached 4,409.6 billion kip, or US$ 415.3 million.
321 
Over half of this budget (57.3%) went to capital expenses, with the remainder 
absorbed by wages (15.2%), subsidies to government enterprises (7.7%), maintenance 
(7.4%), and other recurrent expenses. See Figure 8. Western donors fund roughly 60% 
of the capital budget, but none of the government’s recurrent cost. 
The central government lays claim to about 60% (or 2,438.1 billion kip) of this 
budget, with local governments spending the rest (1971.4 billion kip). From the    
 
                                                 
321 The government’s financial year runs from October 1 to September 30. Figures were calculated at 
prevailing exchange rates: US$ 1 = 10,500 kip. The latest government budgetary data derive from 
Government of Lao PDR, "Official Gazette: State Budget Revenue - Expenditure Implementation of Fy 
2002 - 2003 and State Budge Revenue - Expenditure Plan for Fy 2003 -2004,"  (GoL, 2004).      142 
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Source: Table A14, Appendix. 
Figure 8. Composition of Public Expenditure, Lao PDR, FY 2002-03 
 
capital, three ministries control almost two-thirds of central government spending. 
Outside the capital, five provinces spend about half of all local expenditures.
322 
Although the government planned to spend 4,700 billion kip in fiscal year 2002-
03, actual expenses reached only 93.8% of expected costs.
323 On the aggregate, 
provincial governments exhibited weak control of public spending, in exceeding their 
expenditure plans by 4.6%. These soft budget constraints of local expenditures 
underscore the discretionary power of provincial authorities to flaunt national plans.
324 
In contrast, central government ministries displayed discipline by spending only 
86.6% of planned outlays.
325 
                                                 
322 See Appendix A8, especially Figures A22 and A23. 
323 By expenditure category, administrative subsidies and transfers to various government operations 
accounted for the bulk of cost overruns. See Tables A14-16.  
324 At the local level, wages and subsidies both outstripped expense targets by about 10%. Accounting 
for the lion's share of local over-spending, miscellaneous expenses ran three times higher than expected. 
325 From the capital, unexpected costs appeared in some categories of operations/maintenance and 
subsidies/transfers.      143 
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  A combination of taxes, fees, and non-tax income compose government 
revenues. Over the past decade, revenue collection ranged about 10-13 percent of 
GDP (Figure 9).  Taxes collected by the Tax Department and Customs division of 
MoF account for most of the revenues. In fiscal year-ending 2003, the government 
collected 2,505.9 billion kip (or US$ 236.0 million, 12% of GDP) in revenues, which 
managed to cover only 57% of expenditures. From this total, various taxes and 
customs revenues accounted for over half of all revenues. Other sources of income 
derived from royalties on natural resource extraction and revenues from, as well as 
sales of, state-owned enterprises.
326  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Table A18, Appendix. 
Figure 9. Structure of Government Revenues (percent of GDP)  
Lao PDR, FY 1994/95-2003/04 
                                                 
326 For details on the composition of government revenues, see Appendix A10.       144 
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The central government collected about 40% of all revenues in fiscal year-
ending 2003, mainly from taxes and centrally-controlled government assets. At the 
provincial level, customs duties provided the bulk of local revenues. Provincial 
governments regulate the logging industry, which made up 14.4% of local revenues in 
2003. Reflecting the concentration of economic activity in the country, four provinces 
contributed the bulk of all local revenues. Vientiane Municipality alone collected a 
third of all local revenues. The other two major urban centers, Champasack and  
Savannakhet, along with the mineral and logging wealth of Khammuane province, 
each accounted for about 10% of local government income (Figure 10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Table A20, Appendix. 
Figure 10. Government Revenues, by Source and Administration 
Lao PDR, FY 2002-03      145 
 
Mirroring the regional disparity in revenue collection, a narrow tax base 
presents obstacles to fiscal expansion. Available data from 2002 puts the number of 
registered taxpayers at 62,911, comprising individual taxpayers, small- to medium-
sized businesses, and large companies.
327 Regulated by the Large Taxpayer Unit 
(LTU) of the Tax Department, 80 large businesses alone delivered 45% of government 
revenues by the end of fiscal year 2002. Individual taxpayers account for only 5% of 
revenues, and tax-evasion runs rampant. Hence, official figures disguise the true 
number of taxable entities in Laos. Some observers estimate that the number of 
business operations in Laos may stretch as high as 170,000.
328 Thus, with better legal 
enforcement, the scope for expanding the revenue base remains strong. Without 
reforms in tax administration, fiscal crises may undermine the country’s economic 
potential.     
Fiscal Sustainability and Public Debt 
The Lao government runs perennial budget deficits, financed through donor 
inflows and borrowing from the banking system (Figure 11). With the collapse of the 
Soviet empire, the Lao government lost a dependable source of funding for public 
expenditure. Almost overnight, external financing of government operations dropped 
precipitously from over 15% of GDP in 1989, hovering around 5% thereafter. 
Compensating for this drop, foreign aid from the West, in roughly equal parts grants 
and loans, has assisted the Lao government to meet its public obligations ever since.
329 
External funds usually shore up the capital component of public expenditures.  
                                                 
327 Table Appendix A11, Table A21.  
328 As cited by the Lao National board of statistics, in Swedish International Development Agency, 
"Swedish Support to Strengthen Fiscal Management in Lao PDR: Tax Policy and Tax Administration 
Issues,"  (Vientiane, Lao PDR: SIDA, Tax Department (Ministry of Finance) Lao PDR, 2003), 9. 
329 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Lao government faced a serious problem of budget 
deficits, which were covered by generous external assistance aimed at helping the country adjust to the 
market transition. As a result, the country’s international reserves actually increased by almost 50% (to 
US$61 million) by the end of 1990. In that year, total foreign assistance reached US$150 million. 
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Source: Table A11, Appendix. 
Figure 11. Budget Deficit Financing (percent of GDP), by Source 
Lao PDR, 1984-2004 
 
Over the past few years, revenue projections by the government have 
unrealistically overstated actual revenue capacity. In the current fiscal year, for 
example, anecdotal evidence suggests that the Lao government has struggled more 
than usual to match revenue projections. While donors play a large role in covering 
capital expenditures, Lao officials have requested additional financial relief to cover 
shortfalls in the recurrent budget as well. 
In 2003, both central and local governments, on the aggregate, ran deficits. 
While central ministries spent 144% more than what their revenues brought in, local 
expenditures at the provincial level reached 30% more than their income generating 
-3 
0
3
6
9
12 
15 
1984 1989 1994 1999 2004
Other foreign financing 
Grants 
Domestic financing      147 
 
capacity.
330 Broken down by locale, only three provinces produced budget surpluses 
and transfers to the national budget: Vientiane Municipality, Champasack, and 
Savannakhet. All other locales relied on external funds and central transfers to meet 
the cost of government operations.  
These fiscal data reflect the precarious position of government finances. Fiscal 
crises are unlikely to diminish any time soon in Laos and may, in all probability, 
become more acute in the coming years. As a member of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Lao PDR has agreed to abide by the Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff (CEPT), in preparation for the ASEAN Free Trade Area. The treaty 
hopes to reduce and harmonize tariffs in all member countries. The Lao government 
has until 2008 to implement its obligations under CEPT, which stipulates that tariff 
rates on most imports from the region cannot exceed five percent. Because customs 
duties and import tariffs account for over a quarter of all government revenues, 
ASEAN free trade will most likely compound fiscal crises in the short run.
331  
Fiscal reforms have taken on international dimensions, and Lao officials have 
emphasized the country’s international obligations under ASEAN as a way to increase 
pressure for reforms domestically. Unless the Lao government finds alternative 
sources of income, the expected decline in customs revenues may well plunge the 
entire economy into financial disarray. To pay for administrative operations, the 
government might have to borrow more heavily than usual from the Bank of Laos. In 
past crises, deficit financing through the Bank of Laos sparked macroeconomic 
instability, fueling domestic inflation and accelerating the dollarization of the  
                                                 
330 See Table A19, Appendix A10.  
331 Economists at the IMF estimate that tariff reductions under CEPT will eventually cost the Lao 
government, under the current tax structure, up to 27% of revenues by 2008. See Adrien Goorman, 
Jacque Baldet, and Rick Fisher, "Lao People's Democratic Republic. Revenue Impact of Cept 
Implementation, Vat Policy and Administration Issues, and Presumptive Taxation,"  (Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund, 2000).      148 
 
Lao economy.
332 The possibility of exacerbating this macroeconomic imbalance limits 
the scope of financing deficit spending through heavy bank borrowing. 
For one, fiscal crises exacerbate the country’s external sovereign debt. Without 
major reforms in fiscal management, the IMF warns, the country’s overall debt load 
may prove unsustainable. As of 2003, the net present value of public external debt 
equaled US$ 1,223 million, or 59% of GDP.
333 In comparison to other developing 
countries, this debt burden appears unsustainably high. Undertaken by the IMF, an 
analysis of the structure of this debt suggests that the country’s debt load may not 
prove sustainable for too long.
334 The country’s debt-to-revenue and debt-to-exports 
ratios far exceed the IMF’s indicative threshold for debt distress.
335 Nonetheless, the 
                                                 
332 A rapid expansion of credit to finance budgetary outlays fuels domestic inflation and puts pressure 
on the exchange rate of the kip. In 1997-2000, the country experienced a period of high inflation 
primarily due to large budget deficits and a reduction in foreign sources to fund budgetary shortfalls (as 
a consequence of the Asian financial crisis). Because of fiscal and monetary instability in past years, the 
Lao economy is heavily dollarized. An astonishing 75% of monetary transactions in the country occur 
in foreign denominated currencies, mostly in U.S. dollars, the Thai baht, and increasingly Euros. That 
is, the ratio of foreign currency deposits to the total stock of broad money equals 0.75. Dollarization 
refers to the domestic use of foreign currencies either as a store of value (asset substitution) or for 
transaction purposes. For an extended discussion of dollarization in the Lao PDR, see International 
Monetary Fund, "Select Issues (Sep 02)."  
333 The face value of public external debt in 2003 amounted to US$ 2,171 million, a little more than the 
entire economic output (US$ 2,088 million) in Laos that year! Because most of Laos’ debt was made on 
a concessionary basis, NPV of debt is less than face value. In 2003, the government serviced US$40 
million (2% of GDP or 17% of revenues) of this debt outstanding debt. International Monetary Fund, 
"Lao People's Democratic Republic: 2004 Article Iv Consultation-- Staff Report,"  (Washington, DC: 
IMF, 2005), Table 3, p. 25. 
334 As part of its Article IV consultations with the Lao government, the IMF performs debt-
sustainability analyses. By estimating the gross financing needs of a country, debt analysis supposedly 
helps to indicate a country’s vulnerability to liquidity pressures that normally precede and precipitate 
debt crises. See UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs et al., "Strategic Issues in Managing 
Sovereign Debt for Sustained Development: An Issues Paper for the Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on 
Debt,"  (Washington, DC: 2004). 
335 On the other hand, the country’s NPV debt service-to-exports, as well as debt service-to-revenue, 
ratios fall below the IMF’s threshold for debt distress. International Monetary Fund, "Lao People's 
Democratic Republic: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix,"  (Washington, DC: IMF, 2005), 6. 
More generally, economists disagree about what actually qualifies as sustainable debt. Because 
financial crises have occurred at varying levels of debt load, other analyses of debt vulnerability (e.g., 
structure and composition of debt and a country’s debt management capacity) should also accompany a 
study of debt sustainability. UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs et al., "Strategic Issues in 
Managing Sovereign Debt for Sustained Development: An Issues Paper for the Multi-Stakeholder 
Dialogue on Debt," 4.      149 
 
Lao government refuses to consider debt relief under the Heavy Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative, even though the country fulfills all necessary conditions for 
eligibility.
336 Lao authorities hold out the hope that donor and investment inflows will 
continue to make up the short-falls in public expenditures and current accounts. This 
economic and foreign policy remains incomplete, however, without a concerted effort 
to rationalize the public economy, in order to bring expenditures more in line with 
revenues. With revenue collection among the lowest in the region, the government has 
considerable scope to increase capital accumulation.
337  
Fiscal Rationalization, Tax Reforms, and Revenue Mobilization 
The communists in Laos continue to transform inter-governmental relations in 
response to challenges of the socialist transformation.
338 These changes have 
invariably affected the country’s financial infrastructure for capital accumulation. The 
following sections analyze fiscal reforms, paying particular attention to central-local 
struggles over budgetary control and revenue management. Since 1991, as the next 
section reveals, the market transition has demanded strong central control of fiscal 
                                                 
336 Lao authorities reason that the opportunity costs of submitting to HIPC procedures and the potential 
loss of access to bilateral loans and foreign direct investment outweigh any possible gains from debt 
relief in the medium term. International Monetary Fund, "Select Issues (Jan 05)," 4. For all their blister 
about fiscal crises, the IMF readily concedes that, in the medium term, the country’s debt service 
burden is sustainable—with the caveat that more economic (i.e. fiscal) reforms should continue 
unabated. International Monetary Fund, "Select Issues (Jan 05)," 8. Further, their own projections show 
that the government has the continued capacity to service its public debts (equivalent to 3% of GDP) 
into 2008. See International Monetary Fund, "Staff Report No. 05/08," Table 3, p. 25. 
337 In Southeast Asia, all other countries, except Cambodia, revenue collection reaches about 20% of 
GDP, almost twice the level in Laos. World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian 
Development Bank, "Lao PDR: Public Expenditure Review, Country Financial Accountability 
Assessment (Volume Ii: Detailed Reports),"  (Washington, D.C.: WB, IMF, ADB, 2002), 5. 
Nonetheless, this revenue discrepancy disappears when the agricultural sector is excluded from 
comparison. By itself, the predominance of the agricultural sector in Laos reduces the range of the tax 
base and distorts any meaningful country-wide comparisons. Once this distortion is removed, however, 
the ratio of tax revenues to non-agricultural GDP in Laos becomes broadly comparable to Vietnam and 
Thailand (and higher than Cambodia). See International Monetary Fund, "Select Issues (Jan 05)," 20.  
338 Earlier reforms to fiscal management stressed local self-sufficiency in an expression of pure 
devolution. See Appendix A12 for a brief overview.       150 
 
affairs. The remaining sections examine reforms in tax administration, structure of 
taxes, and management of state-owned assets. 
The Initial Phase of Fiscal Restructuring 
Up until 1991, Laos contained a weak central government and strong 
provincial governors, who controlled all aspects of government in their respective 
regions. In response to local mismanagement of natural resources, low tax revenues, 
and non-compliance with national directives, the central government thereafter began 
a concerted effort to re-centralized budgetary control.
339  
Promulgated in 1991, the Lao PDR’s first constitution redressed the problem 
of excessive local autonomy by formally recognizing national control, regulation, and 
management over fiscal affairs. According to the document, all government revenues 
were to pass through a national budget managed by MoF. In the same spirit of control 
and oversight, other decrees followed.
340 Under new rules, revenues collected in the 
provinces, in principle, enter the central budget (through the national treasury) before 
being allocated to the line ministries and provinces. Reinforcing these centralizing 
trends, Instruction 01 and Decree 192 by the Prime Minister aimed to make “the 
provinces the strategic unit, the districts the budget planning unit, and the villages the 
implementing unit.”
341  
                                                 
339 A government decree in 1991 strictly forbade civil servants (whether central or local officials) “from 
making use of any revenue source to cover expenditure in any specific sector without passing through 
the state budget plans.” See Government of Lao PDR, "Decree on the Basic Principles for the 
Centralisation of State Finance, Budget and Treasury, No. 68/Pm,"  (1991), Article 2. 
340 Aiming to achieve greater uniformity in fiscal management, Decree No. 68/PM (August 28, 1991) 
formally established a system for centralized tax collection and budgetary functions within MoF. 
341 Government of Lao PDR, "Instruction 01." And Government of Lao PDR, "Decree on the 
Implementation of the State Budget Law, No. 192/Pm,"  (Prime Minister's Office, 1999). In the 
development community of Vientiane, Instruction 01 is often referred to as the “decentralization 
decree” but actually makes no mention of the word “decentralization.” Rather, Instruction 01 extends 
responsibility for financial management to the provinces and districts.      151 
 
Many of these changes have met with resistance from provincial authorities 
reluctant to relinquish economic prerogatives. In practice, recent government decrees 
have limited the central government’s ability to collect, use, and redistribute 
government revenues.
342 The new initiatives further blurred the horizontal and vertical 
lines of authority and reduced the central government’s control of tax collection.
343 
While the central government views these rules as a way to make the provinces more 
responsible for collecting and remitting national revenues, provincial governors, 
especially of the wealthier urban centers, have interpreted the new rules in ways that 
legitimize their fiscal independence. In principle central ministries reasserted control 
over their line ministries in the provinces. In reality, as the following sections reveal, 
the locus of local power remains in the hands of provincial governors. 
Tax Administration and Customs Reform 
The central government (through the Ministry of Finance at the central level) 
has weak control of national revenues collected outside the capital. Government 
pronouncements to the contrary, provincial governments remain fiscally independent 
of the center. All provincial governors are high-ranking members of the Central 
Committee, the real seat of power in the country, and have overall responsibility for 
oversight of their respective regions. Consequently, the provinces assert strong control 
over revenues and expenditures managed in their respective locales. While 
fragmenting economic regulation, fiscal autonomy limits the reach of the central 
government. As the country modernizes, however, this political structure becomes 
more of a barrier to economic reforms. Tariff reductions under AFTA threaten to 
plunge the entire Lao economy into financial disarray; and national control of the 
                                                 
342 Patrick Stoop, "Fiscal Centralisation and Decentralisation, Policy Paper (Draft),"  (Vientiane: 
Department of Public Administration and Civil Service, Governance and Public Administration and 
Reform (GPAR) Project, 2003), 3. 
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public economy provide a strong impetus for central authority to rein in the power of 
autonomous provinces. As with challenges to governance reforms discussed in the 
previous chapter, fiscal rationalization equates with central control and oversight of 
autonomous provinces.  
In this highly decentralized environment, provincial authorities express little 
willingness to collect and remit revenues to the national budget. Introduced in April 
1999, the current tax sharing scheme classifies provinces into three types: those in 
budge surplus, self sufficient, or in budget deficit. Provinces in surplus retain half of 
their surplus, while deficit provinces can keep all recorded revenues in excess of 
budgetary targets. Given this incentive structure, provincial governments have little 
rationale to report budget surpluses or excess revenue.
344 Few actually do. In the 
expenditure plan for fiscal year 2002-03, for example, only the provinces with the 
wealthiest urban areas (Vientiane, Savannakhet, and Champasack) remitted any 
revenues to the central government.
345 The rest displayed weak budgetary controls and 
under-reported revenue collection. In some instances, national revenues collected by 
the provinces are recorded in a separate, provincial budget and earmarked for local 
development funds. 
Further complicating efforts to unify the management of government finances, 
provincial authorities open their own bank accounts at local branches of state-
commercial banks.
346 Out of these accounts, governors control government operations 
in their respective regions. Thus, provincial offices of MoF fall under the control of 
                                                 
344 Provinces have an incentive to “cook the books” when they surpass their revenue targets for the 
fiscal year. A large proportion of revenues collected above fiscal targets (50%) by law should be 
remitted to the national treasury. In practice, virtually none leaves the provinces. Ibid., 9.  
345 Although in surplus, these three provinces failed to meet their revenue targets. World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank, "Lao PDR 2002," 51. 
346  In Savannakhet province, for example, various government administrations open a total of 19 bank 
accounts, in three different banks. Ibid., 39. The lack of a single network of treasury accounts attests to 
the underdeveloped nature of the financial system.      153 
 
governors, who decide on personnel issues and salaries of public officials in their 
locality.  
With authority to speak for the government, provincial governors greatly 
influence the assessment and collection of national revenues, whether customs duties 
or other applicable taxes. As a result, national rules and guidelines continue to be 
interpreted to suite the local context. In its promotion of local self-reliance, for 
example, Instruction 01/PM may have exacerbated these weaknesses of tax 
administration. The government lacked clear guidelines on how to interpret the Prime 
Minister’s order. Interpretations and applications of the instruction vary across the 
country.
347 In many instances, local authorities have used the instruction as a pretext to 
increase their hold on government revenues. Empowered by this instruction, local 
officials have effectively increased revenue collection at the village level. Since 2000, 
when the instruction was first promulgated, remittance of government revenues to the 
central treasury has decreased.
348    
While MoF actively monitors the government’s finances in the capital, their 
power of oversight quickly disappears at the local level. According to the 
government’s formal organization chart, field offices of the customs and tax 
departments report to the vertical hierarchy of MoF. In practice, horizontal authority 
of the provinces control fiscal management, irrespective of national rules to the 
contrary. Outside the capital, tax offices of MoF fall under the Provincial Offices of 
Financial Services, which control all public expenditure and revenue management at 
the local level.
349  
                                                 
347 Stoop, "Fiscal Centralisation and Decentralisation," 21. 
348 Ibid., 9. 
349 For the organizational structure of the Ministry of Finance, see Figure A37, Appendix. The field 
offices of MoF play a double role in the provinces. Besides managing national revenues and 
expenditures, they also manage their provincial equivalence under the direction of governors. In 
practice, all fiscal management in the provinces falls under local control. Provincial authorities 
determine working conditions and salary scale for staff of field offices of MoF.      154 
 
With limited authority in the provinces, the central government struggles to 
control discretionary spending. Attempting to address this issue, the central 
government recently instructed that only projects included in the annual PIP and 
approved by the National Assembly should be funded from the budget.
350 Still, 
provincial and district officials routinely authorize local spending on unapproved 
expenditure items. This discretionary power of local governments contributes to soft 
budget constraints and uncontrolled spending. Revenues designated for the central 
budget usually never leave the provinces. Instead of remitting surplus revenue to the 
central level, provincial authorities usually disperse the windfall on local projects not 
approved by expenditure plans.  
The Lao government lacks a clear and appropriate division of fiscal roles and 
responsibilities. Overlapping and conflicting jurisdictions between vertical and 
horizontal lines of authority have limited the scope of fiscal reforms. At the 
institutional level, financial laws and regulations need a clearer distinction in roles and 
responsibilities of the various levels of government. In tax administration, 
international advisors recommend improved reporting, transparent accounting, and 
adequate controls on the use of government funds.
351 Capacity remains weak, 
requiring improvements to strengthen internal controls, inspections, and audits at 
different levels of government.
352 No doubt partly true, these administrative and fiscal 
reforms remain far from complete without a broader overhaul of inter-government 
relations in Laos. 
At the borders, meanwhile, customs regulations have longed lacked uniformity 
across the provinces. Possibly unique among modern states, the Lao PDR lacks 
                                                 
350 World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank, "Lao PDR 2002," 81. 
351 Stoop, "Fiscal Centralisation and Decentralisation," 7. 
352 Ibid., 8.      155 
 
centralized control over customs collection. Again, provincial authorities enforce 
national policies at their own discretion. As a consequence of this predicament, 
seldom do national customs revenues make their way to the capital. Although 
technically under the supervision of central authorities of MoF, customs official 
receive local salaries and rarely enforce national regulation to the detriment of local 
interests. Frequent conflicts of interests between central policy and local prerogatives 
usually resolve in the latter’s favor.  In many instances, provinces compete with one 
another for import transit fees and frequently grant arbitrary tariff exemptions to 
promote investments in their respective regions. Attempting to unify customs 
regulations, the donor community continues to advise the central government on ways 
to streamline customs procedures. With donor assistance, the amount of paperwork to 
clear customs has reduced significantly. Still, provinces value categories of imports 
differently, allowing importers to shop between entry points.
353 Fiscal discretion 
among the provinces prevents the development of a unified economic space. This 
situation intensifies economic competition among the provinces in a struggle for 
scarce sources of investment. To promote investment in their regions, governors prefer 
to grant exemptions rather than enforce a strict tax regime. 
In this fragmented fiscal structure, improvements in fiscal management have 
come slowly, intermittently, and sporadically—to the frustration of international 
economic advisors in Laos. According to many observers, the central government and 
MoF lack the capacity to monitor the performance of tax collection by provincial 
authority.
354 Studies of reforms at the Tax and Customs Departments suggest the need 
to establish a national tax administration, an expanded Tax Department with qualified 
personnel, and clear mandates to steer, monitor, and evaluate tax administration 
                                                 
353 Sida, "Financial and Administrative Systems," 24. 
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nationwide.
355 International advisors suggest the need to centralize all areas of tax 
administration: from tax registration, filing/payment, control/audit, to enforcement and 
appeal. They emphasize a movement towards a concentration of tasks, creation of 
strong centers of competence, and reduction of redundant and inefficient work. 
Essential to this rationalization, salary and personnel issues (for customs and national 
tax staff) require strong vertical (i.e., central) lines of control. These fiscal reforms 
entail building a national customs and a unified tax administration, with strong vertical 
lines of control.  
Revenue Restructuring and Collection 
The current tax system in Laos identifies two broad categories of taxpayers, 
depending on their income (for individuals) or turnover (i.e. sales for businesses).
356 
Local governments impose taxes on small businesses and individual taxpayers. With 
this fiscal power, provincial authorities routinely grant exemptions and preferential 
treatment to investors, at times in competition with other provinces. Particularly with 
the turnover tax, provincial authorities offer a wide variety of exemptions for 
development purposes, and businesses have exploited the loopholes with calculating 
shrewdness.
357 In many instances, medium-sized companies register as small 
businesses, even though their sales turnover classifies them at the higher tax-bracket. 
Categorized in the local tax system, many businesses escape higher taxes and stricter 
regulations by MoF. Under the jurisdiction of local tax administration, businesses 
negotiate their tax liability without having to present records of sales required of 
                                                 
355 Swedish International Development Agency, "Swedish Support to Strengthen Fiscal Management in 
Lao PDR: Capacity Study on Organization and Management Issues of the Tax Administration,"  
(Vientiane, Lao PDR: SIDA, Ministry of Finance (Lao PDR), 2003). 
356 For a breakdown of taxpayers, see Table A21, Appendix.  
357 These exemptions include imports of goods for the agricultural sector, air transportation, medical 
use, banking, education services, and a variety of other goods recognized for development purposes. 
See Swedish International Development Agency, "Tax Policy and Administration Issues," 10.       157 
 
medium and large businesses.
358 The lack of transparency in the system results directly 
from local discretion in tax administration. Moreover, the absence of a national tax 
administration reduces accountability, while contradictory lines of administrative 
responsibility weaken fiscal controls. Because of the system’s perceived lack of 
fairness, many taxpayers fail to report their tax liability accurately, if at all.   
The Ministry of Finance fails to define the limits within which provinces can 
create and manage local taxes and other revenues. The central government makes no 
clear distinction between local and national taxes or simply fails to enforce uniform 
standards throughout the country. As a result, provincial authorities collect and spend 
most taxes in their respective locales.
359  
Part of the problem lies in the confusion over national and local taxes. A clear 
distinction between the two does not exist. Efforts to clarify the distinction have 
compounded problems of enforcement and regulation. The infamous Prime Ministerial 
Decree 192 complicated fiscal management, where conflicting interpretations of the 
decree’s intent continues to hamper vertical and horizontal coordination between MoF 
and the provinces.
360 This decree was intended to clarify national revenues from local 
ones but, in reality, created further confusion of tax administration. For some tax 
categories, the distinction between national and local taxes is far from clear, allowing 
even more local discretion in fiscal matters.
361  
                                                 
358 Up to mid-2003, tax officials have redefined some 1900 taxpayers from the lower to higher tax 
bracket, under central government oversight. Swedish International Development Agency, 
"Strengthening Fiscal Management in Laos," 17. 
359According to some tax advisors, national taxes should ideally include customs duties, excise, 
turnover/value added tax, profit tax, tax on dividends paid, and salary tax. Local budgets should 
comprise local taxes and fees, a portion of national taxes, and funding from the national budget for 
government service delivery at provincial and district levels. Stoop, "Fiscal Centralisation and 
Decentralisation," 5. 
360 Government of Lao PDR, "Decree on the Implementation of the State Budget Law, No. 192/Pm." 
361 For example, national revenues ostensibly include import duties, special export levies, direct and 
indirect taxes, and “all kinds of fees,” among many others. The provinces have authority to collect a      158 
 
Nor do clear rules and regulations ensure compliance by local officials. The 
central government lacks the capacity to enforce central directives uniformly across 
the country. This problem transcends the mere codification of rational rules and 
regulations, which in the context of weak enforcement matter little. Regional interests 
continue to hinder government efforts to rationalize the country’s public 
administration. As a result, the tax system is riddled with exemptions and varying tax 
rates that lack uniformity across the country.
362 
The most egregious flaunting of national directives takes place at the village 
level, where financial units collect taxes in consultation with district authorities.
363 As 
part of the overall village administration, members of these financial units do not 
qualify for government salaries but, instead, keep a percentage of their collected taxes. 
Nor do local remittances of central revenues follow standard procedures, either within 
or across provinces.
364 Inconsistent interpretations and arbitrary legal enforcement 
notwithstanding, new fiscal rules, especially Instruction 01 and Decree 192, appear to 
have one outstanding commonality: increased tax collection at the village level.
365  
Because village administrations depend almost entirely on their ability to tax 
peasants, local officials have tended to view recent fiscal reforms from the capital as a 
                                                                                                                                              
variety of other direct and indirect taxes. In the absence of clear rules, regulation, and central 
enforcement, provincial officials have interpreted the decree to their perceived self-interest.  
362 Supported by the donor community, various programs of tax and customs reform focus on the 
structure of taxes, procedures in their collection, and computerization of fiscal management. Despite 
efforts to improve tax and customs collection, revenue performance continues to fall below 
expectations. Sida, "Financial and Administrative Systems," 24. 
363 Currently, village authorities have responsibility for collecting the following taxes: land tax, 
presumptive (i.e. turnover) tax for small businesses, taxes on sales of animals, gun permits, and other 
taxes on consumption goods. Patrick Stoop, Assessment of Current Decentralization (Vientiane, Lao 
PDR: GPAR and UNDP, 2002) 21. 
364 As outlined in Instruction 1823 from MoF, village financial units can keep revenues according to the 
following formula: 4% of revenues for villages in urban areas, 6% for villages in urban periphery, 10% 
for rural villages, and 15% for remote villages. Sekong province uses these percentages: 10, 15, 20, and 
50 respectively. Ibid.  22. 
365 Ibid.  22-3.      159 
 
call for more vigorous revenue collection at the village level. These revenue increases 
derive, in part, from land taxes, whose collection surged over 100% in some areas. 
Associated with this spirited attack on the natural economy, the government’s new 
land use policies, based on regulating land titles, have attempted to expand the market 
for formal property rights.
366 Concomitantly, access to land titles guarantees greater 
membership in the tax state. Although revenues collection has suffered from poor 
administration and declined in recent years, tax collection in the villages has 
surprisingly increased.  
Management of State-owned Enterprises and Banks 
The management of state-owned assets indirectly affects fiscal crises. To 
strengthen the broader fiscal position, the IMF has advanced programs to reform the 
country’s state commercial banks (SCBs) and their associated state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). Without strict oversight, international advisors warn, operating expenses at 
theses government businesses pose the biggest threat to fiscal sustainability in the 
medium term.
367 Lao banks are technically insolvent, lacking prudent credit 
management and strong regulation. Acting at the central bank, the Bank of Laos 
regulates the financial system and continues to follow a policy of directed lending, in 
which government priorities, rather than sound assessment of financial risk, determine 
credit worthiness at the state-owned banks. Consequently, non-performing loans at 
state banks may reach as high as 90% of all outstanding debt. Three SCBs dominate 
                                                 
366 Property rights in Laos are murky. Like all socialist countries, land in Laos formally belongs to the 
state, which then leases out property for development purposes. In a February 1988 speech, President 
Kaysone clarified the meaning of landownership rights in Laos: “Under our new system, the entire land 
is the common property of the entire society with the state as the representative.” Quoted in Evans, 
"Planning Problems in Laos," 108. In reality, abundant rural farmland land belongs to those willing to 
stay and development its agricultural potential. Only in the more populated urban areas are rights to 
property more stringently enforced. AusAid and the World Bank have developed land tilting programs 
to help the government create a market for formal property rights.  
367 World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank, "Lao PDR 2002."      160 
 
the financial system and account for almost three-quarters of all banking assets.
368 
Responsible for 80% of these deficient loans, SOEs survive off loose credit policies, 
rather than operational self-sufficiencies based on the profit motive.
369  
Like other communist states, the Lao PDR has long engaged in direct 
production of economic output. Since the reform period in the early 1990s, the 
government has drastically reduced the number of state-owned assets. At present, the 
central government directly runs 34 state-owned enterprises and collaborates in eight 
joint ventures.
370 An obstacle to more far-reaching reforms, provincial control of 
another 59 SOEs guarantees the continuation of fiscal crises. Exhibiting a strong 
presence in many areas of local governance, provincial governments figure 
prominently in the financial distress of state-run businesses. Many SOEs, mainly at the 
provincial level, suffer from weak governance oversight, poor financial reporting, and 
a lack of proper accountability to the central government. Most SOEs pay taxes, and 
efforts are underway to transfer the largest SOEs in the provinces to central oversight 
under the large taxpayer unit, where tax liabilities formerly under local control would 
enter the central treasury directly.  
At the provincial level, two SOEs account for half of all outstanding loans, 
Phoudoi and DAFI, military conglomerates made powerful through their regional 
                                                 
368 These dominate banks are Banque pour le Commerce Exterieur du Laos (BCEL), Lane Xang Bank 
(LXB), and Lao May Bank (LMB). Another government-owned bank, the Agricultural Promotion Bank 
(APB), acts as a development bank and accounts for only 5% of total banking assets. Subject to policy 
lending in the agricultural and rural sectors, APB escapes stricter financial regulations that the Bank of 
Laos demands of the commercial banks. International Monetary Fund, "Select Issues (Sep 02)," 3. 
369 International Monetary Fund, "Staff Report No. 05/08," 5. 
370 Prior to market reforms in the early 1990s, the state sector enjoyed a virtual monopoly in the 
industrial sector and employed roughly 10% of the non-agricultural workforce. In the market transition, 
the communist rulers emphasized privatization of SOEs, and the government drastically reduced its 
direct involvement in economic output. Out of 640 SOEs in operation in 1989, only 93 currently remain 
fully state-owned, with 32 designated “strategic” and immune from privatization. With this downsizing, 
SOEs now account for about 15% of industrial output and less than 1% of the workforce. See 
International Monetary Fund, "Select Issues (Sep 02)," 5.      161 
 
monopolies of the lucrative logging industry. Responsible for 40% of all non-
performing bank loans, Phoudoi alone comprises 58 companies spanning travel, 
hotels, construction, logging, and other enterprises.
371 Guided by the international 
financial institutions, the government hopes to consolidate Phoudoi into nine holding 
companies through the sale of non-core assets.
372 As part of the general trend towards 
centralization of economic management, MoF recently took ownership of Phoudoi in 
2001 and seeks to disentangle the financial accounts of the conglomerate’s various 
units, in efforts to merge its core assets.
373 
In some key strategic areas, capital continues to be politically allocated, 
irrespective of locale. Nonetheless, the problem runs deeper in the autonomous 
provinces. While the central government more strictly oversees lending policies in the 
capital, oversight and enforcement of lending policies diminish outside Vientiane. 
Overall, reforms in the banking and enterprise sectors to limit the growth of non-
serviceable debt require an overhaul of inter-governmental relations, stronger control 
and supervision by central authority, and reduced autonomy of the provinces.  
Central Strategies for Fiscal Control 
The current tax system performs below expectations. Tax evasion runs high. 
Across the provinces, tax exemptions reduce overall compliance, by distorting 
taxpayer incentives to abide by formal regulations. Moreover, local hoarding of central 
revenues reflect the overall lack of transparency and accountability in tax 
administration. While some reforms call for strengthening central authority at the 
expense of local discretion, others (especially in tax collection and revenue 
management) attempt to circumvent provincial authorities all together. Foremost on 
                                                 
371 Also known as Bolisat Phattana Khet Phoudoi (or Development Company of Phoudoi district), 
Phoudoi operates out of central Laos.   
372 International Monetary Fund, "Select Issues (Sep 02)," 10. 
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this agenda is the need to define – and thus limit— the powers of governors in fiscal 
management. The following section discusses three current strategies: (1) direct tax 
collection by the central government, (2) a value-added tax to force compliance 
national standards, and (3) super-regions to usurp fiscal independence of the 
provinces.  
In the major urban centers, MoF has established a Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU) 
to streamline and centralize tax collection of medium and large businesses. Taxes 
collected through these units enter the national treasury directly. Located in the large 
urban areas, large businesses pay taxes directly to MoF, effectively cutting off some 
provinces from fiscal control of a major source of revenues. Efforts to establish these 
units nationally across all provinces have met with resistance from the provinces, 
which unenthusiastically welcome the surrender of locally collected, state taxes to the 
center. 
In light of the many tax distortions, international advisors have pushed the Lao 
government to introduce a value-added tax (VAT) to replace the current turnover tax, 
a source of major exemptions. If properly implemented, the VAT may overcome fiscal 
independence of the provinces by reducing the scope of arbitrary tax regulations now 
controlled by governors. Also known as the general system of tariffs, a VAT levies a 
charge on all goods and services at each point of sales. Although similar to the 
turnover tax in targeting business sales receipts, the VAT restricts the number of 
possible tax rates, usually in essential food and agriculture. In streamlining revenue 
administration, its single tax rate facilitates compliance while limiting the scope for 
exemptions.
374 By reducing tax distortions, the VAT—in the most optimistic of 
                                                 
374 The VAT improves transparency by placing the onus of record keeping with the taxpayer. Provided 
they retain records of their sales transactions, VAT taxpayers, except for final consumers, can claim a 
deduction on their VAT purchases. Adopted in many countries, the VAT is recognized as a fair and 
effective consumption tax. Seen as part of an overall fair and efficient tax system, the VAT also 
contributes to a strong business climate to attract foreign investments. See International Monetary Fund,      163 
 
scenarios— increases taxes and offsets revenue losses anticipated from forced tariff 
reductions in 2008. Due in part to the intransigence of provincial authorities, the VAT 
has proved difficult to implement, and its successful introduction looks uncertain.
375  
In the meantime, central government officials have proposed another strategy 
to usurp the financial powers of provincial authorities. In the capital, tax advisors and 
officials at MoF toss around the idea of creating super-regions, encompassing several 
provinces, as a new tier of government to control tax administration. Officials justify 
this new concentration of fiscal authority from the point of view of staffing. By all 
estimates, MoF is understaffed and lacks qualified personnel to administer its tax 
regime. Moreover, the location of staff in no way corresponds to potential for revenue 
collection. For example, tax officials in the capital city collect about a third of all local 
taxes, as well as all central government revenues. The average tax official in Vientiane 
processes 375 taxpayers. In contrast, the smaller provinces, such as Phongsaly and 
Saravane, process around only 30 taxpayers per tax official.
376 Moreover, districts and 
villages administer an overwhelming number of individual taxpayers, which bring in 
only 5% of all tax receipts.
377 Even though local officials have collected more 
revenues, the meager proceeds from village taxation, at only 2-3% of total government 
income, hardly justify the cost of disrupting the natural economy.
378 Unless MoF re-
assigns staff to monitor taxpayers by their capacity to pay (usually in urban centers), 
provincial governors and their horizontal lines of control at district and village levels 
                                                                                                                                              
"Strengthening Fiscal Management: Understanding Tax and Customs Administration Reforms,"  
(Vientiane, Lao PDR: IMF, 2002). 
375 When the VAT takes effect, now slated for 2006 at the earliest, the turnover tax will be abandoned. 
Swedish International Development Agency, "Tax Policy and Administration Issues," 25. 
376 Swedish International Development Agency, "Strengthening Fiscal Management in Laos," 16. 
377 Ibid., 23. 
378 Stoop, Assessment of Current Decentralization  23.      164 
 
will continue to view fiscal reforms solely in terms of increasing revenue collection 
from the easiest targets, village peasants. 
The current, regressive tax regime fails to make good use of scarce government 
resources. Because tax officials remain geographically scattered throughout the 
countryside, efforts to concentrate resources in the large urban areas may prove more 
cost-effective in the long-term. By targeting business in the productive urban centers, 
MoF can make better use of scarce staff. A draft law on tax management has 
considered such a possibility of concentrating fiscal control. In consolidating fiscal 
tasks to fewer provinces, this radical strategy would effectively reduce the number of 
subnational units of government. Upon careful review and debate within the Central 
Committee, however, provincial officials effectively watered down the rule’s 
enforcement mechanism and delayed any final decision to enact changes.
379 More a 
planning fantasy than feasible solution, the idea of super-regions lacks broad-based 
political appeal outside Vientiane. Central government officials at MoF have 
expressed the desire to consolidate tax and fiscal authority but resigned themselves to 
a slow and gradual reform program that recognizes and respects the enduring strength 
of provincial officials in all aspects of local governance.  
The possibility of central authority bypassing horizontal controls of national 
revenues collected locally, for the moment, remains political untenable. Since 2000, 
the government has lost more control of revenue collection and cash flow management 
to the provinces, which exert tremendous influence over the field offices of tax, 
customs, and treasury administration. Coupled with failed efforts to expand the Large 
Taxpayer Unit, the weakening of central control over fiscal management imperils 
macroeconomic stability, compounding the government’s perennial fiscal crisis. 
Moreover, the loss of fiscal control limits the central government’s role of 
                                                 
379 Personal communications with tax officials and advisors at MoF, March 2005.       165 
 
redistribution to redress regional inequalities. As a consequence, poorer provinces and 
districts have suffered from major cash flow problems, such as delays in salary 
payments for teachers and other civil servants working in remote, poorer areas of the 
country.
380 In all matters of governance, provincial authorities continually re-assert 
their horizontal authority over vertical incursions of central line ministries. This 
autonomy hampers reforms in other areas of the country’s modernization.  
The Quest for Hard Budget Constraints 
A hallmark of socialist production, SOEs in Laos exhibited “soft budget” 
constraints that lacked a profit-making rationale.
381 These soft budgets also apply to 
the public household as well, in which negotiations by political elites, rather than the 
revenue limits on spending, determine the scope of fiscal crises. To improve hard 
budget constraints that better matches revenues with expenditures, fiscal 
modernization in Laos would require the reduction of provincial authority, vis-à-vis 
central government. This section surveys the trend towards decentralization and then 
develops an analytical model to examine the claim that centralization provides an 
appropriate policy at Laos’ level of development.  
Fiscal Decentralization in International Perspective  
The experience in Laos presents a clear-cut case where market liberalization 
has been followed by very statist, centralizing policies, reinforcing Karl Polanyi's 
claim that the free market demands strong state regulation.
382 While encouraging a 
                                                 
380 Stoop, "Fiscal Centralisation and Decentralisation," 10. 
381 As a result, chronic shortages of resources, as Kornai perceptively captures, plagued the entire 
system. In contrast to the capitalist economy, marked by demand-constraints, socialist production ran 
into perennial supply constraints, accounting for its low level of efficiency. See Kornai, Socialist 
System.  
382 Written during the World War II era, Karl Polanyi's Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 1st 
Beacon paperback ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). presents a compelling argument on the economic 
process of modern civilization. Polanyi makes several important contributions to the study of political 
economy.  First, he describes an economic system as embedded in a society and reflecting the social 
values of that society.  Second, this social construction of markets reveals the fallacy of the idea of a      166 
 
nascent private sector, the government, under the guidance of international 
institutions, has seen fit to usurp the authority of provincial governors.  
Despite evidence of centralization, many in the development community in 
Laos promote policies of decentralization. Donors in Laos, as elsewhere, link the long 
term benefits of good governance, local empowerment, and market exchange with the 
broad push for decentralization in the public sector. Perhaps in ignorance of the 
country’s history of devolution, international advisors routinely promote the general 
idea of decentralization, as if the edifice of central planning required dismantling.  
The campaign for decentralization also appears to misrepresent fiscal policies 
as well.  Prepared for the Swedish International Development Assistance and the 
World Bank, a recent report entitled Fiscal Decentralization in the Lao PDR: 
principles, practices and prospects in 2001 describes the evolution of the current 
revenue-sharing scheme and efforts to reform tax collection. However, the reader is at 
pains to see where an actual fiscal decentralization component fits into current reform 
efforts.
383 Recent reforms have begun to address the inefficiencies in the tax sharing 
system, which donors continue to assist with technical expertise. Yet, coaxed in the 
language of decentralization, programs to improve tax administration takes on new 
dimensions– divorced from any economic rationality – and becomes part of a 
development discourse incompatible with political realities.   
Various development reports on Laos attempt to portray a country removing 
the shackles of communist central economic planning to embrace free market 
                                                                                                                                              
self-regulating market.  Third, the expansion of markets creates a countermovement which checks (for 
society's self-protection) the deleterious effects of markets.   
  
383 Francois Vaillancourt, "Fiscal Decentralization in Lao PDR: Principles, Practices and Prospects in 
2001," in Paper prepared for the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) to support the 
Public Expenditure Review of the World Bank (Vientiane, Lao PDR: Sida, 2001). In addition, 
Vaillancourt rightly notes that all tax revenues are national but nonetheless states that a centralization of 
tax collection "is a major weakness and an obstacle to eventual meaningful decentralization" (p. 21).        167 
 
liberalism and decentralization of economic control. In this depiction, a 
decentralization of economic control, in freeing up prices, also includes the whole 
withdrawal of the state from economic management. As this chapter demonstrates, 
fiscal restructuring of the Lao state actually demands more central control of the 
budgetary process, tax management, and revenue collection. Without these reforms, 
fiscal crises will continue to limit the capacity of the national government to manage 
the market transition. 
Around the world, fiscal decentralization, as part of the overall reduction of the 
public sector, figures prominently in development thinking.
384 To some, the 
decentering of government authority asserts a worldwide trend, to others a larger 
“paradigm shift” in tackling underdevelopment.  Against this seeming trend, the 
market transition in Laos has required a strengthening of central administrative 
planning in fiscal matters. However, centralization of fiscal control is not an isolated 
case of peripheral socialism in the process of restructuring. In sofar as modernizing 
states elsewhere confront the same challenges to development observed in Laos, 
government centralization provides an appropriate development strategy to rationalize 
and consolidate a functioning public economy.  
As the experience in Laos demonstrates, without complete control of national 
revenues, the central government cannot increase the scope of tax collection. If the 
Lao government hopes to improve general fiscal management and reduce fiscal crises, 
political and economic reforms must curb the economic powers of the provinces. 
Currently, the central government controls neither the execution of fiscal policies nor 
the management of revenue collection. A clear distinction of national versus local 
revenues does not exist, and national taxes collected in the provinces usually fail to 
                                                 
384 Paul Smoke and Yun-Kwan Kim, eds., Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Asia: Challenges for 
the Future (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2002).      168 
 
find their way into the central treasury. As long as provincial authorities assert 
autonomy over national directives delegated through vertical line ministries, central 
efforts to stabilize the macro economy (through monetary and fiscal instruments) will 
continue to meet with limited success. A straightforward economic model helps to 
prove the point.  
A.H.P. and Fiscal Policymaking in Laos 
As seen from the fiscal side, market liberalization in Laos unequivocally 
demands administrative centralization. The analytic hierarchy process (AHP) model 
provides a useful way to analyze and quantify the costs and benefits of competing 
development policies. The model helps with decision making when participants cannot 
assign specific value or utility to particular decisions but can do more than just rank 
preferences.
385 Because of the secretive nature of governance in Laos, this model 
provides a useful way to gauge decision making within the communist government.
386 
This section uses the AHP model to compare competing policies to reduce fiscal crises 
of the Lao government.  
The Lao state is weak, and the transition from taxes on trade to direct taxes on 
income will strain the capacity of its tax administration. To improve fiscal 
management, reforms aim (1) to streamline, rationalize, and hence modernize 
procedures for tax collection; (2) to broaden the tax base by reducing exemptions and 
other tax distortions; (3) to control expenditure management at state-owned enterprises 
                                                 
385 As a broad method of measurement, AHP has been used as a tool in conflict resolution to evaluate 
the relative positions of interested parties. The method assumes that participants can “make pairwise 
comparisons of elements and state that one element is X times as desirable as a second one.” For an 
overview of AHP, see Iwan J. Azis and Walter Isard, "The Use of the Analytic Hierarchy Process in 
Conflict Analysis and an Exension," Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 3, no. 3 
(1996): 15. 
386 As the name implies, the AHP method structures a decision problem into a hierarchy that reflects the 
complex relationship inherent in the situation. It entails arranging goals, attributes, issues, and 
stakeholders into a related hierarchical structure. See Thomas L. Saaty and Luis G. Vargas, Decision 
Making in Economic, Political, Social and Technological Environments with the Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (Pitssburgh, PA: RWS Publications, 1994) 2.      169 
 
and banks. In addition, the Lao government’s fiscal position also depends on 
continued inflows of development assistance and foreign aid.   
Based on the above discussion of fiscal sociology, an AHP model of fiscal 
crises includes a series of three objectives, four targets, and three strategies. See 
Figure 12 below. This model is based on my own perceptions of the likely options 
available to government officials. Because of difficulty in direct access to government 
officials, I have substituted my estimates of the preferences and weighting of leading 
public officials. For making these estimates, I rely on information from the formal 
interviews conducted during my research in Laos.  
Overall, the reduction of fiscal crises in Laos requires sustained economic growth, 
a broadened tax base, and controls on expenditures. To achieve these objectives, four 
targets have to be realized: (1) sustained inflows of development assistance and 
foreign investment, (2) reduction of non-performing loans from state-owned 
enterprises, (3) efficient tax administration and better enforcement of fiscal rules, and 
(4) the rule of law. To meet these targets, the government must follow strategies to:  
 
•  attract foreign direct investment (FDI); 
•  sustain overseas development assistance from donor countries (ODA); 
•  implement Value-Added Tax to simplify tax collection (VAT); 
•  expand Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU);  
•  centralize tax administration, customs administration, and treasury 
management (National);  
•  establish strong central oversight of SOE management (SOE); and 
•  create super region encompassing several provinces (Super). 
 
In order to realize the above strategies effectively, the Lao government can 
pursue one of three plausible policies: (1) the international trend towards 
decentralization, (2) the status quo where governance is negotiated within the Central 
Committee, or (3) a developmentalist path towards strong centralization. After several 
runs of the model, it is possible to estimate what path is most likely to be taken. From 
simulations of the model on Superdecision software, option (3) of centralization      170 
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Figure 12. AHP Model for Reduction of Fiscal Crises in Lao PDR 
 
Note: * Values in parenthesis indicate eigenvalues (or priorities) associated with the 
AHP (initial value; robust values from sensitivity analysis).       171 
 
offered the best possible path to reduce fiscal crisis, as expected. These results are also 
robust. Varying the relative importance of the three alternative objectives (subgoals), 
repeated simulations consistently produced data supporting policies of centralization. 
Normalized values for option (3) exceeded 0.7, while the status quo option (2) came 
up a distant second, with values in the range of 0.15-0.18. As the least feasible 
alternative, policies of decentralization placed third in all simulations. See Tables A25 
and A26 in the Appendix.  
As the simulation makes clear, centralization in the developmentalist mold of 
its East Asian neighbors offers the most appropriate response to Laos’ economic 
underdevelopment. If hard budget constraints come from increasing financial 
accountability, in the execution of government budgets and the collection of state 
taxes, then fiscal reforms unequivocally require centralization. However, outright 
centralization remains a planning fantasy in Laos; and the above model fails to 
consider the costs of centralization.  
Capturing the negative impacts of fiscal restructuring, a second AHP model 
helps to explain the difficulties of enacting centralization in communist Laos. See 
Figure 13 below. Broadly speaking, fiscal structuring has political, economic, and 
social costs. Economic modernization risks (1) provincial instability of disempowered 
governors, (2) economic decline from disinvestment, (3) revenue redistribution to the 
detriment of wealthier provinces, and (4) strong central oversight of once autonomous 
regions and population. The potential impacts of these risks include:  
•  a declining political commitment to the regime;   
•  a weakening of the patronage networks; 
•  various costs to the local economy; 
•  decline of economic activity; 
•  loss of local sources of revenues; 
•  higher tax burdens; and  
•  loss of local autonomy.      172 
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Figure 13. AHP Model of Negative Impact of Fiscal Restructuring  
 
Note: * Values in parenthesis indicate eigenvalues (or priorities) associated with the 
AHP (initial value; robust values from sensitivity analysis).      173 
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The three possible policies remain the same: (1) decentralization, (2) status 
quo, and (3) centralization. From the perspective of modernizing elites in Laos, these 
costs may potentially outweigh the benefits of strong centralization policies, as the 
model suggests. Repeated simulations reveal that, from the standpoint of Lao officials, 
the centralization option (3) had the highest negative impact (normalized value of 
0.76) when weighted against political, economic, and social costs. The 
decentralization scenario (2) ranks second with 0.15, while the status quo option (2) 
possessed the least negative impact (at 0.09). As with the previous results, these 
rankings proved robust upon close inspection. See Tables A28 and A29, in the 
Appendix.  
A ratio of costs to benefits of the two models suggests, surprisingly, that the 
status quo option (2) may provide the most sensible path towards economic reforms. 
See Figure 14 below. Thus, while centralization provides the most appropriate policy 
of fiscal reforms, as the fiscal sociology above argues, the most likely scenario 
involves a negotiated settlement between provincial governors and modernizing  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Tables A30, A31 
Figure 14. Comparison of Benefit-Cost Ratios of AHP Models      174 
 
elites in the capital. There are several reasons why a cost-benefit analysis would 
produce this suboptimal economic result. First, the party may perceive that political, 
economic, and social costs of fiscal centralization are too high a price to pay for the 
country’s development. Second, while centralization offers the most ideal option from 
a fiscal standpoint, political realities prevent a full embrace of fiscal rationalization. 
Third, the enduring powers of provincial governors make the radical break with 
traditional authority less politically feasible. Fourth, in attempting to sustain a 
consensus for reform within the party, government officials may encounter difficulty 
justifying a wholesale transformation of fiscal policies. Party hardliners have long 
resisted market reforms that usurp their long-held powers. Thus, a political consensus 
that moves the reform agenda forward cannot, in all likelihood, embrace centralization 
to the strong detriment of traditional sources of political and economic authority.  
Given the cost-benefit analysis, the AHP modeling exercise captures some of 
the tensions of central-local relations and cautions against centralization as an 
unmitigated good policy of national development. To the extent that alternative 
policies and constraints closely mirror actual options of economic restructuring, this 
modeling exercise captures the general outlines of decision making alternatives for 
high-level government officials in Laos. In reality, governance reforms, bureaucratic 
rationalization, and the separation of party and state take place slowly and cautiously, 
as captured in the cost-benefit comparison. Into the near future, economic reforms will 
continue to be piecemeal, at times a constructive advance, other times a cautious 
retreat. Discussions with Lao authorities reinforce these views. In terms of the pace of 
economic restructuring, government officials emphasize a slow and carefully phased 
market transition that preserves a strong consensus for reform.  
Even though the third model (on cost-benefits) shows that a full embrace of 
centralization would, at this time, not be politically tenable, challenges to fiscal      175 
 
restructuring, nevertheless, equate with the struggle for centralization. As emphasized 
throughout this dissertation, economic modernization goes hand in hand with central 
control and regulation of the development process.   
In summary, efforts to replace the expected revenue shortfalls all point towards 
fiscal centralization, which follows from the logic of territorial state control and 
administrative consolidation explored in the previous two chapters. The modernization 
of government administration in Laos requires centralized control over fiscally 
independent and politically autonomous provinces. Resistance to centralization remain 
strong, accounting for the slow pace of fiscal reforms. Nonetheless, the country’s 
modernization demands fiscal reforms and structuring towards stronger central control 
and oversight. In creating the foundations of a market society and its national 
economic space, the Lao government continues to push for uniform economic 
regulation over regionally dispersed economies. 
Modernizing States and Fiscal Control 
In Laos, the quest for hard budget constraints resonates with the struggle to 
enforce central control and oversight of fiscal (as well as general economic) affairs. 
Experience of fiscal reforms in other countries also justifies the central push in Laos. 
Research into the budgetary process in some European countries discovers that 
centralized control over spending correlates with lower fiscal deficits.
387 Thus, if 
governments take seriously the need to control the budgetary process and to mitigate 
fiscal crisis, then centralized control over spending priorities appears to reduce deficits 
by hardening budgetary constraints.
388 In the absence of concentrated fiscal authority, 
                                                 
387 See Jakob De Haan, Wim Moessen, and Bjorn  Volkerink, "Budgetary Procedures: Aspects and 
Changes. New Evidence from Some European Countries,"  (University of Groningen, 1997).  
388 Strong central control over fiscal affairs in France and Germany have restricted budget deficits, 
while in Italy, loose expenditure management has, until recently, undermined prudent fiscal policies. 
See Juergen Von Hagen and Ian Harden, "Budget Processes and Commitments to Fiscal Discipline," 
IMF Working Paper 96/78 (1996).      176 
 
constant bargaining over the budget contributes to soft budget constraints and larger 
fiscal crises than necessary.  
In many areas of governance, provincial officials in Laos often fail to enforce 
fiscal policies and financial regulations in accordance with national directives. 
Although the Minister of Finance wields immense power as a high ranking member of 
the Central Committee, he holds equal rank with the 18 provincial governors, and his 
authority outside the capital depends of his relative position in the party hierarchy. 
Only a close analysis of the relative positions of party members provides clues to the 
effectiveness of national policies at provincial, and hence local, levels.  
On-going struggles for centralized political administration and financial 
management present one of the major challenges to the socialist transformation in 
Laos. The fragmented nature of governance of this nominally communist regime 
offers a stark contrast to the experience of Soviet communism. While socialist regimes 
in Eastern Europe decentralized economic control to their political demise in the late 
1980s, the Lao PDR, starting from de facto devolution, embraced a program of 
centralization in its market transition, not only in pragmatic response to the country’s 
low economic base, but also as a defensive strategy of political expediency.  
  Laos is not an isolated case. For many developing countries struggling to 
cement the foundation of a market system, economic and administrative centralization 
may, in fact, hold the key to stronger economic growth and rising standards of 
living.
389 If the international development community is serious about promoting 
national economic wealth in poor countries, there has to be a larger effort to recognize 
the central role of national governments in overall economic development. The highly 
                                                 
389 Research shows that the fiscal strength of states plays an important role in economic development. 
See J. W. Meyer and M. T., eds., National Development and the World System (Chicago: Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 1979), R. Rubinson, "Development, Government Revenue, and Economic Growth, 
1955-70," Study of Comparative International Development 12 (1977).      177 
 
regionalized and fragmented nature of Laos’s political economy may describe the 
situation in other parts of the world. For many developing countries carved out of 
colonial territories, a remote central government struggles to legitimize political rule 
over a disparate, and sometimes hostile, countryside. Like their European predecessors 
before them, these modernizing states strive for political and economic centralization, 
in a continuing quest for legitimation and accumulation. However, western 
development policies, drawn from the liberal tradition of the Enlightenment, are 
naturally reluctant to embrace central, concentrated authority.  
  To the extent that the market transition in Laos provides any broad 
generalizations for other post-socialist or developing countries, policies of economic 
consolidation and expansion of the public budget may prove more appropriate for their 
level of development than policies of public decentralization and fiscal contraction 
promoted by the international financial institutions. Communism aside, the market 
transition in Laos is not an exceptional case. There are broader lessons to be drawn 
from the market transition in Laos, especially in regards to central-local relations. For 
many modernizing states, centralization of fiscal, if not altogether political, authority 
may offer the most sensible path toward nationally-guided development. These 
reforms do not come without strong resistance from traditional sources of political 
authority, as the AHP modeling exercise reveals.  
In opting for market freedom in the absence of political pluralism, communist 
rulers in Laos seem to be following the successful example of their East Asian 
neighborhoods rather than the post-socialist debacle in Eastern Europe. Modernizing 
elites in many parts of East Asia have developed their country under a 
developmentalist model that values economic growth with social stability, while 
relying on sustained general economic growth for political legitimacy.      
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Chapter V 
THE ROAD TO SERFDOM AND BACK: 
THE PROCESS OF MARKETIZATION IN LAOS 
 
In surveying the fiscal crisis of the Lao state in detail, the first section 
describes the allocation of public expenditures and the tax structure. The second 
section explores fiscal reforms in the budget planning process, tax and customs 
administration, and deficit management. As with challenges of administrative 
restructuring discussed in the previous chapter, entrenched political interests at the 
local level continue to hinder fiscal reforms and the rationalization of financial 
management. Success in fiscal reforms, thus, requires strong central control over 
regionally autonomous and fiscally independent provinces, and the third section 
describes several strategies explored by the Lao government. The fourth section places 
fiscal reforms in international perspective and develops an analytical hierarchy model 
(AHP) to examine competing policies of fiscal management. In the conclusion, I claim 
that the fiscal experience in Laos is not an isolated circumstance of peripheral 
socialism, but rather a general case of a post-colonial state struggling to modernize a 
country in the face of traditional sources of political and economic authority.  
Communism and the Road to Serfdom 
The road to communism was paved with intellectual fervor. Nineteenth century 
socialist thinkers from Saint Simon to Engels boldly envisioned a socialism that would 
transform governmental authority dominating people to a simple bureaucratic 
administration of things.
390 In Engel’s optimistic assessment of the possibility of 
socialism, “The anarchy of the market is replaced by conscious social organization… 
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The laws of society come under man’s control, and men, for the first time, can make 
their own history.”
391 In the chaos and waste of market capitalism, each person 
unconsciously pursues his own self-interest, while no one consciously plans for 
betterment of the collective whole. According to Karl Marx, the dialectical unfolding 
of history leads to "replacing the domination of circumstances and chance over 
individuals by the domination of individuals over chance and circumstances.”
392 In his 
materialist conception of history, human development culminates in the end of history, 
with the transition from capitalism to communism. This higher form of social 
organization resolves the inners contradictions of capitalism. A socialist revolution 
would redistribute the wealth of capitalist production, thus liberating an exploited 
proletariat and emancipating all of humanity on a democratic road to socialism. Marx 
famously predicted “from each according to his ability to each according to his 
needs.” As prophesized in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, this utopia would 
contain “an association in which the free development of each will be the condition for 
the free development of all.”
393  
Where Marx optimistically asserts that "Democracy is the road to socialism," 
libertarians defiantly respond that capitalism offers the road to democracy. A chief 
proponent, Freidrich von Hayek, has long countered that the market is unknowable in 
its chaotic whole and, therefore, cannot be directed to achieve specific equality for 
specific people. In The Road to Serfdom, he offers a liberal defense of the free 
market.
394 He predicted that socialism would assure the enslavement of the masses, the 
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destruction of advanced civilization and human progress, and economic involution of 
impoverished states on their regressive road towards feudalism. Serfdom, he warned, 
awaited those societies undertaking the socialist experiment, however righteous their 
cause of redistribution, their quest for social justice, their vision for economic equality, 
or their hope for a better humanity. Unfreedom in the economic realm eventually 
obstructs freedom in the political sphere. In the true libertarian sense, Hayek 
confidently champions the belief that “free markets make free men.” Freedom in the 
economic realm presupposes freedom in all other spheres of human exchange and 
value.
395 
  These compelling ideologies shaped politics in the twentieth century and still 
frame controversies over the appropriate role of government in the economy.
396 By the 
early 1990s, the collapse of the communist second world contributed to a shift in 
political economic thinking about the role of states in relation to markets.
397 Currently, 
the socialist transformation in Laos presents similar competing world views about the 
appropriate role of government in the economy. In the context of these debates, this 
chapter examines the process of marketization in Laos. 
Summarizing the findings from the previous three chapters, the first section 
documents the history of central-local relations of the Lao government, whose 
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modernization embraces the centralization of public administration and economic 
management. Next, a review of books and donor documents on the market transition 
in Laos exposes a strong anti-centralist bias that not only misrepresents the role of 
government in the economy, but also reflects a discourse of diverse agendas from the 
development community. The distortion of economic rationality derives, in part, from 
the hegemony of a neoliberal ideology, and the third section examines the Hayekian 
roots of this market utopia. In countering this ideology, the fourth section advances the 
market perspective from the field of economic sociology, which posits a more realistic 
and pragmatic role of governments in economic development. Placing these 
competing market visions in the context of the Lao experience, the conclusion points 
to the constructive role of governments in developing countries to control the terms of 
economic liberalization and global integration.  
Government Structure and Central-local Relations in Laos 
In 1975, the Pathet Lao communist guerillas gained full control of Laos and 
established the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR). Under the direction of 
the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LRRP), the Lao government began 
experimenting with several forms of territorial organization, oscillating between 
central planning and regional autonomy, while adhering firmly to both democratic 
centralism and one-party control.
398  
Communist Consolidation with Weak Centralization: 1975-1986 
Like all modern revolutions, the one in Laos "resulted in the extension and 
strengthening of the power of the state over society."
399 The new regime moved 
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swiftly to enact socialist planning, agricultural collectivization, and administrative 
control over the countryside.
400 Rice cultivation and other productive activities came 
under central administrative control, which dictated production quotas, prices for 
goods and services, and civil service wages. The government treasury resided with the 
State Bank of the Lao PDR, which managed the supply of currency, transferred funds 
to subnational administrative units, and provided loans to state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). As a result of these centralized activities of the command economy, local 
governments lost a level of autonomy previously enjoyed under the Royal Lao 
government.  
Nonetheless, the provinces enjoyed a strong degree of regional autonomy from 
the central government in the capital Vientiane. With insecure borders and internal 
insurgencies against communist rule, the government severely restricted travel within 
the country and required self-sufficiency of local food production. In a country where 
the population remains geographically dispersed, moreover, an extremely poor 
transport and communications infrastructure contributed to weak central authority and 
a strong degree of regional autonomy. More than half the road system remained 
impassable during the rainy season. Many provincial towns lacked 
telecommunications links to the capital, and air travel often provided the only means 
of transport between outlaying provinces. Consequently, provincial authorities 
adopted central directives at their own discretion, to suite the local context. All the 
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socio-economic life.   
400 Observers find that the economic doctrine of the Lao PDR has paralleled similar but earlier phases of 
Marxism-Leninism in the former Soviet Union: war communism, cooperative movement, New 
Economic Policy, and capitalism (Funck, "Decentralization," 127.) Trotsky advocated and Lenin 
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while, the public administration remained weak and proved unable to implement a 
central planning system.  
  Up until the early 1990s, the weak central government transferred few 
resources to the autonomous provinces and expected none in return. Governors of each 
province reported directly to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. They 
maintained their own administrations and budgets, funded through transfers from the 
state budget and operational surpluses of SOEs under their jurisdictions. Possibly 
unique among socialist countries, horizontal lines of provincial control superseded the 
vertical authority of central ministries. Field office of central ministries (such as the 
Ministries of Education, Health, Agriculture, Finance, and Commerce) reported 
directly to the governors of their respective provinces. With little oversight from the 
central government, provincial governors amassed local power and developed 
networks of clan-patronage reminiscent of the previous Royal Lao government. 
  Over the first decade of its existence, the Lao PDR consolidated its rule and  
granted a large degree of regional autonomy, but in such a way as not to threaten the 
party's control.  One observer characterizes this period as “a spreading government 
presence, growing administrative control that reached to the village level, and a 
restructuring of the economy and political framework.”
401 Arguably, this process of 
political consolidation continues to this day.   
New Economic Mechanism and Regional Autonomy: 1986-1991 
Ultimately, the regime’s brand of socialism failed to improve the economic 
conditions in the country.
402 Peasant resistance and low productivity forced the 
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government to cancel its first experiments with agricultural cooperatives. Rather than 
endure communist hardship, many Lao poured across the porous borders of the 
Mekong River into Thailand and onward to the West. Economic failure threatened 
political stability and forced the LPRP to make pragmatic adjustments.  
Beginning in the early 1980s, the government instituted policies of incremental 
market liberalization, culminating with the New Economic Mechanism (chin tanakaan 
mai) promulgated at the 4
th Party Congress in 1986. Socialist economics gave way to 
market-oriented reforms, although the party doctrine formally recognized Marxist-
Leninism. While embracing the idea of free markets, the government embarked on a 
series of liberalization measures. Soviet and Vietnamese advisors, as well as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), of which Laos was still a member, urged these 
changes in policies.
403  
In abandoning central planning, the regime resorted to even more 
administrative and financial autonomy at the subnational level. In efforts to make local 
governments completely self-sufficient, the regime devolved massive government 
prerogatives to the provinces, which took responsible for managing and administering 
local resources.
404 The government abandoned administrative pricing and allowed 
market forces more scope for determining the value of goods and services. On the 
fiscal side, tax administration fell under the direct control of provincial governors, 
who also nominated managers of the local branches of the State Bank.
405 Independent 
of central authorities, these branches implemented their own credit policies. Provincial 
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authorities set their own exchange rates and determined salaries for civil servants. 
Self-management characterized SOEs, which no longer received subsidies but 
determined production levels, investments, and wages in accordance with market 
conditions.
406  
Continuing from the previous period, subnational units of government 
mirrored their central counterparts but were now granted relative autonomy, with the 
benefit of even less central government transfers. Provinces composed a quasi 
confederation of local entities, each resembling a mini-state.
407 This pure form of 
devolution created major weaknesses in the macroeconomy that the central 
government found difficult to resolve. As a result of local autonomy, financially 
instability increased, quality of public service delivery further declined, regional 
disparities widened, and physical infrastructures deteriorated for lack of maintenance.  
While autonomy of the provinces and state enterprises at first remedied the 
main failures of the previous command economy, the loosely connected regional 
economies later became an obstacle to the ongoing process of economic reforms. 
Instead of paying profit taxes to the state budget or making new investments, for 
example, SOEs increased salaries for workers, usually financed with loans from the 
local branch of the State Bank.
408 Before the implementation of the NEM in 1986, less 
than 20 percent of government expenditures went to salaries. As a result of local 
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autonomy, by 1990 salaries accounted for over 50 percent of current expenditures.
409 
Furthermore, financial and fiscal autonomy resulted in revenue imbalances among the 
provinces, while the central government received only 25 percent of fiscal revenues–
out of which it had to finance its own expenditure and those of poorer provinces.
410 To 
cover its annual budget, the central government relied heavily on bank loans to finance 
its perennial budget deficits. As a result, by mid-1989, inflation devalued the currency 
by over 100 percent. Yet, the central government possessed little power to dictate 
provincial credit policies, which governors directed towards local enterprises. Thus, 
while market-correcting measures contributed to economic growth, administrative 
decentralization eventually hampered efforts to stabilize the economy.  
A lack of qualified civil servants further exacerbated financial and economic 
mismanagement. Provincial governors held complete control over the hiring and 
financing of their personnel, whose political loyalty mattered more than their 
administrative competence. Central ministries possessed little authority over technical 
services at the subnational levels and faced difficulties enforcing national policies and 
addressing inefficiencies in the delivery of public services.
411  
To this day, political and economic governance remains fragmented along 
regional lines. Governors enjoy ministerial rank and fiercely defend their local 
autonomy against incursions from the central government. In the socialist 
transformation that began in the early 1990s, the central government undertook 
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reforms to wrestle administrative controls back from the provinces. Local autonomy 
led to sharp regional disparities and hampered government attempts at national unity 
and economic integration. Eventually, the central government moved to regain the 
economic initiative. Political and economic consolidation continues up to the present 
time. 
Market Liberalization as an Impetus for Recentralization: 1991-present 
Changing political fortunes in 1989 marked a watershed for the Lao 
government. By the end of the 1980s, economic reforms took on a new urgency with 
the withdrawal of aid from members of the former Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance, external assistance from the non-convertible currency area of the former 
Soviet Union and its satellites.
412 Dwindling financial support from its erstwhile 
communist brethren forced the regime to look West, in a new struggle for dependency, 
foreign investment, and aid. The party-state pragmatically welcomed the idea of free 
market reforms, and international donors readily stepped into the geopolitical void to 
plug the financial gap.  
Since the early 1990s, economic policies began to reflect "a systematic 
disengagement of the state from the management and financing of state enterprises."
413 
Responding to increased concerns over local mismanagement of natural resources, low 
tax revenues, and non-compliance with national directives, the central government re-
centralized budgetary control and re-attached all provincial and district technical staff 
to their respective national ministries.
414 In 1990, the State Bank turned into the 
Central Bank of the Lao PDR, which currently holds responsibility for monetary 
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policies. The World Bank and the IMF have encouraged and guided these changes 
with structural adjustment credits, conditioned on compliance to an economic 
framework of macroeconomic stability, improved fiscal performance, and 
efficiency—if not wholesale privatization—of SOE's.
415  
For the first 15 years of its existence, the Lao PDR followed no codified rule of 
law; the LPRP exercised complete power, albeit arbitrary and ad hoc, in the affairs of 
the state. Promulgated in 1991, the regime’s first constitution provided a firm legal 
foundation for economic liberalization.
416 In principle, the legal document 
strengthened the role of the National Assembly, which oversees activities of the 
government and the judiciary. However, decision making authority remains 
concentrated within the party, which encounters little opposition to communist rule.  
In addition, the constitution formally recentralized financial and budgetary 
management of the country. More radical changes in central-local relationships 
followed. The government promulgated Decree No. 68/PM (August 28, 1991) that 
established a system for centralized tax collection and budgetary functions within a 
Ministry of Finance. Under this system, still in effect in 2006, revenues collected in 
the provinces enter the central budget (through the national treasury) before being 
allocated to the line ministries and provinces. In principle, provinces no longer have 
their own sources of revenues and must rely on negotiations with the central 
government to determine their targeted levels of revenue generation and public 
expenditures.
417 Once this planning process has set targeted levels for provincial 
                                                 
415 Vokes and Fabella, "Lao PDR," 26. 
416 For a thorough review of the Lao constitution, including changes to draft forms of the document, see 
Stuart-fox, "Constitution of Lao PDR." See also Brown and Zasloff, "Government and Politics." 
417 Provinces are rewarded for increased tax revenues and can keep at least 50 percent of any surplus. 
See International Monetary Fund, "Lao People's Democratic Republic: Recent Economic 
Developments,"  (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2000). This and other recent IMF staff reports contain the 
most up-to-date summary of fiscal policies in the Lao PDR. The current tax sharing scheme, introduced 
in April 1999, classifies provinces into three types: those in budge surplus, self sufficient, or in budget 
deficit. Provinces in surplus keep 50 percent of their surplus, while the others can keep 100 percent of      189 
 
expenditures, governors cannot hope to change spending allocations during budget 
execution. The first national budget was prepared and approved in 1992. The national 
treasury followed in 1993 with a new system of disbursement that replaced the 
provincial branches of the previous State Bank.
418  
Centralization and rationalization of the machinery of government remain far 
from complete, however. In many ways, the provinces continue to assert 
administrative and fiscal independence from the central government. While in 
principle local staff of government agencies report to their central ministries back in 
the capital, in reality governors exert tremendous influence on all government 
activities in their respective locales. Financial rules and regulations lack uniformity 
across the provinces, which frequently grant tax exemptions and reduce customs 
duties for businesses in order to spur local investment—often in competition with 
other provinces. As a result, tax collection performs below expectations, while 
discretionary local spending typically fails to match revenue generating capacity. 
Consequently, perennial fiscal crises characterize the Lao state.  
The market transition, coupled with government efforts to regulate a suspicious 
(and sometimes hostile) countryside, has reinforced the general trend towards 
administrative centralization and political consolidation. The government has made 
no recent effort to relinquish central authority. Over the past ten years, the 
government has promulgated consistent policies that make clear the provenance of 
power and authority in the country. Powerful pockets of entrenched, regional interests 
have long resisted central incursions in their domains, however. Provincial governors 
continually re-assert their perceived right to govern their territories over incursions 
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from central directives. In the transition process, efforts to redress the highly 
devolved nature of governance figure prominently in the country’s modernization. 
Government efforts to separate state from party, promote a rule by law rather than 
decree, and streamline the public administration have engendered a parallel shift 
towards centralization.  
Peripheral States and the International Agenda of Decentralization 
  Since the early 1990s in Laos, the socialist transformation and marketization 
have resulted in more centralization of administrative control and economic 
regulation. In the process, governors have been disempowered, while central 
ministries have gradually reasserted control over their line ministries. Striving to 
unify the country and project its influence deeper into the remote countryside, the 
government has consolidated public institutions in accommodating the market 
transition. Administrative changes since market liberalization in the 1990s have not 
led to a devolution of economic control. Nor has the economic opening promoted a 
political one. Government restructuring during the market transition has reinforced 
the party’s hold on the government. In making pragmatic adjusting in the face of 
economic constraints, the party has consolidated its power base while managing a 
more market-driven economy. Ironically enough for this outpost of Marxist-
Leninism, the march to capitalism, as well as its initial road to socialism, has entailed 
a political and economic shift towards stronger government and centralization of 
public administration. 
But the experience in Laos is not an isolated case of peripheral socialism 
making do with a market-driven economy. To the extent that other developing 
countries encounter the problems of a weak center and strong traditional sources of 
political authority (at the local level), centralization may provide an appropriate policy 
for many developing countries, particularly peripheral states.      191 
 
Modernization and the Rationality of Centralization 
   In the market transition, Laos becomes more a typical developing country 
encountering many of the same problems of modernizing states: weak institutions, 
clientelism, ad-hoc enforcement of laws and regulations, corruption, etc. Thus, Laos 
presents, albeit in exaggerated forms, many of the dilemmas of national development. 
These challenges of modernization reinforce what David Slater calls the "centralist 
ethos of state power” in which the territorial restructuring of peripheral states, as well 
as the internal logic of their bureaucratic modernization, results in centralization of 
government authority.
419 My research agrees with these generalizations. In Laos, as 
for most peripheral states, the centripetal bias of national development gravitates 
towards centralization. For poor countries, to build capacity in most areas of 
governance demands the centralization of state functions.   
Despite these trends, a worldwide development agenda of decentralization 
aims to take governance reforms in the opposite direction. Complicating Laos’ 
modernization, some donors promote the idea of decentralization in disregard of the 
country’s economic and administrative fragmentation. As the next section reveals, the 
development discourse of decentralization obscures the reality of government 
restructuring and, by extension, sensible ways to promote the country’s 
marketization.  
The International Agenda of Decentralization 
  The experience of market reforms in Laos contradicts the worldwide trend 
toward decentralization. According to many observers, the push for government 
decentralization may be strong throughout the world.
420 Pushing the agenda of 
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decentralization in Laos, many in the development community present a general 
misreading of the market transition in Laos. Specific to Laos, many articles and 
reports of government restructuring either ignore the logic of centralization or dismiss 
the move as a necessary prelude to decentralization.
421 Nonetheless, the transition in 
Laos makes a strong case that, to be effective, market liberalization demand statist, 
centralizing policies. While encouraging a nascent private sector, the Lao government, 
under the guidance of some international institutions themselves, has seen fit to usurp 
the authority of provincial governors. However, the important role of the state in 
economic affairs has, in many instances, been needlessly ignored or simply equated 
with failed centralized planning.  
   To international experts on Laos, decentralization of economic prerogatives 
appeared, quite understandably if naïvely, as the natural progression for a country 
abandoning centralized planning and embracing free market “fundamentals.” 
Capturing this general misrepresentation of the market transition, a report by the 
UNDP provides the dimensions of two competing economic systems open to the 
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Devyani Mani, and Josefa S. Edralin, "Building Sustainable Planning Capacity in Lao PDR," Regional 
Development Dialogue 22, no. 1 (2001).; Frederick Brown, "The Economic Development of Vietnam, 
Laos, and Cambodia," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies  (1993).; Alan Taylor, "Rural Development 
Issues in the Lao PDR: Technical Assistance to the Lao PDR [Sppd Project Lao/98/551] Improving the 
Management and Implementation of the National Rural Development Programme,"  (Bangkok: 
International Labour Organization, 1999).; and Vokes and Fabella, "Lao PDR."      193 
 
country, as they were widely understood.
422 See Figure 15. In this model, socialism 
equates with failed central planning, and free market liberalism with privatization and 
decentralization. From this conventional wisdom, a move from central planning to 
market liberalization quite naturally entails a push towards decentralization and a 
rollback of state authority.
423 
  In general, economic reforms (i.e. market liberalization and privatization) have 
carelessly been conflated with decentralization in Laos. In various reports and books 
written on the country's transition to a market-oriented economy, government efforts 
to embrace a free market system (which have required very statist policies and a push 
 
Central Command  Market-based 
Centralization  Decentralization 
Administrative processes  Markets 
State/collective ownership  Private ownership 
Orders (for commands)  Incentives 
Monopoly  Competition 
Autarky  Internationalization 
 
Source: Reyes, “Role of the State” 51.   
Figure 15.  Dimensions of Imagined Economic Systems. 
 
                                                 
422 Romeo A. Reyes, "The Role of the State in Laos' Economic Management," in Laos' Dilemmas and 
Options: The Challenge of Economic Transition in the 1990s, ed. Mya Than and Joseph L.H. Tan (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 50-1. 
423 For recent articles that view decentralization as a natural concomitant to economic liberalization, see 
Mya Than, "Indochina: Transition from Centrally Planned Economy to a Market System," in 
Indochina: From Socialism to Market Economy, ed. Mathews George Chunakara (Hong Kong: Clear-
Cut Publishing, 1996), 35.; Robert J. Bennett, "Decentralization, Intergovernmental Relations and 
Markets: Towards a Post-Welfare Agenda?" in Decentralization, Intergovernmental Relations and 
Markets: Towards a Post-Welfare Agenda, ed. Robert J. Bennett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).; 
Brown, "Economic Development of Indochina," 3.; Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird, "Rethinking 
Decentralization," 4.; and Reyes, "The Role of the State in Laos' Economic Management," 50.      194 
 
towards recentralization) appear only as "market reforms," "macroeconomic 
adjustment," or simply "stabilization."
424 In these portrayals, "recentralization" is an 
unqualified bad and duly minimized.  
These various reports not only inaccurately portray government restructuring, 
but more importantly reveal a systematic misrepresentation of a development setting, 
using a picture constructed through a reliance on institutional norms which uncritically 
conflate economic liberalization with decentralization. If these reports fail to withstand 
academic scrutiny, it is not because of unprofessional or sloppy work, but rather 
because of an institutionalized development profession which frames decentralization 
as a particular type of development intervention. The reports attempt to portray a 
country removing the shackles of communist central economic planning to embrace 
free market liberalism and decentralization of economic control. This image can only 
be true if we equate a decentralization of economic control with privatization of state 
enterprises and other market correcting measures, e.g. price decontrol. Yet, 
decentralization of economic control requires much more. It would entail the form of 
regional autonomy that characterized inter-governmental relations prior to 1991. If 
donors seriously want to promote fiscal discipline and administrative competence, 
then the push for fiscal decentralization has little rationale in Laos, as elsewhere. 
Through a discourse on decentralization, nonetheless, donors continue to push 
their own agenda, one which advances a neoliberal program of economic liberalization 
and democratic crusades for self-determination,
425 at the expense of pragmatic 
adjustments in the face of social and political realities. Laos reveals, on a small scale, 
                                                 
424 See for example, Brown, "Economic Development of Indochina," 3.; Than, "Indochina," 35-6.; 
Vokes and Fabella, "Lao PDR," 31-112. 
425 According to Barry R. Weingast, "Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political 
Foundations of Secure Markets," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149 (1993), 
decentralization and federalism arguably make governments more political responsive to citizens and 
supportive of economic growth.       195 
 
a larger trend in economic globalization: the push for a minimalist state when, in fact, 
state-building demands institutional building for markets to function efficiently. Why 
then do donors push the agenda of decentralization?  
Neoliberalism and the De-central March to Capitalism 
At one level, the mismatch of perceptions on economic reforms and state 
restructuring suggests that a neoliberal ideology continues to cloud sensible economic 
policies at the multilateral organizations working in Laos. While international 
financial institutions continue to push neoliberal policies emphasizing export-led 
growth and pliable domestic markets for foreign domination, the UNDP and other 
donor agencies unwittingly contribute to the same agenda by promoting programs of 
decentralization. Embedded in these entrenched views of development is a religious 
and unquestioned belief in the power of unregulated markets to increase economic 
performance. The ideology portrays governments as intrusive, inefficient, and in 
opposition to free markets. This section examines the roots of neoliberalism, as 
described in the writings of its most indefatigable defender, Friedrich von Hayek.
426  
Hayek’s depiction of the market order derives from the neoclassical model of 
economic equilibrium
427 and the political liberalism of the Enlightenment,
428 which 
                                                 
426 For a recent discussion of neoliberal ideology, see David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005). Here, Harvey examines the condition of neoliberalism, which implies the 
reconstitution of state power that restores class privileges. For Harvey, neoliberalism dismantled the 
compromise of embedded liberalism that underpinned much of the Western welfare state up to the late 
1970s. As the new economic orthodoxy after 1979, this ideology emphasizes privatization, finance, and 
market processes to the detriment of state intervention in either the economy or social welfare. Harvey 
remains vague, however, on who exactly benefits from the reconstitution of class power.   
427 Such a market constitutes an allocative mechanism for the factors of production and commodities. 
The mutual adjustment of supply and demand creates a market equilibrium through the feedback of 
price signals. Markets work efficiently when private enterprises have free entry and existing firms 
exercise free exit. Decision-making by economic agents is decentralized. In the neoclassical economic 
order, failure is not only unpredictable, but a vital systemic tool for adjusting individual action. That is, 
economic power ideally is diffused, and markets disperse responsibility. The rigors of the market 
determine the allocation of resources and investments. The neoclassic model of market equilibrium 
derives from Say’s Law, which makes the assumption that everything produced will eventually be 
consumed. Classical economics claims that a market of supply and demand tends towards equilibrium. 
There are thus no crisis tendencies under capitalism. In theory, overproduction or underproduction      196 
 
together form the basis of this robust ideology. Neoliberalism promotes the abstract 
idea of liberal democracy, in a defense of individual freedom, free markets, limited 
government, protection of private property upon a foundation of the rule of law, and 
public accountability through a form of representative government. A liberal society 
has a healthy suspicion of concentrated authority and thus diffuses power, both in the 
economic and political realms. Economically, this diffusion implies a decentralization 
of decision- and profit-making in an ideal free market utopia in which individuals are 
free to enter and exit. Prices reflect relative scarcities of the factors of production and 
the opportunity cost of supply and demand. Politically, limited government increases 
the scope of individual freedom unfettered by an oppressive and exploitative state.  
In his writings, Hayek describes the emergences free market capitalism, the 
institutions which maintain it, and the consequences of destroying the traditions of this 
market order. He spent his life defending capitalism (or the “extended order” as he 
                                                                                                                                              
disappears in the long run. Unemployment thus suggests a temporary, short-run, dislocation which 
disappears once production and consumption returns to equilibrium. Prices fluctuate freely in response 
to supply and demand. In time, consumer prices and wages would correct production imbalances and 
eliminate unemployment. A free market ensures this equilibrium, in the long run. See Bell, "Prospects 
of American Capitalism." Classical economists, writes Bell, “rooted their system in a fear of 
concentrated power.” Bell, "Prospects of American Capitalism," 86. 
428 English liberalism, as derived from Kant, values individual rights and freedoms (while challenging 
government authority and other forms of concentrated power) and opposes government efforts to 
regulate the economy or personal morality. As Bell explains, 
Classic liberalism defined equality as equality before the law. The definition rests on the 
distinction between the rule of law and the rule of men. The rule of law sets the rules of the 
game which apply generally to all players; within these rules, individuals are free to strike their 
own bargains, make their own choices, determine their own actions. Under the rule of men, a 
governor or judge may set forth determinations which single out some, but not others, for 
obligation and redress. Often this may be for reasons of justice and fairness, but an element of 
arbitrariness and coercion remains. 
The bias of liberalism was for the first, even though an inequality of outcome might 
result, because its overriding value was the reduction of coercion by government and the rule 
of free bargain. The bias of social intervention was, and is, the element of redress in the name 
of some other value. The heart of the liberal argument is that men differ in their capacities, 
needs, aptitudes, and talents. Thus one has to distinguish between treating people equally and 
making them equal. The effort to make people equal must lead to some determination by an 
administrative body of the degree of differences, and the degree of redress. It therefore means 
treating people unequally. The logic is inescapable. See Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of 
Capitalism  260. Emphasis original.      197 
 
grandly describes the economic and social institutions of the free market) against what 
he perceived as the iniquities of socialism and its assault on individual freedom, 
private property, and advances in civilization. In his utopia, economic life arises from 
a spontaneous, accidental order—as much unpredictable as unplanned. The principle 
of consumer sovereignty defines a market economy. The aggregate decision of 
individuals or households, as consumers, determines what is to be produced, in 
accordance with their taste.
429 Hayek premises his argument for the market on a 
neutral assessment of value and a neoclassical equilibrium that satisfies supply and 
demand. The market is unknowable in its complex whole and cannot achieve specific 
ends for deliberate social purposes. Merit has no meaning in this ideal market 
economy. The price mechanism reflects the degree to which individual action benefits 
other participants. Profit provides the only material incentives for economic decisions. 
Decentralized, market-oriented economic systems based on competition, free 
entry/exit, voice, and private ownership of the means of production are more 
responsive to changes in relative prices and technology than centrally planned 
economic systems based on collective ownership and administrative allocation.  
From Hayek’s libertarian perspective, men do not intentionally create the 
complex system of a market, which evolves spontaneously by the virtue of human 
action. A product of evolutionary selection, morals and cultural rules form the 
foundation of this system. Rules of conduct adopted by a particular group, often for 
unknowable reasons, survive when they contribute to that group’s success. The value 
of exchange, the imperative of competition, and the necessity of private property 
evolved into the general principles that continue to guide the current market system. 
Knowable premises cannot always justify such rules, whose adoption may simply 
reflect the accident of history.  
                                                 
429 See Ibid.  223.      198 
 
A fatal misconception results from the misguided belief that human reason can 
understand the market order well enough to adjust these rules of conduct and direct the 
system towards any particular end. In this ideal type of a free market, no single 
economic actor has the capacity to comprehend all the relevant facts.
430 The market 
order allows individuals, through competition and price signals, to make use of 
information which need not be understood in its entirety. The impact of any individual 
action on this system cannot be predicted, but only approximated, since the system 
continually adjusts to innumerable individual inputs and decisions. A self-correcting 
equilibrium allows for the satisfaction of numerous needs and wants and makes a 
morally neutral assessment of value with respect to individual economic decisions. 
This extended order forms the basis of personal liberty, inexorably linked to economic 
freedom, and allows individuals to pursue their own needs and desires without being 
subjected to the coercive will of others.
431  
Neoliberalism contrasts the “purity” of the market system with the “corrupted” 
political process.
432 Given such stark alternatives, economic policies rationally should 
aim to slim the state by reducing the range of government functions. The ideology 
manifested itself most transparently in the erstwhile “Washington Consensus,” which 
for most of the past two decades dominated development thinking at the international 
financial institutions and the U.S. Department of Treasury.
 433 This consensus spanned 
                                                 
430 Friedrich A. von Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," American Economic Review 35, no. 4 
(1945). In this important paper, Hayek praises the price system as a mechanism for communicating 
information and knowledge that no central authority can possibly comprehend or make sense of. In 
essence, markets disperse information throughout the economy. 
431 Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1988). Expanding upon earlier ideas in The Road to Serfdom, Hayek offers a passionate 
defense of private property, which is morally correct and economically necessary. Collective action is 
roundly denounced as evil. Freedom derives from private property, which symbolizes an independent 
sphere free from outside interference.  
432 Stilwell, Political Economy  350. 
433 John Williamson, "Democracy and the "Washington Consensus"," World Development 21, no. 8 
(1993). In this highly influential paper, Williamson identifies a consensus within the international      199 
 
many areas of economic reform and development, justifying the notorious structural 
adjustment policies (SAPs) that dictated the terms of market liberalization in many 
developing countries. 
For the transition countries of the former Soviet block, neoliberalism provided 
the justification for the infamous “shock therapy” of economic reform, which 
attempted to inaugurate a market society in the absence of supportive structures and 
economic institutions.
434 In their rush to embrace the abstract idea of capitalism, 
however, countries in the former second world ran up against the harsh realities of 
capitalist construction and the difficulties of structuring market relations. Economic 
liberalization for these post-communist countries has produced mixed results, to say 
the least. Much to the chagrin of economists, economic performance of transitioning 
countries bears no relationship to the level of liberalization.
435 Many of these countries 
had to create market and government institutions practically from scratch; and initial 
                                                                                                                                              
financial institutions (i.e. World Bank and the IMF) and the U.S. government (i.e. Treasury 
Department) in ten areas of economic reform and development: fiscal discipline, public expenditure 
priorities, tax reform, financial liberalization, exchange rates, trade liberalization, foreign direct 
investment, privatization, deregulation, and property rights. (See what Gore article has to contribute to 
current economic policymaking. Charles Gore, "The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a 
Paradigm for Developing Countries," World Development 28, no. 5 (2000).) 
434 As John McMillan, Reinventing the Bazaar: A Natural History of Markets (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2002) 210, notes: 
The fastest route from a planned economy to functioning markets, it turns out, was not 
frenetically tearing down the old institutions, starting with a clean slate, and enacting top-down 
reforms. It entailed letting the new economy grow up around the old ones, maintaining some 
stability to let people create new ways of doing business.  
According to John McMillan, in this recent book about markets, a well-structured market contains five 
elements: a free-flow of information; protected property rights; trust in meeting contractual obligations; 
limits to negative externalities; and a culture that fosters competition. To promote these market-
enhancing rules, the government has an essential role to play in the economy. 
435 World Bank, "From Plan to Market: World Development Report 1996,"  (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 1996), Figure 2.1, p. 26.      200 
 
conditions, rather than liberal economic policies greatly influenced economic 
growth.
436 
For these post-socialist transitions, the simplistic view of socialism as mass 
utopia was prematurely overtaken by the naïve belief in the mystical powers of the 
“invisible hand” of a free market system. These opposing ideologies usually 
exaggerate the role of government in the economy. While socialism promoted the state 
as the arbiter of collective values, capitalism sang the virtues of an economic order 
unfettered by an obstructionist, if not altogether repressive, government. The stark 
contrast between markets and states tends to obscure the ways in which governments 
need to structure market relations.  
At an abstract level, it is hard to disagree with the Nobel Laureate. History has 
proven Hayek’s claims to be, for the most part, on the mark. Socialism has entailed a 
program of redistribution under a central planning authority. Despite socialism’s 
progressive appeal, the collectivization of the means of production and nationalization 
of industrial sectors produced few lasting gains in either the realm of economic 
development or legitimate claims to representative government. Soviet communism, in 
the form of allocative economics under bureaucratic administration and political 
repression directed by the vanguard party-state, collapsed under the weight of its 
overwhelming contradictions. Even if, as Hayek convincingly argues, central planning 
is not workable, does it naturally follow that that the market is inescapable?  
While socialist planning and Marxist ideology failed to live up to their own 
discursive myths, the liberal economy and the unconscious belief in the divine hand of 
the market equally disguised a religious devotion to a secular faith. Communism and 
                                                 
436 Initial conditions, by and large, determined economic performance in all the transition countries in 
Eastern Europe. See World Bank, "Transition, the First Ten Years: Analysis and Lessons for Eastern 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union,"  (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002).      201 
 
liberalism present societies with a false choice. Like most ideologies, these two 
extremes tend to distort reality. As Robert Reich sensibly argues,  
 
Posing the debate in mythic terms, as a moral choice between the security 
combined with stagnation of bureaucratic control and the vitality combined 
with rapacity of capitalist enterprise, obscures the more prosaic but central 
choice, the real choice [of how societies make market rules].
437  
 
In a less ideologically moment, Hayek draws a similar conclusion. At one point in The 
Road to Serfdom, he writes,  
 
Though the terms "capitalism" and "socialism" are still generally used to 
describe the past and the future forms of society, they conceal rather than 
elucidate the nature of the transition through which we are passing."
438  
 
It is no longer a question of socialism or capitalism for places like Laos, but rather 
degrees of openness to the global economy.
439  
Central Construction of Social Markets 
Against the view that free markets make free men, economic sociologists 
counter that free men do not a free market make.
440 Procedural democracy quickly 
followed the demise of Soviet Communism in Eastern Europe. Tempering the initial 
                                                 
437 Robert B. Reich, "Of Markets and Myths," Commentary 83, no. 2 (1987): 38. The solution, of 
course, comes from the messy, and ideologically neutral, middle of the spectrum. Reich suggests “that 
the government concern itself with designing the right market rules, rather than trying to dictate the 
right market results” (Reich, "Of Markets and Myths," 39). 
438 Hayek, “Road to Serfdom,” 46.  
439 McMillan, Reinventing the Bazaar 227, makes a similar point: 
The best way to understand the interaction of state and markets is not to debate it in the 
abstract but to examine how real economics with varying degrees of government intervention 
actually works. Whether intervention is warranted, and by how much, is best decided case by 
case. It requires looking into the details of the specific market, while taking into account any 
distortions the government’s action would bring. It is a technocratic issue, not one of high 
principle. 
440 Economic sociologists are sometimes referred to as institutional economists as well. For a collection 
of the seminal pieces of this school of economic thought, see Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg, 
The Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton, N.J., Princeton UP, 1994). See also Mark S. 
Granovetter and Richard Swedberg, eds., The Sociology of Economic Life (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1992).       202 
 
euphoria, Michael Mandelbaum observes, “while the end of communism is a matter of 
fact, the transition to democracy and free markets remains a works in progress.”
441 
One by one, Eastern European countries began to privatize erstwhile state owned 
enterprises, in the confident hope that free markets could develop quickly enough to 
erase the brutal history of socialist oppression and economic involution. These new 
governments, freely elected, were more than willing to embrace the “shock therapy” 
of economic reform, if only to remove wholesale an oppressive state from the 
commanding heights of the economy and society in general.
442 The result was 
economic failure and societal chaos, contrary to neoliberal expectations. 
The notion of a free market separate from government is a myth
443; and the 
neoclassical model of equilibrium fails to capture the dynamics of modern 
capitalism.
444 Hayek’s libertarianism mistakenly naturalizes the market, in the 
                                                 
441 Michael Mandelbaum, "Introduction," in Post-Communism: Four Perspectives, ed. Michael 
Mandelbaum (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1996), 4. 
442 Capturing the mood of many leaders in post-communist Eastern Europe, Vaclav Havel praises the 
virtues of a market economy: 
Though my heart be left of centre, I have always known that the only economic system that 
works is a market economy. This is the only one that leads to prosperity, because it is the only 
one that reflects the nature of life itself. The essence of life is infinitely and mysteriously 
multiform, and therefore it cannot be contained or planned for, in its fullness and variability, 
by any central intelligence. As quoted in Vaclav Havel, Summer Meditations (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1992) 62. 
443 Reich, "Of Markets and Myths," 38, sensibly argues,  
The idea of a free market somehow separate from law is a fantasy. The market was not created 
by God on any of the first six days (at least, not directly), nor is it maintained by divine will. It 
is a human artifact, the shifting sum of a set of judgments about individual rights and 
responsibilities. What is mine? What is yours? What is ours? And how do we define and deal 
with actions that threaten these borders—theft, force, fraud, extortion, or carelessness? What 
should we trade, and what should we not? (Drugs? Sex? Votes? Babies?) How should we 
enforce these decisions, and what penalties should apply to transgressions? As a culture 
accumulates answers to these questions, it creates its version of the market. 
444 As Peter Self, Government by the Market (London: Macmillan, 1993) 209, points out, 
Those thinkers such as Friedman and Hayek who laud the market system, and want it to 
operate largely free from control, seem to be living in a vanished world. Theirs is a world of 
individuals bettering themselves and their society through hard work, enterprise and saving in 
some useful trade or occupation. Such individual efforts are still highly valuable to society and 
still continue to be made, yet they seem rather far removed from modern economic realities. 
The virtues of hard work and savings lose much of their moral appeal in a society where      203 
 
simplistic view that economic exchange constitutes an arena of choice and capitalist 
society the perfection of freedom.
445  
Neoliberal ideology falsely depicts the capitalist market as an opportunity 
rather than an imperative; the rise of capitalism entails simply the removal of 
obstacles, the breaking of fetters, but somehow not the creation of a new economic 
logic.
446 In the neoclassical formulation, capitalism and free market liberalism are 
simply taken for granted and presented in opposition to the obstacles that prevented 
their full maturation and progressive development.
447  
  In contrast to the mythical debate of states versus markets, the economic 
historian Karl Polanyi provides a better way to view the market transition. He 
famously promotes the idea that markets are “embedded” in society. From this 
                                                                                                                                              
economic growth is directed more towards titillating individuals into consuming luxuries than 
meeting more basic needs; and the virtues of private enterprise seem less obvious when it takes 
the form of financial speculation, monopolistic profits or tendentious advertising.  
445 Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origin of Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999) 16. She 
convincingly argues that there was nothing inevitable about capitalism, which developed under 
conditions unique to England. Wood makes the case that, “The capitalist market as a specific social 
form gets lost when the transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist societies is presented as a more or less 
natural, if often thwarted, extension or maturation of already existing social forms, more a quantitative 
than a qualitative transformation” (Wood, The Origin of Capitalism  7.). By locating the provenance of 
modern capitalism in the specific social forms of English history and highlighting its rupture with 
earlier social forms, Wood challenges the naturalization of capitalism. In her own words, 
the conditions for material prosperity existed in early modern England as nowhere else, yet 
those conditions were achieved at the cost of widespread dispossession and intense 
exploitation. These new conditions also established the foundation and seeds for new and more 
effective forms of colonial expansion and imperialism in search of new markets, labor forces 
and resources….The existence of one capitalist society thereafter transformed all others, and 
the subsequent expansion of capitalist imperatives constantly changed the conditions of 
economic development. Wood, The Origin of Capitalism  117-9. 
446 Wood, The Origin of Capitalism  33. Elsewhere, Wood writes: 
The old models of capitalist development were a paradoxical blend of transhistorical 
determinism and “free” market voluntarism, in which the capitalist market was both an 
immutable natural law and the perfection of human choice and freedom. The antithesis of such 
models would be a conception of the capitalist market that fully acknowledges its imperatives 
and compulsions, while recognizing that these imperatives themselves are rooted not in some 
transhistorical natural law but in historically specific social relations, constituted by human 
agency and subject to change. Wood, The Origin of Capitalism  25. 
447 Wood, The Origin of Capitalism  34.      204 
 
perspective, the state in no way stands outside the economy (however autonomous its 
micro-economic foundations) but rather constitutes its very core. In his masterpiece, 
The Great Transformation, Polanyi presents compelling ideas on the social basis of 
economic systems.
448 He makes three important contributions to the study of political 
economy: (1) the social construction of markets, (2) the myth of the self-regulating 
market, and (3) the double movement.    
At the heart of his argument, Polanyi emphasizes the immutable fact that 
humans are inherently social beings, where social relations take precedence over 
economic ones. In his view, people value material goods in so far as they serve these 
ends. That is, "economic motives spring from the context of social life… The 
economic system is, in effect, a mere function of social organization."
449 In other 
words, an economic system is embedded in society, not the converse. The institutions 
and values of a particular society determine the organization of its economic activities.  
                                                 
448 The thesis reads as follows:  
the idea of a self-regulating market implied a stark utopia. Such an institution could not exist 
for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it 
would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness. 
Inevitably, society took measures to protect itself, but whatever measures it took impaired the 
self-regulation of the market, disorganized industrial life, and thus endangered society in yet 
another way. It was this dilemma which forced the development of the market system into a 
definite groove and finally disrupted the social organization based upon it. Polanyi, The Great 
Transformation  3-4.  
Polanyi makes a strong case that the economic function should be subordinated to the political order. 
The great transformation refers to the transition to capitalism, prior to which economic life was 
embedded in society. As Mitchell Bernard, "Ecology, Political Economy and the Counter-Movement: 
Karl Polanyi and the Second Great Transformation," in Innovation and Transformation in International 
Studies, ed. Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UP, 1997), 85-6. 
remarks, “Polanyi understood disembedding in terms of the creation of fictitious commodities and the 
reorganisation of society around the institutions of a self-regulating market. It was the unsustainability 
of this project that precipitated the counter-movement.”  
Polanyi’s book describes the rise and fall of market society. In the process, two critical 
transformations take place: “the emergence of market society out of mercantilism and the collapse of 
market society into fascism and world war” Fred Block and Margaret R. Somers, "Beyond the 
Economistic Fallacy: The Holistic Social Science of Karl Polanyi," in Vision and Method in Historical 
Sociology, ed. Theda Skocpol (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 53. 
449 Polanyi, The Great Transformation  46-49.      205 
 
By extension, the social construction of markets reveals the fallacy of a self-
regulating market. A competitive market is imposed from above. Only states with 
strong central governments have the coercive power to impose a competitive market. 
Polanyi asserts that there is nothing natural about a self-regulating market; free 
markets are enforced by the state.
450 Thus, he correctly understands the great 
transformation, or transition to capitalism, “in terms of the agency that brought it 
about. Rather than seeing it as something natural or inevitable, to Polanyi it was a 
discontinuity brought about by the exercise of state power.”
451 
Finally, whenever a self-regulating market tries to impose its will on society, 
counter forces (society's self-protection) attempt to re-exert the primacy of society. A 
self-regulating market leads to the destruction of society, which attempts to check the 
actions of the market. The expansion of markets inevitably creates tensions between 
social beings and a market system which seeks to commodify their labor. Government 
interventionism forms the basis of this counter movement.
452  
If Polanyi’s views of market society help to explain the failures of neoliberal 
policies, then economic reforms in developing countries must recognize the central 
                                                 
450 In reference to British economic policies of the 19
th century, he claims: 
The road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous 
organized and controlled interventionism… the introduction of free markets, far from doing 
away with the need for control, regulation, and intervention, enormously increased their range. 
Ibid.  139-40. 
451 Bernard, "Ecology, Political Economy and the Counter-Movement," 78. 
452 Polanyi describes the double movement as follows: 
The one was the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment of a self-
regulating market, relying on the support of the trading classes, and using largely laissez-faire 
and free trade as its methods; the other was the principle of social protection aiming at the 
conservation of man and nature as well as productive organization, relying on the varying 
support of those most immediately affected by the deleterious action of the market- primarily, 
but not exclusively, the working and the landed classes- and using protective legislation, 
restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention as its methods. Polanyi, The 
Great Transformation  132.       206 
 
role of states to manage and regulate capitalist markets. That is, market relations work 
through states.
453 A market is a human artifact. As one scholar notes,  
 
The market is not omnipotent, omnipresent, or omniscient. It is a human 
invention with human imperfections. It does not necessarily work well. It does 
not work by magic or, for that matter, by voodoo. It works through institutions, 
procedures, rules, and customs.
454 
 
While the market constitutes a mechanism for the efficient use of scarce resources, 
societal values guide its operations and determine what is bought or sold.
455 As social 
construct, a market and the concomitant economy it gives rise to are functions of 
social organization, embedded in their respective society, rather than the result of 
some abstract rules, as Hayek argues, that evolve through learned human traditions.  
Taking on this more nuanced view of markets, the field of economic sociology 
starts from the assumption that social relations, social structures, and their 
accompanying institutions shape market processes. Since Max Weber’s initial inquiry, 
sociologists have recognized the important role of the state in the consolidation and 
expansion of capitalism.
456  
                                                 
453 Drawing on Polanyi’s account of the formation of the nation-state, McMichael notes,  
the trajectory of an institution like the market is only comprehended through an interpretation 
of its cumulative social and political consequences. Beyond an economic process, market 
construction is a historical process of governing resistances to social transformation via 
conceptions of sovereignty and rights. (Philip McMichael, "Globalization,"  (Ithaca, NY: 
2003), 2.) 
454 McMillan, Reinventing the Bazaar, 8.  
455 Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism  323. 
456 State formation cannot be separated from the rise, consolidation, and expansion of rational 
capitalism. Weber attributes the rise of Western, modern, rational capitalism to three factors:  
•  Economic: the economy fosters rational enterprises, producing for a mass market and using 
modern accounting practices; 
•  Political: a political state contains a predictable legal system, guaranteeing a semi-autonomous 
economic sphere; and  
•  Religious: a value system receptive to profit-making.  
Economic factors include the emergence of modern accounting, free labor, mass markets, joint-stock 
corporation, the factory, and innovations in science and technology. A political community, separate 
from the household/clan, first emerged in Western cities and would eventually develop into the modern 
nation-state, another prerequisite for rational capitalism. Finally, a religious ethic that de-stigmatized      207 
 
In practice, market arrangements are socially embedded and depend on 
supportive institutions for efficient operation. Legal institutions establish and enforce 
property rights and contractual principles. Financial institutions legitimize the means 
of exchange and the value of monetary instruments. Finally, social institutions 
reinforce the ideological and cultural hegemony that stabilizes the existing economic 
order.
457 These various structures contribute to market stability for economic actors 
that use them.
458 Governments intervene in market processes to regulate competition 
for economic growth. The transition to a market society, thus, requires that states 
develop rules governing property rights, governance structures, rules of exchanges, 
and conceptions of control for the purposes of stabilizing economic relations.
459 
Through these institutions, economic actors are able to “produce social structures to 
organize themselves, to compete and to cooperate, and to exchange with one another 
in a regular and reproducible fashion.”
460 The strengthening of governmental capacity 
to make and enforce such rules contributes to societal wealth creation.
461  
While neoliberal prescriptions call for a retreat of the state from all areas of 
socio-economic life, evidence from trade expansion over the past forty years in the 
West points to the continuing significance of states to manage market transformations. 
                                                                                                                                              
profit-making, as best exemplified by Protestantism and Calvinism, helped to create a new economic 
mentality favorably to modern capitalism. For an overview of Weber’s political sociology, with a focus 
on political organizations and the state, see Swedberg, The Idea of Economic Sociology, especially 
Chapter Three.  
457 Stilwell, Political Economy  209. 
458 Neil Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century 
Capitalist Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2001) 11. According to Fligstein, in the developed 
West, the market-making project aims to stabilize and routinize competition. He notes, 
societies have general rules, both formal and informal, about organizing economic activities. 
These rules provide the social conditions for economic exchange and allow for the production 
of new markets. Markets need definitions of property rights, governance structures, and rules 
of exchange.  
459 Ibid.  37. 
460 Ibid.  33. 
461 Ibid.  37.      208 
 
In a paper for the National Bureau of Economic Research, Dana Rodrik examines the 
size of government and trade dependency of OECD countries.
462 His econometric 
analysis provides evidence that the more trade-dependent societies have relatively 
larger governments than those more domestically closed. Social disruptions 
engendered by freer trade have contributed to increased public welfare spending, in 
order to maintain social stability, thus mitigating the worst excesses of market 
anarchy.
463 Using a time-series analysis, Rodrik shows that trade expansion at an 
earlier point in time correlates with increased social spending. Thus, the opening up of 
world markets contributes to the fiscal expansion of governments, supporting 
Polanyi’s claim that the state plays a vital role in structuring the free market.  
These findings fly in the face of neoliberalism, whose ideology of market 
capitalism posits the myth of the self-regulating market and the borderless world of 
economic globalization unfettered by government interference or public oversight. 
Contrary to this market utopia, the state continues to be integral to the consolidation 
                                                 
462 Dani Rodrik, "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?"  (Cambridge, MA: 
NBER, 1996). Rodrik uses an econometric model with other 100 countries extending from 1960s to 
1990s. In Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, D.C.: Institute of International 
Economics, 1997), he makes the same argument specifically for small, open economies.  
463 In the West, this political economic phenomenon is often referred to as the social compromise of 
“embedded liberalism” in which the extension of the ruthless logic of the market requires social 
protection through the expansion of the public economy. See John Gerard Ruggie, "Embedded 
Liberalism and the Postwar Economic Regimes," in Constructing the World Polity: Essays on 
International Institutionalization (New York: Routledge, 1998). In the postwar years, global economic 
integration contributed the building of what John Ruggie calls the compromise of embedded liberalism 
in the West. Liberal democracy or welfare capitalism epitomizes this system of political economy. See 
also Hannes Lacher, "Embedded Liberalism, Disembedded Markets: Reconceptualizing the Pax 
Americana," New Political Economy 4, no. 3 (1999): 344. Essentially, this economic regime is captured 
in the phrase: “Smith abroad and Keynes at home.” According to Ruggie, embedded liberalism 
translated into economic policies in which a liberal trade regime was promoted internationally, in 
exchange for advances in social welfare on the domestic front. Within this framework: “multilateralism 
and domestic stability are linked to and conditioned by one another. Thus, movement toward greater 
international openness is likely to be coupled with measures designed to cushion the domestic economy 
from external disruptions (Ruggie, "Embedded Liberalism," 78.) In making these claims, Ruggie 
assumes that “[s]tate-society relations express shared social purposes regarding the appropriate role of 
authority vis-à-vis the market” (Ruggie, "Embedded Liberalism," 62.) As Bernard notes, “liberalism 
was constrained within advanced capitalist countries by the social arrangements produced by the 
counter-movement” (Bernard, "Ecology, Political Economy and the Counter-Movement," 86.)      209 
 
and expansion of capitalism. Moreover, economic performance also seems to demand 
sensible government intervention to facilitate private economic prosperity. Long-term 
economic growth seems to require a healthy appreciation of public investment in 
education, physical infrastructure, and political stability.
464 Overall, governments seem 
to have a positive role in the process of economic development.
 465  
Modernizing States, Nation Building, and the Logic of Centralization 
  As one scholar notes, “history shows that the driving force of successful 
capitalist development is not the perfection of the market mechanism but the building 
of organizational capacities.”
466 In Laos, this capacity building project continues to 
demand a strong push towards administrative centralization, the consolidation of a 
political space, and the unification of regionally dispersed economies. The socialist 
transformation in Laos (i.e. marketization and capitalist incorporation) is synonymous 
with building a national economy, where none existed before, and the construction of 
a unified economic space where regional ones persist.  
  Contrary to the general global trend of public decentralization in the transition 
process, Laos provides a stark contrast, offering a valuable insight into the important 
role of governments in structuring economic relations. As Polanyi would have 
predicted, a country undergoing a liberalizing transformation requires more, not less, 
                                                 
464 Fligstein, Architecture of Markets  60-1. According to D. Aschauer, "Public Investment and Private 
Sector Growth,"  (Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, 1990), p ublic investment in education 
and physical infrastructure contributes significantly to economic growth. 
465 As Fligstein argues, 
There is no evidence that trade has made states “smaller” over the past 30 years. In fact, it is 
quite the opposite. There is evidence that high exposure to trade combined with organized 
labor has produced more social protection and larger states. There are theoretical reasons to 
believe that states continue to matter in producing economic growth by providing public 
goods, the stable rule of law, and under certain conditions, good industrial policy. Fligstein, 
Architecture of Markets  217. 
466 William Lazonick, Business Organisation and the Myth of the Market Economy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1991) 8.      210 
 
government control and regulation. The creation of a national economic space, which 
is how to view the economic transition in Laos, continues to demand the centralization 
and consolidation of political authority and economic policymaking. It is an attempt at 
nation state building in the European mold of the late nineteenth century.   
  The government in Laos faces many problems shared by other newly emerging 
nations. The transition from a rudimentary planned economy to an emerging market 
one presents the government with challenges of building and consolidating a modern 
state. By the government’s own assessment, the country’s transition to a market 
economy provides further impetus “to consolidate the nation-state, create national 
unity and establish the basis for sustainable and equitable development… In this 
process of nation-building, our country has faced fundamental challenges that have 
necessitated an emphasis on strengthening the government structure and functions.”
467 
As emphasized throughout this dissertation, nation state building, in Laos as elsewhere 
in the periphery, requires centralization.
468 
  In this dissertation, I examine the circumstances in which a small, peripheral 
country has undergone the postsocialist transition, from its failed attempt to administer 
the classical command economy to its current effort to usher in a form of market 
economy. Through the broad lens of political economy and sociology, my research 
explores three important areas of state capacity: (1) political structure, (2) public 
administration, and (3) fiscal management. I also incorporate a modeling exercise to 
similate decision making alternatives for Lao policy makers. From these various 
perspectives, evidence demonstrates that the transition did not usher in the much-
touted “invisible hand” of market forces. Rather, the Lao experience has shown the 
                                                 
467 Government of Lao PDR, "Background Paper on Governance," 5-6. 
468 As Bendix notes, "The central fact of nation-building is the orderly exercise of a nationwide, public 
authority." Bendix, Nationl-Building and Citizenship  22.       211 
 
importance of governments in structuring market relations and political regimes of 
accumulation. The country’s initial condition, i.e. peripheral socialism and 
underdevelopment, ensured that the transition to a market society would diverge from 
the experience in Eastern Europe, where the Soviet model of central planning required 
a withdrawal of the state from all aspects of the economy.  
  While economic liberalization calls for a retreat of the state from direct 
management of economy, the transition to a market economy demands the creation, 
not the dismantling, of state functions in Laos. This experience contradicts patterns of 
reform in Eastern Europe, in which the entrenched (institutional) features of central 
planning required wholesale dismantling before capitalism could take root. The 
socialist project lasted only a decade in Laos. Thereafter, the government has 
embraced market reforms that allowed a greater sphere of private economic exchange. 
With an eye towards political stability, the party leadership has guided these 
transformations and, like good communists, bases its right to rule on economic 
performance.  
  The state building project in Laos has produced the following general results: a 
redefined role for the state; public disengagement from direct production of economic 
output; deregulation of prices and increased reliance on markets; and an increased 
scope for the private sector. To establish the regulatory environment and efficient 
management of the macroeconomy, the Lao state has instigated a sustained process of 
centralization and administrative rationalization, in an overall push to modernize the 
country. Instead of direct economic production, the Lao PDR now manages the 
economy indirectly through macroeconomic means of monetary and fiscal policies. 
Reforms in these areas have the objective of establishing of a national regulatory 
environment where none existed before and, concomitantly, a centralized public 
administration reminiscent of the road toward socialism. Even though microeconomics      212 
 
of supply and demand determine prices throughout the country, centralization, in the 
creation of a national economic space, plays an important part in the market transition. 
That is, efforts to manage the market in Laos have required an efficient, rational, and 
uniform regulatory environment that all demand strong central control.  
  Ironically, the process of marketization in the Lao PDR, like its failed march 
towards socialism, requires centralization. This seemingly contradictory convergence 
appears, upon closer inspection, to have a logical rationale. In 1975, the Lao PDR 
began the search for the end of history, as Hegel and Marx envisioned the march 
towards democracy. Socialism instigated the centralization of political-administrative 
power in order to enact a central planning system. Since 1991, Lao communism has 
taken a turn towards a market system, and the search began anew. Likewise, the 
building of a market society within a national economic space involves a consolidation 
of political rule, rationalization of bureaucratic governance, and a centralization of 
fiscal prerogatives. The failure of state socialism has given rise to the faith in liberal 
democracies around the world. Instead of the march towards socialist serfdom, the 
current search for history’s end entails the capitalist development of markets in Laos, 
as elsewhere.  
  Despite the competing world views advanced by capitalism and socialism, 
Laos’ aborted venture in social engineering and unsteady march toward market society 
have both entailed building the foundations of a strong government capable of 
realizing public objectives. The road to serfdom and back offer two divergent paths 
toward modernity, whether in the mold of forced industrialization under the dictates of 
a central plan or through a pattern of capitalist development organized by market 
exchange. In either case, the state takes on various roles, differentiated by a matter of 
degree rather than kind. Nonetheless, modernizing peripheral states exhibit a 
centripetal bias of national development drawn toward centralization. Because the Lao      213 
 
PDR possesses a weak central government, its ability to impose a competitive market 
has thus far proved limited. In the comprehensive overhaul and modernization of the 
Lao government, as evidence suggests, centralization provides an appropriate policy at 
the country’s level of development. 
Laos: Please Don’t Rush  
The idea of free markets presupposes an ideal type, or model, of a competitive 
society based upon an efficient allocation of resources and free consumer choice. By 
enslaving economic man, Hayek long ago warned, programs of socialist utopias 
invariably destroy the foundations of a free society. Once free of the impediments of 
socialist central planning, the creation of a market order idyllically leads to a 
decentralization of the economy, allowing homo economicus freely to choose the 
capitalist high road from serfdom. By forcing economic man to look beyond the self-
interest of his wallet, the socialist allocative system degrades the collective bounty of 
society. In planning market outcomes, the socialist bureaucracy annihilates whatever 
economic incentives exist to maximize surplus value. Hayek and the liberalism he 
doggedly championed eventually conquered Lenin and the Marxism he brutally forced 
to fruition.
469  
However, capitalism and markets are not natural developments, but rather 
historical ones, rooted in social relations and structured by prevailing norms of 
society. In the secular religion of neoliberalism, capitalism and free markets are 
treated more or less as an organic growth— a spontaneous order— that magically 
emerges once the final obstacles of state intervention and obstruction in the economy 
                                                 
469 Echoing Say’s Law, Hayek claims that laissez-faire economies tend towards equilibrium. Countering 
Keynes, he argues that the state is the root of all economic evils. Economic crises arise when 
uninformed bureaucrats tamper arbitrarily in the economic system. “The State, in Hayek’s view, was 
not an executive committee of a ruling class, but… an independent bureaucratic force which, by its 
Leviathan nature, was coercive and against freedom. Any policy that strengthened the role of the state 
negated liberalism.” See Bell, "Prospects of American Capitalism," 80.      214 
 
are removed. In the former communist block, the road from socialist serfdom leads to 
the highway of economic liberalism. This process of marketization entails not only 
economic logic of supply and demand, but also a reassessment of society values, a re-
evaluation of public goals, and renegotiation of the content of citizenship. These 
propositions transcend a simple all or nothing choice of states versus markets, 
demanding instead political compromises with undeniable trade-offs based upon 
evolving standards of social norms. 
In an era where American capitalism reigns supreme as an imperial ideological 
force, its imposition on unsuspecting societies can only lead to wholesale disruptions 
of their social and political institutions. International development technocrats 
(whether from the World Bank, IMF, or United Nations) push privatization and 
decentralization schemes that usually create havoc on developing countries. They 
ignore Polanyi's fundamental observation that an economic system is a function of 
social organization. The promotion of Western liberal economy cannot easily produce 
a Western democratic society. From economic orthodoxy, decentralization and 
privatization in developing countries (albeit initially disruptive to society) create 
internal demands for institutional and social reforms along democratic and liberal 
economic lines. However, the converse is more appropriate, plausible, and humane. 
The building of civil society and social institutions must take precedence over market 
reforms. Otherwise, we may continue to see the wholesale annihilation of societies 
which shortchange social development for economic gains that, nonetheless, never 
materialize.  
In the high phase of communism, central planning dictated inefficient market 
outcomes. For late socialism of the remaining ideological heirs of Marxist-Leninism, 
the party-state has pragmatically resigned itself to the limited role of designing market 
rules and providing for public goods. The demise of Soviet communism in the early      215 
 
1990s has forced all socialist countries to embrace a form of market economy which 
provides a larger scope for the private sphere of economic activity separate from the 
state. Governments cannot systematically dictate market results. State policies now 
generally focus on creating structures of economic incentives in their design of market 
rules, as well as managing macroeconomic stability to improve the investment climate 
for development. For a peripheral state like Laos, this transition has engendered an 
organizational logic of centralization.  
Against the pro-market enthusiasm for smaller government that 
decentralization ostensibly promotes, the experience in Laos suggests caution. The 
complex reality of government restructuring in Laos reveals the limitations of the 
neoliberal thrust for smaller government in the transition to capitalism. The national 
state continues to provide an essential, if not the primary, substance and meaning to 
social change and transformation. Economic integration does not produce a 
predetermined outcome but, rather, reflects a choice with inescapable trade-offs. Nor 
does capitalist incorporation diminish the role of the state. In an integrating world of 
unequal exchange, governments and institutions continue to matter. States play an 
essential economic role in promoting capitalist expansion.
470 
Development requires purposeful government action to promote societal 
values and development objectives, however defined. On the country’s road from 
                                                 
470 Commenting on the inadequacies of prevailing thinking on globalization, Leo Panitch asserts, 
there is the problem of tending to ignore the extent to which today’s globalization is authored 
by states and is primarily about reorganizing rather than bypassing them. A false dichotomy 
between the national and the international is promoted, which diverts attention from the need 
to develop new strategies for transforming the state, even as a means of developing an 
appropriate international strategy.  
See Leo Panitch, "Rethinking the Role of the State," in Globalization: Critical Reflections, ed. James H. 
Mittelman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 85. He goes on to argue that capitalist 
globalization “takes place in, through, and under the aegis of states.” The process involves shifts in 
domestic power relations. Often this transferal entails “the centralization and concentration of state 
powers as the necessary conditions of and accompaniment of global market discipline.” (Panitch, 
"Rethinking the Role of the State," 86.)      216 
 
socialist serfdom, the Lao state remains a key site of not only economic management, 
but also social change and sensible development. Its political and economic 
consolidation follows a familiar pattern of peripheral states. Its cautious and, at times, 
ad hoc policymaking suggests a willingness to experiment and innovate, however 
sporadically. Its pragmatism places tangible results ahead of ideology, particularly in 
the party’s continuing struggle for internal legitimacy and external sovereignty. In a 
running joke on the country’s pace of liberalization, some observers lightheartedly 
contend that Lao PDR should really stand for Laos: Please Don’t Rush!     
217 
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Livestock and 
Fishery 17.2% 
Crops 28.2% 
Hotels and restaurants 1.9% 
Ownership of dwellings 2.7%  
Mining and quarrying 1.7% 
Construction 2.3% 
Electricity, gas, and 
water 2.8% 
Manufacturing 19.2% 
Forestry 3.3% 
Other services 1.2% 
Public wage bill 3% 
Transportation, storage,  
and communication 6.3%  
Wholesale and retail  
trade 10.3% 
Industry 25.9% 
Agriculture 48.6% 
Services 25.5% 
GDP: 1,323 billion kips 
Source: Table A2 
Figure A4.  GDP by Industrial Origin, Lao PDR, 2003 224 
   
Appendix A4.  Balance of Payments, Lao PDR 1996-2008 
 
Table A3. Balance of Payments, Lao PDR, 1996-2008* 
 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Current Account -224.7 -185.1 -52 -58.3 -14.3 -65.6 -97.7 -116.2 -204 -210 -304 -336 -367
Excluding official transfers -306.7 -282.1 -126 -128.3 -129.3 -128.6 -145.7 -179.2 -276 -285 -385 -421 -457
Merchandise trade balance -367.7 -331.1 -212 -212.3 -207.3 -208.6 -229.7 -217.2 -315 -201 -201 -238 -278
Exports, f.o.b. 322.6 316.8 340.8 342 354.7 333.6 340.4 401 437 563 663 683 705
Imports, c.i.f. 690.3 647.9 552.8 554.3 562 542.2 570.1 618.2 752 764 864 921 983
Services (net) 25 28 71 99 132 125 131 95 122 97 68 80 93
Income (net) -7 -22 -34 -45 -75 -67 -70 -81 -108 -208 -282 -295 -307
of which: interest payments 6 -19 -24 -35 -38 -35 -29 -35 -47 -45 -44 -42 -115
of which: public debt 0 0 0 -8 -11 -11 -10 -12 -26 -27 -27 -28 -30
Transfers (net) 125 140 123 100 136 85 71 87 97 102 111 117 125
P r i v a t e 4 34 3 4 93 02 12 22 3 24 25 27 30 32 35
Official 82 97 74 70 115 63 48 63 72 75 81 85 90
Capital Account 295 154 39 62 69 65 153 135 212 214 332 373 402
Medium-and Long-Term loans 139 161 86 93 63 66 127 89 72 185 324 338 342
Disbursements 155 179 98 134 99 105 165 136 139 256 406 418 427
Amortization -16 -18 -12 -41 -36 -39 -38 -47 -67 -71 -82 -80 -85
of which: public debt 0 0 -7 -29 -36 -39 -38 -47
Foreign Direct Investment 176 104 56 52 31 24 60 69 186 105 86 88 90
Net foreign assets of commercial banks -7 14 -17 -3 25 28 -7 -21 -38 -35 -35 -35 -25
Other private flows and errors and omissions 91 -125 -86 -80 -50 -53 -27 -2 -9 -41 -43 -18 -5
Overall balance 70.3 -31.1 -13 3.7 54.7 -0.6 55.3 18.8 8 4 28 37 35
Financing - Central bank net foreign assets -69 30 18 -3 -43 1 -55 - 2 0- 3 0- 2 1- 2 8- 3 8-36
  Assets (increase -) -74 31 23 6 -33 6 -62 -20 -23 -21 -28 -38 -36
  Liabilities (reduction -) 5 -1 -5 -9 -10 -5 7 0 - 70000
Memorandum items:
Current account (percent of GDP) -12.2 -10.7 -4.4 -4 -0.8 -3.7 -5.4 -5.6 -8.5 -7.9 -10.5 -10.8 -10.9
(excluding official transfers) -16.6 -16.3 -10.1 -8.7 -7.4 -7.3 -8 -8.6 -11.4 -10.7 -13.3 -13.5 -13.5
Gross official reserves
(millions of U.S. dollars) 136 112 106 127 134 196 216 239 260 287 325 361
(months of goods and services imports) 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.6 2.6 3.5 3.2 3.9 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.5
Public debt service ratio
(percent of exports of goods and services) 7.3 9.7 6.2 5.8 7.2 7.1 7.2
Nominal GDP at market prices (US$ millions) 1,729 1,273 1,473 1,740 1,762 1,818 2,088 2,412 2,665 2,895 3,125 3,375
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Staff Reports and Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, 
Washington, DC: IMF, various years.  
Note: * Figures for 2005-06 are IMF staff estimates.  
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Appendix A5. State of Civil Service, Lao PDR 
According to official figures, the government apparatus oversee a civil service that 
roughly numbers 90,070, up 28 percent since 1995.
471 See Table A7 below. Many 
government employees lack the technical competence and educational training that their 
workers have a university education, with the majority skilled in some form of vocational 
training. The workforce is relatively young; 82 % of government employees are under age 
40.
472 The vast majority of civil servants (four-fifths) work outside the capital, in 
provincial and district levels.
473 See Figure A9. The remaining employees work in 
government ministers in Vientiane (11%) or take various party appointments throughout 
the country (7%). 
                                                 
471 Government of Lao PDR, "Background Paper on Governance," 30. These figures should be treated 
with caution. They are only broadly indicative. Figures for civil servants do not include army personnel, 
workers in state-owned enterprises, contractual workers, or village chiefs. Of these exclusions, only 
salaries for village chiefs are paid out of the national budget. The government maintains a standing 
army of 29,100 soldiers, supplemented by a local militia numbering about 100,000. See Clay Wescott, 
ed., Key Governance Issues in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Viet Nam (Manila, Philippines: 
Asian Development Bank, 2001) 24. According to Keuleers, "District Administration," 47, village 
chiefs receive a monthly stipend of 10,000 kip, or US$ 1.25.  
472 Chagnon et al., "Good Governance in Laos," 51. 
473 Wescott, ed., Governance Issues in Sea  26. puts this figure as high at 89 percent.  231 
   
 
 
 
 
Table A7. Civil Servants by Educational Background 
Lao PDR, various years, 1995-2002* 
 
 1995/96 1997/98 2000/01 2001/02 1995-2002 
Level of 
Education   
% 
Total   %  Total   
% 
Total   
% of 
Total  % change 
General Education 
   
7,568   10.7 
  
6,822  8.2 
   
8,237   9.1 8.8 
Lower Technical 
   
28,586   40.5 
  
33,763  40.6 
32,860 36.1 
   
26,749   29.7 -6.4 
Middle Technical 
   
23,389   33.2 
  
29,611 35.6 
  
29,008 31.8 
   
33,790   37.5  44.5 
University and 
     Upper Technical 
   
10,693   15.2 
  
12,613 15.2 
  
17,821 19.6 
   
16,033   17.8  49.9 
Postgraduate 
   
317   0.4 
  
391 0.5 
  
1,010 1.1 
   
919   1.0  189.9 
Education        
     Unspecified 
   
-    0.0 
  
-   0.0 
  
10,445  11.5 
   
4,342   4.8 - 
Total 
   
70,553   100.0 
  
83,200 
  
100.0 
  
91,144  100.0 
   
90,070   100.0 27.7 
 
Source: Government of Lao PDR. "Public Service Reform, People's Participation, 
Rule of Law and Sound Financial Management: Background Paper on Governance." 
Vientiane, Lao PDR, 2003. 
Note:* Figures exclude army personnel, workers in state-owned enterprises, 
contractual workers, and village chiefs.  
positions demand. From government estimates, less than a fifth of documented  
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  Central 
ministries
11%
Provinces and Districts
82%
  Party-
        appointed
7%
 
 
Source: Chagnon, Jacquelyn, Dirk Van Gansberghe, Binh Vongphasouk, and Roger 
Rumpf. "Looking Back to See Forward: Consultations About Good Governance and 
Participatory Development in the Lao PDR." Vientiane, Lao PDR: Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency, 2002, p. 52. 
 
Figure A9.  Appointment of Civil Servants by Location, Lao P.D.R., 1998 
 
 
Over half of documented government staff work in the education sector, either as 
teachers or school administrators.
474 See Figure A10 below. Women remain highly under-
represented in government, accounting for only 6.2% of central staff, 2.1% of provincial 
employees, and 6.2% of local hire.
475 No statistics on the ethnic make-up of government 
staff are currently available. However, anecdotal evidence suggests a low representation 
of non-Lao ethnic minorities.
476 
                                                 
474 Underscoring the lack of qualified civil servants, an estimated 6,000-7,000 teachers are purely 
political appointments, with little or no teaching duties. According to Ibid., these government 
appointments are rewards for political loyalties of revolutionary cadres stemming from the civil war 
period.  
475 Data from a 1999 Lao Women’s Union study, as documented in United Nations Development 
Program, National Human Development Report, Lao PDR 2001: Advancing Rural Development  22. 
Most women take positions in either health or education. 
476 In one project of governance reform, for example, 80-90% of government employees in piloted 
departments identified as the dominate ethnic Lao Loum, who comprise 40% of the country’s 
population. See Governance and Public Administration Reform, "Organizational Review: Gpar Luang 
Prabang Project,"  (Vientiane, Lao PDR: United Nations Development Programme, Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency, Government of the Lao PDR, 2003), 16. 233 
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Source: Governance and Public Administration Reform. "Pay and Compensation in the 
Lao Civil Service." Vientiane, Lao PDR: UNDP, 1999, pp 13-4. 
 
Figure A10.  Civil Servants by Sectors, Lao P.D.R., 1998 
 
 
Although the government releases no official figures on salaries, anecdotal 
evidence and case studies highlight the continuing problem of low remuneration. A 
preliminary report in 1999 puts public salaries in the range of US$ 7 – 30 per month, 
at prevailing exchange rates.
477 In a more recent study, teachers, who account for the 
majority of civil servants, receive a base salary of about 3 million kip per year, paid in 
12 installments mid-monthly. In dollar terms, their wages equal US$ 300 a year, or a 
monthly take-home base of $25.
478 Salaries in other ministries, especially in technical 
positions of finance or transportation, may rate higher but rarely exceed US$ 50 per 
month. Considering a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of US$ 381 and a 
poverty level of 39% of the populace, government employment alone barely covers 
the living costs for food and basic necessities.
479  
                                                 
477 Governance and Public Administration Reform, "Pay and Compensation in the Lao Civil Service,"  
(Vientiane, Lao PDR: UNDP, 1999), Table 2, p. 21. 
478 Chagnon et al., "Good Governance in Laos," 54. 
479 Asian Development Bank, Ppa, Lao PDR  87. 234 
   
An informal survey conducted in 2002 illustrates the lack of real growth in 
wages. Summarized in Table A8, this inquiry not only provides a snapshot of salaries 
for some high school teachers in Vientiane over the years, but also offers a glimpse of 
general government wages and subsidies for much of the civil service. In 1980, 
teachers received the kip equivalent of US $10 per month, in addition to subsidized 
utilities and consumable allowances totaling US$ 15. From the mid-1980s to the mid-
1990s, base salaries gradually increased to about US$ 50 per month, while subsidies 
eventually disappeared. In these intervening years, an income tax came into effect, 
further reducing real wages. Erasing these salary gains altogether, the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis contributed to high inflation in Laos. Consequently, the purchasing 
value of monthly salaries plummeted to US$ 18. As economic conditions in the 
country improved, the government gradually increased public wages. By 2002, teacher 
 
Table A8.  Sample Teacher Wages, Vientiane High Schools 
Lao P.D.R., 1980 - 2002 
Year  Monthly Cash Payment  Monthly Value of Subsidies 
1980  US$10  (tax exempt)  $15 value (rice, electricity, water, free housing 
for some, meat, sugar, and many consumables) 
1986  US$20 (tax exempt)  $5 (water, electricity, free housing for some) 
1991  US$50 (taxed)  None  
1998  US$18 (taxed   None 
2002  US$ 25 (taxed)   None 
 
Source: Chagnon, Jacquelyn, Dirk Van Gansberghe, Binh Vongphasouk, and Roger 
Rumpf. "Looking Back to See Forward: Consultations About Good Governance and 
Participatory Development in the Lao PDR." Vientiane, Lao PDR: Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency, 2002, p. 54. 
Note: Cash payments expressed in real values exchanged in U.S. dollars.  
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salaries rose to 250,000 kip per month, the equivalent of US$ 25.
480 Echoing the views 
of many in government, this survey reveals the precarious state of public 
remuneration. Adding insult, in many remote areas of the country, salary payments 
frequently fall three to six months in arrears. 
  In recently years, salaries and wages have absorbed about a fifth of the 
government’s recurrent budget. For fiscal year ending 1997, the first year of published 
figures, government wages accounted for 4.5% of GDP. See Figure A11. Thereafter, 
wage outlays have contributed less to overall economic activity, tumbling to a low of 
2.1% in fiscal year 1999 but rising steadily to 3.5% in 2004. Overall, these figures rate 
low in comparison to other countries in Southeast Asia, which manage to spend, on 
average, 4.5% of their GDP on government salaries. 
While these statistics reveal a weak public administration on many measures, 
the official structure, documented size, and apparent cost of the Lao civil service 
disguise the scope of the public sector. Possibly half of government employees do not 
appear on official statistics.
481 Although categorized as civil servants by the 
government, military personnel, police officers, employees of state-owned enterprises, 
and contract workers fail to appear on published payrolls.
482 The government does not  
 
                                                 
480 Salary raises occur every two years. Promotions occur twice a year, January and July. Salary 
increments are automatic, since almost everyone receives a positive performance appraisal. 
Nonetheless, real wages have remained flat for most of the history of the Lao PDR. See Governance 
and Public Administration Reform, "Performance Appraisal and the Lao Civil Service,"  (Vientiane, 
Lao PDR: United Nations Development Programme, 1999), 11. 
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the education sector suffered deep cuts, as falling 
government revenues forced major cuts in expenditures. For the period 1996-98, teachers’ wages 
decreased by almost two-thirds in real terms. Teaching careers have since looked less attractive. 
Enrollment in teacher training schools has dropped sharply, while recent graduates appear to seek 
careers in other fields. See World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank, 
"Lao PDR: Public Expenditure Review, Country Financial Accountability Assessment (Volume I: 
Summary Report),"  (Washington, D.C.: WB, IMF, ADB, 2002), 14. 
481 Wescott, ed., Governance Issues in Sea  26. 
482 Chagnon et al., "Good Governance in Laos," 51. Although not considered as part of the civil service, 
village officials have also appeared on government payrolls.  236 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated from IMF reports, various years. 
Figure A11.  Government Wages and Salaries, Percent of GDP 
Lao PDR, 1997 - 2004. 
Note: * Fiscal years extend for the period October 1-September 30. 
compile a complete list of all public sector employees. Nor are there systematic 
procedures to remove former employees from the payroll.
483 In distorting public 
expenditures, these “ghost workers” reflect a general lack of transparency in the public 
administration. 
In monitoring fiscal expenditures, the Lao government sets staff quotas and 
budgetary targets for each ministry.
484 Circumventing hiring limits, ministry officials 
have recruited (usually with donor funds) temporary employees, known as “contracted 
staff” or sanyachang.
485 In one agency, for example, a knowledgeable official 
estimates that temporary workers comprise 20 percent of the workforce. Their 
                                                 
483 Wescott, ed., Governance Issues in Sea  26. 
484 Several government policies actual prohibit staff increases. See Keuleers, "District Administration," 
iii. 
485 Chagnon et al., "Good Governance in Laos," 51. The typical contract worker is a young, recent 
university graduate. Within a few years and usually after an examination process, some of these 
temporary employees may take on permanent positions. According to Keuleers, "District 
Administration," 47, in 2001 a typical contract worker received a monthly salary of 65,000 kip, or US$ 
8.  
0.0 
1.0 
2.0 
3.0 
4.0 
5.0 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Fiscal Year*237 
   
numbers fail to appear on official ministry payroll or statistics.
486 Because external 
assistance furnishes funds for most public works projects and practically every state 
agency, the ranks of temporary workers may run quite high.
                                                 
486 Chagnon et al., "Good Governance in Laos," 51.  
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Appendix A7. History of State Finances in Laos 
Local nobility collected head taxes, payable in either cash or corvée labor, 
from subject populations in the scattered principalities that constituted pre-colonial 
Laos. In 1893, Laos became a French protectorate, one of five associated regions of 
Indochina.
487 Under French colonialism, revenues were never enough to cover the cost 
of administrating the Lao territories. Head tax and monopolistic control over the sale 
and distribution of essential cash crops, most notably opium, composed the bulk of 
colonial revenues, which barely met the administrative cost of salaries for colonial 
civil servants. Transfers from Tonkin, the colonial center of Indochina, covered the 
remainder of operating costs in Laos. The French continued the traditional practice of 
corvée, which subjected all males in the 18-45 age range to labor demands of colonial 
administration.
488  
Discriminatory classifications of race and ethnicity emerged as a valuable 
instrument of colonial rule, especially in fiscal matters. For administrative expediency, 
the colonial government distinguished three broad categories of ethnic groups in Laos: 
Lao Luom, the predominate ethnic group dominating the low lying areas hugging the 
Mekong River and its tributaries; Lao Theung, taking the mountain sides and valleys; 
and Lao Soung, occupying the mountainous highlands.
489 Out of these distinctions, the 
                                                 
487 The other parts of Indochina include Cambodia and the three regions composing Vietnam: Tonkin, 
Annam, and Cochinchina. In northern Laos, the Kingdom of Luang Prabang joined as a protectorate, in 
a form of indirect colonial rule. The French ruled central and southern Laos as direct colonies until 
1899, when all of Laos became one administrative unit of French Indochina. For a good introduction to 
the history of Laos, see Grant Evans, A Short History of Laos: The Land in Between (Chiang Mai, 
Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2002). 
488 Stuart-fox, A History of Laos  33. 
489 Although highly inaccurate, this crude classification has provided various Lao governments, up to 
the 1980s, with a simple and straightforward way to sort-out the various ethnic make-up of Lao peoples. 
For an overview of the various classification schemes, see  Joachim Schliesinger, Ethnic Groups of 
Laos: Introduction and Overview, vol. 1 (Bangkok: White Lotus, 2003). Currently, the Lao government 
recognizes 49 categories of ethnic groups in Laos, covering the Lao-Tai, Mon-Khmer, Chinese-Tibetan, 
and Hmong-Mien linguistic groups.  240 
   
French increased taxation by doubling the head tax of the economically prosperous 
Lao Loum, while demanding more corvée from the other ethnic groups, whose labor 
proved essential for road building projects in the sparsely populated, mountainous 
regions of the colony.
490 Over the period 1896-1910, direct taxation increased 
threefold but only covered about one-third of the colonial budget.
491 Under pressure to 
increase revenue generation in Laos, the colonial administration expanded the 
cultivation, sale, and distribution of opium, by far the most profitable government 
monopoly in Indochina. Through the 1930s, the market for opium thrived in northern 
Laos, where the mountainous terrain proved ideal for its production.
492 Ethnic Hmong 
(i.e., Lao Soung ethnic group) grew rich from the opium trade, and colonial 
administrators increasingly relied on its opium franchise to subsidize local budgets in 
Laos.
493   
                                                 
490 For the Lao Loum, a head tax (2 piastres per year, plus 20 days of corvée) on all males in the age 
range of 19-60 applied. Piastres served as the major unit of currency for French Indochina, as well as 
Ottoman Turkey. The Lao Theung were compelled to pay one piastre per year and 10 days of corvée. 
Because of their capacity to pay, Lao Loum often commuted their corvée, substituting cash payments 
for labor obligations. Evans, A Short History of Laos: The Land in Between  46. In addition, Vietnamese 
and Chinese merchants residing in colonial Laos were also subject to head taxes, double and five times 
as much as Lao Loum respectively. Stuart-fox, A History of Laos  32-3. 
491 In 1910, the total budget in French Laos reached 900,000 piastres. Stuart-fox, A History of Laos  32. 
492 By formal agreement, revenues from opium sales were equally shared between the French colonial 
administration and the Royal house of Luang Prabang. In practice, this arrangement was impossible to 
police. By 1914, the royal administration lost its fiscal independence, and its budget was integrated into 
the overall colonial budget of Indochina. See Evans, A Short History of Laos: The Land in Between  46. 
493 From the late 1890s, Governor-General Paul Doumer transformed fiscal deficits in French Indochina 
into surpluses through a series of fiscal reforms and the rationalization of the opium business. Doumer 
consolidated the five colonial budgets into one centralized treasury, in the process reorganizing the five 
autonomous opium agencies into a single opium monopoly. His administration oversaw the 
construction of a modern opium refinery in Saigon. During his four years in office, Doumer increased 
opium revenues by 50 percent; the monopoly contributed to over one-third of all colonial revenues. By 
1918, French Indochina boasted1,512 opium dens and 3,098 retail shops. Throughout the colonial 
period, opium revenues steadily increased and, by 1938, raised 15 percent of all colonial revenues—the 
highest proportion of administrative budgets in Southeast Asia. See Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of 
Heroin: Cia Complicity in the Global Drug Trade. Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, 
Colombia, 2nd Revised ed. (Chicago: L. Hill Books, 2003) 111-2. 241 
   
Formal independence in 1953, under a constitutional monarchy, failed to 
change the basic calculus of fiscal crises. The end of colonial rule, along with the 
disappearance of French subsidies through the Indochinese budget, deepened fiscal 
crises for the Royal Lao government. With the French in full retreat after their 
humiliating defeat at the hands of the Viet Minh in 1954, the geopolitical void at the 
heart of Southeast Asia provided fertile soil for Cold War proxy wars. As in the rest of 
Indochina, both sides of the ideological divide heavily subsidized military rivals in 
Laos, and a civil war engulfed the country until the America military campaign came 
to a close two decades later.      
In the capitalist camp, the U.S. took over France’s role in Indochina and sought 
to shore up the Lao government in Vientiane against the communist threat. In 1954, 
the U.S. kept alive the Royal Lao government under Savan Vatthana, whose entire 
military budget was financed by the American Central Intelligence Agency and 
Defense Department.
494 By the 1960s, the Royal Lao government raised only about 
40% of its budget through taxes and duties.
495 Fiscal crises characterized the Royal 
Lao government until its demise in 1975. See Figure A13 below. From the mid-1960s 
onwards, the American-backed government amassed annual budget deficits in the 
range of 40-60 % of expenditures.  
On the socialist front, meanwhile, the Pathet Lao communist guerillas, the 
eventual winners of the civil war, relied almost entirely on the Viet Minh for military  
 
                                                 
494 Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993) 74. At 
the time, U.S. aid to Laos totaled $300 million, or more than $150/Lao citizen and twice the annual per 
capital income. In the first four years of independence, the Royal Lao Government received US$ 166 
million in American aid, as well as an additional US$ 125 million for military programs and related 
expenses. See Evans, Lao Peasants under Socialism. 
495 That is, budget deficits amounted to about 60% of expenditures. The American largesse subsidized 
the rest. Fred Branfman, "Presidential War in Laos, 1964-1970," in Laos: War and Revolution, ed. Nina 
S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1970), 226. 242 
   
 
 
Source: Calculated from Asian Development Bank. "Economic Report on the 
Kingdom of Laos." Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 1974, Appendix 
14, p. 109.  
 
Figure A13.  Budget Deficits, Royal Lao Government, 1965-1975* 
 
Note: * Economic data in Laos, then as now, must be treated with caution. These 
fiscal figures are only broadly indicative. Data from the Royal Lao Government 
provide estimates of the Lao economy but make no distinction between the entire 
country or just parts of the country administered from Vientiane. 
 
 
and financial survival. In an oddity of history, foreign powers completely financed 
both warring factions of the civil war in Laos. With the socialist transition in 1975, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic  (Lao PDR) inherited a war-torn, bankrupted state 
and continued to rely on the communist Second world for military, financial, and 
ideological support. Economic dependency repeated a familiar pattern for modern Lao 
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states. As a client state under new sponsorship, the Lao PDR substituted American aid 
for Vietnamese and Soviet assistance.
496  
From the outset, government expenditures in communist Laos depended on 
foreign aid,
497 and fiscal crises greatly hampered the march toward socialism. Because 
of economic constraints, central planning along the Soviet model never materialized. 
Collectivization and the command economy survived barely a decade. Available data 
indicate that fiscal deficits ranged from 30 to 60 percent of expenditures in the early 
years of communist rule—starkly reminiscent of fiscal crises under the previous 
regime. See Table A10 below. 
 
Table A10. Government Budget, Lao P.D.R., Selected Years, 1980-90* 
 
 1980  1982  1984  1986  1988  1990 
Revenues 748 2,755 4,947 18,503 28,531  61,045
  Taxes  98 775 1,669 1,755 21,474  37,720
  Nontax revenues  650 1,980 3,278 16,748 7,057  23,325
  
Expenditures 1,777 5,475 8,384 26,535 75,044  143,357
  Current  1,028 2,259 4,126 14,803 28,038  69877
  Capital  749 3,216 4,258 11,732 47,006  73,480
    
Deficit -1,029 -  2,720 -3,437 -8,032 -46,513  82,312
  % of expenditures  57.9 49.7 41.0 30.3 62.0  57.4
Source: Calculated from Savada, Andrea Matles, ed. Laos: A Country Study. 
Edited by Federal Research Division, Area Handbook Series. Washington, 
D.C.: Library of Congress, 1995. Table 8, p. 306. Note: * in millions of kip. 
The history of state finances in Laos depicts a recurring pattern of fiscal crises.  
                                                 
496 As late as the 1980s, the Soviet Union provided up to one half of all foreign assistance to Lao PDR, 
as well as substantial military aid. From a high of 60% of all aid in 1990, Soviet assistance abruptly 
ended in 1991. Alexander Yerofeyev, "Foreign Economic Assistance to Lao P.D.R.: Transition from 
Soviet Aid to Other Bilateral and Multilateral Aid," in Economic Development in Lao P.D.R.: Horizon 
2000, ed. Chi Do Pham (Vientiane, Lao PDR: Dalley Book Service, 1994). 
497 The new regime continued Laos’ membership in the World Bank, IMF, Asian Development Bank, 
and the United Nations. Through these organizations, aid flowed freely to the communists in Laos. For 
a general description of the aid situation in the early years of Lao socialism, see T.M. Burley, "Foreign 
Aid to the Lao People's Democratic Republic," in Contemporary Laos: Studies in the Politics and 
Society of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, ed. Martin Stuart-fox (New York: St. Martin's Press). 244 
   
Lao governments throughout the country’s modern history have relied upon 
external sources of funding to prop up the façade of a modernizing state. Under 
colonial rule, Laos lacked fiscal independence and survived off subsidies from the 
central colonial administration. During the Cold War, the Lao state was the most 
heavily aid-dependent country in the world. At the time, the U.S. subsidized the 
budget of the Royal Lao government, which would not have otherwise met its public 
otherwise met its the obligations. Per capita, American assistance amounted to an 
astonishing US$ 192 for every Lao man, woman, and child—the highest in the world 
at the time.
498 With the communist victories in Indochina, the Second world took over 
responsibility of propping up an otherwise economically unviable government. During 
this time, the Soviet Union provided the bulk of external financing of the Lao state, as 
well as military aid. After the fall of the Soviet empire, the communist leadership in 
Lao successfully transitioned to a new form of foreign aid. Since the 1990s, Western 
donors have taken over the supporting role for a country marred by the legacy of 
Vietnam, during an otherwise uninterrupted history of dependency. 
Throughout the modern era, successive Lao regimes have mitigated fiscal 
crisis by strategically positioning their governments to the geopolitical current of the 
region and by acting as a client state to more powerful sponsors. Compounding 
financial difficulties of the public economy, socio-economic underdevelopment and 
low administrative capacity of the tax state ensured the continuing mismatch between 
public expenditures and tax revenues. Before examining the contemporary public 
household in detail, the next section presents an economic overview of Laos.  
 
                                                 
498 These figures cover the period 1955-1963, when America foreign assistance to Laos amounted to the 
highest of proportion U.S. aid to all of Southeast Asia. Stuart-fox, A History of Laos  91.  
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Table A14. State Budget Expenditure ImplementationLao PDR, 2002/03- 
2003/04* 
billions of kip % of total billions of kip % of total %of Plan billions of kip % of total
Total Expenditure 4,700.0         100.0     4,409.6         100.0     93.8        5,620.0           100.0    
Wages, salaries and benefits 660.0             14.0         671.4             15.2         101.7       848.7             15.1        
Salaries 455.2              9.7           492.5              11.2         108.2       650.0              11.6        
Compensation and allowances 169.5              3.6           156.8              3.6           92.5         164.9              2.9          
Wages and benefits for contracted persons 23.8                0.5           16.4                0.4           68.9         23.2                0.4          
Living allowances for leadership 2.6                  0.1           2.0                  0.0           76.9         1.0                  0.0          
Severance payments 9.0                  0.2           3.7                  0.1           41.1         9.6                  0.2          
Operations and maintenance 320.0             6.8           324.4             7.4           101.4       384.0             6.8          
Materials, office supplies and fuel 167.0              3.6           164.8              3.7           98.7         156.2              2.8          
Water, electricity costs 18.6                0.4           18.5                0.4           99.5         20.6                0.4          
Rental costs 5.7                  0.1           17.3                0.4           303.5       13.7                0.2          
Repairs and maintenance 27.0                0.6           24.4                0.6           90.4         36.9                0.7          
Insurance 1.5                  0.0           0.9                  0.0           60.0         1.5                  0.0          
Post and telecommunications costs 11.3                0.2           11.8                0.3           104.4       13.9                0.2          
Transportation costs 52.3                1.1           52.7                1.2           100.8       50.1                0.9          
Costs for receptions, meetings, seminar 33.7                0.7           31.9                0.7           94.7         41.7                0.7          
Bank service charges 0.2                  0.0           0.2                  0.0           100.0       0.3                  0.0          
Other payments 2.8                  0.1           1.9                  0.0           67.9         1.6                  0.0          
Interest payments 188.7             4.0           123.4             2.8           65.4        289.0             5.1          
Domestic 56.0                1.2           8.8                  0.2           15.7         65.3                1.2          
External 132.9              2.8           114.6              2.6           86.2         223.7              4.0          
Subsidies and Transfers 263.0             5.6           341.4             7.7           129.8       327.0             5.8          
Political and administrative subsidies 22.7                0.5           39.4                0.9           173.6       45.1                0.8          
Technical promotion costs 37.8                0.8           49.5                1.1           131.0       51.1                0.9          
Family allowances 90.6                1.9           86.6                2.0           95.6         91.6                1.6          
Student allowances 35.9                0.8           36.3                0.8           101.1       41.1                0.7          
Social welfare 39.5                0.8           39.7                0.9           100.5       43.0                0.8          
Subsides, transfers -                  -           -                  -           -           1.3                  0.0          
Transfers 14.5                0.3           9.6                  0.2           66.2         11.6                0.2          
Contributions to international organizations 22.0                0.5           22.0                0.5           100.0       27.5                0.5          
Miscellaneous expenditures 59.0               1.3           66.2               1.5           112.2       304.3             5.4          
Capital expenditure 2,710.0           57.7         2,525.8           57.3         93.2        2,942.7           52.4        
Foreign capital 1,650.0           35.1         1,499.4           34.0         90.9         2,158.9           38.4        
Local capital 1,060.0           22.6         1,026.4           23.3         96.8         783.8              13.9        
Repayment of loan principle (Amortization) 499.3             10.6         356.9             8.1           71.5        524.2             9.3          
Domestic 184.0              3.9           156.3              3.5           84.9         288.5              5.1          
Foreign capital 315.2              6.7           200.7              4.6           63.7         235.7              4.2          
2002-2003 Budget 2003-2004
Plan Actual Plan
Source: Calculated from Government of Lao PDR. "Official Gazette: State Budget Revenue - 
Expenditure Implementation of Fy 2002 - 2003and State Budge Revenue - Expenditure Plan for Fy 
2003 -2004." GoL, 2004. Volumes I and II. Note:* 2002-03 are actual figures; 2003-04 are planned 
budget outlays.  
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Appendix A9. Budget Planning Process 
The Ministry of Finance (MoF) has the primary responsibility for fiscal 
management and financial accountability of the government.
499 Currently, MoF 
maintains a staff of over 1,227, who work in the capital headquarters and its vertical 
lines throughout the country (18 provinces, 142 district offices).
500 The recurrent 
budget observes previously negotiated outlays. Line ministries and provincial 
governments submit their plans to the Budget Department of MoF for review, 
bargaining, and negotiations with relevant central authorities. Once settled, the 
recurrent budget comes before the National Assembly for ceremonial approval.
501  
Complementing MoF, the powerful Committee for Planning and Cooperation 
(CPC) oversees the capital component of public expenditures and takes the lead role in 
the budget preparation process. The capital component follows a comprehensive 
planning framework that outlines the government’s development strategy in the short- 
and long-term. See Figurea A28. This framework includes a 20-year plan, a five-year 
National Socio-Economic Development Plan (NSEDP), and Public Investment Plans 
(PIPs) for five- and one-year periods. The 20-year plan has the strategic intent of 
upgrading Laos from the status of “least developed country” by 2020. The government 
pursues this goal through eight priority programs in three overlapping stages: 
 
1.  the transition from a command to a market economy,  
2.  the establishment of physical and human infrastructure, and 
3.  socio-economic development with basic food security. 
                                                 
499 The Ministry of Finance comprises 12 departments, four for revenue management and the remaining 
eight for the expenditure side. See the Appendix for an organizational chart of MoF.  
500 Of this total, only 946 are permanent staff, while the rest work as contractors, paid a lower wage or 
funded through donor aid projects. Swedish International Development Agency, "Strengthening Fiscal 
Management in Laos," 16. 
501 Based on their allocation, ministries and provinces must then submit a detailed breakdown of 
expenditure categories to MoF for approval. Provinces pay recurrent expenditure out of their own 
coffers, while MoF has responsibility for recurrent payments of expenditures to line ministries. Sida, 
"Financial and Administrative Systems," 10.  261 
   
The eight national socio-economic priority programs include food production; 
commercial production; stabilization of shifting cultivation; infrastructure 
development; rural development; human resource development; service development; 
and foreign economic relations development.  
To reach these goals, the government anticipates sustained economic 
development, targeting annual economic growth of at least 6.6% of GDP. Line 
ministries incorporate this plan with their own strategic plans. The five-year NSEDP 
breaks down the 20-year plan into workable targets and objectives by economic 
sectors and regions. The current NSEDP targets a reduction of basic poverty by 50 
percent and the elimination of opium by 2005. By 2010, the plan anticipates that 80 
percent of the population will achieve “a reasonable standard of living.”  
As a component of the NSEDP, the PIP offers details on investment projects, 
broken down by sectors. The five-year PIP provides guidelines for the annual PIP, 
which reflects capital spending in the national budget.  
Budgetary allocations for the annual PIP follow guidelines issued by the 
Committee for Planning and Cooperation (CPC). Revised annually, the Budget and 
Planning Operational Guidelines provides detailed instructions (on project cycle 
management) for provincial authorities, central ministry officials, and individual 
project managers. According to these guidelines, projects fall into one of three 
categories, depending on their monetary size: 
 
1.  large projects: > five billion kip;  
2.  medium projects: between 500 million and 5 billion kip; or 
3.  small projects: < 500 million kip. 
Procedures for project approval vary according to these guidelines. Large projects 
require ten steps of documentation before approval, medium ones six, and small 
projects two.
502 
                                                 
502 For more details on the budget planning process, see Ibid. 262 
   
Annual Public Expenditure 
Current Expenditure 
 
Wages, Salaries, and Benefits 
 
Operations and Maintenance 
 
Subsidies and Transfers 
 
Debt Payments 
•  Interest 
•  Principle 
 
Other Recurrent Expenditures 
Capital Expenditure 
 
 
 
 
•  Domestically financed projects 
•  External funds for development  
National 5-year Socio-Economic Development Plan  
(SEDP) to 2010 
 
* Reduction of basic poverty by 50%   * Elimination of opium production / shifting cultivation 
6.6% annual GDP growth 
5-year Public Investment Plan (PIP) 
 
* Promote foreign direct investment    * Expand sources of development 
assistance
Annual Public Investment Plan (PIP) 
National 20-year Development Plan 
Upgrade from status of LDC by 2020 
 
     * Command Î Market Economy     * Universal Education and Healthcare      * Food Security 
 
Sector 5-year Plan  Provincial 5-year SEDP 
 
National Priority 
Programs 
Sector Programs 
Sector / District 
Plans and Programs 
Domestic savings reaching 
15% of GDP
Fiscal deficits less than 5% of GDP 
Budget revenues 18% of GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A28. Budgetary Planning Process, Government of Lao P.D.R. 
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Appendix A12. Overview of Devolution’s Past 
Upon taking power in 1975, the socialist government in Laos formally 
inaugurated a centrally planned economy. Logistically however, inaccessibility of the 
outlying provinces assured a high degree of regional autonomy. In 1986, under the 
banner of the New Economic Mechanism, the party-state embraced market reforms by 
dismantling price controls, liberalizing (internal and external) trade, and devolving 
political and economic authority to the provinces. Until constitutional reforms 
reorganized central-local relations in the early 1990s, governors ran the provinces as 
mini-states, asserting fiscal and monetary autonomy. Provincial governors controlled 
all state expenditures under their jurisdiction. State taxes collected in the provinces by 
local branches of MoF were considered provincial revenues. Few resources were 
transferred to, or expected from, the central government, which demanded self-
sufficiency of the provinces. Governors managed all civil servants of the vertical line 
ministries under their jurisdiction and paid their salary from provincial coffers. Local 
branches of the State Bank acted independently of central directives, setting exchange 
rates and credit lending policies to suite local conditions. Tax and costumes policies 
lacked national uniformity and reflected local efforts to attract scarce investment 
opportunities.  
This pure devolution of economic prerogatives created instability in the 
macroeconomy that the central government struggled to control. Lacking central 
oversight, the provinces fueled inflationary pressures with lax fiscal policies. 
Furthermore, devolution failed to improve the economic viability of many state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Instead of aiming for operational efficiency, local managers of 
SOEs increased wages and other expenses with no incentive at economical self-
sufficiency. Many provincial governments ran budget deficits, financed through 
generous bank credits. Local authorities printed money to pay for their excesses, but 282 
   
the rapid increase in liquidity quickly depressed the value of the currency. As a result 
of local autonomy, financially instability spread, quality of public service delivery 
further declined, regional disparities widened, and physical infrastructures deteriorated 
for lack of maintenance.  
In limiting a central government’s tradition role in redistribution, devolution 
also exacerbated regional inequality. Financial and fiscal autonomy resulted in 
revenue imbalances among the provinces, while the central government received only 
25 percent of fiscal revenues–out of which it had to finance its own expenditure and 
those of poorer provinces.
503 To cover its annual budget, the central government relied 
heavily on bank loans to finance its perennial budget deficits. By mid-1989, inflation 
surged over 100 percent; but the central government exerted no control over local 
credit policies, which remained the prerogative of provincial authorities.
504 Thus, 
while market-correcting measures contributed to economic growth in the late 1980s, 
administrative decentralization eventually hampered efforts to stabilize the economy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
503 Keuleers and Sibounheuang, "Central-Local Relations," 204. 
504 Ibid. 283 
   
Appendix A13. Analytic Hierarchy Process  
Analytic hierarchy process (AHP) provides a useful way to analyze and 
quantify decision making when participants cannot assign specific value or utility to 
particular decisions but can  do more than just rank preferences.
505 As a broad method 
of measurement, AHP has been used as a tool in conflict resolution to evaluate the 
relative positions of interested parties. The method requires that participants can 
“make pairwise comparisons of elements and state that one element is X times as 
desirable as a second one.”
506 As the name implies, the method structures a decision 
problem into a hierarchy that reflects the complex relationship inherent in the 
situation. It entails arranging goals, attributes, issues, and stakeholders into a related 
hierarchical structure.
507 
  As Saaty and Vargas suggest, AHP “is used to derive ratio scales from both 
discrete and continuous paired comparisons in multilevel hierarchic structures. These 
comparisons may be taken from actual measurements or from a fundamental scale that 
reflects the relative strength of preferences and feelings.”
508 The first step in building 
such a model is to determine a scale, i.e. a criteria, for making pairwise 
comparisons.
509 Next, a hierarchy depicting the situation (e.g. overall goals, objectives 
or sub-goals) needs to be constructed. The second level of the hierarchy contains n-
elements that form an n-by-n matrix An. Here, aij designates how much more 
important ai is than aj in achieving the overall goal specified at the first level of the 
hierarchy.
510  
                                                 
505 For an overview of AHP, see Azis and Isard, "Use of Ahp." 
506 Ibid.: 15. 
507 Saaty and Vargas, Decision Making in Economic, Political, Social and Technological Environments 
with the Analytic Hierarchy Process  2. 
508 Ibid.  3. 
509 For a useful scale, see Ibid.  16, Table 1. 
510 For the characteristic equation of A, seeAzis and Isard, "Use of Ahp," 23-5. 284 
   
Once these pairwised comparisons are made and recorded in the matrix, the 
object is to determine a set of numerical weights w1, w2, w3, …. wn, an n-by-1 vector 
w, which reflects the recorded quantified judgments.
511 By definition, Aw = nw. Thus, 
to determine w, we must solve the following system of equations: ( A – nI )*w = 0.
512 
This relative measurement wi represents a ratio scale of values determined by 
comparing it in pairs with the other (n-1) priorities.  
In one example, Azis uses the AHP method to unravel the general tensions 
between developed and developing countries.
513 Given the goal of favorable global 
trade and economic development, he determines the most feasible strategies that 
competing countries and the North and South should opt to pursue jointly. From this 
model of conflict, he urges most developing countries to support the multilateral trade 
system under GATT/WTO.
514 Elsewhere in an extension of this model, Azis uses an 
analytic network process to evaluate alternative forms of regional financial 
arrangements.
515 He discovers that the East Asian region would benefit more from 
cooperating strictly in the financial sector than through targeting asset prices and 
exchange rate stability.
516 Saaty and Vargas, the pioneers of AHP provide many 
examples of creative and useful applications of this general theory of measurement.
517 
                                                 
511 Ibid.: 24. 
512 By the perturbation theorem, Aw = λmax * w, where λmax = n iff A is consistent.  
513 Iwan J. Azis, "New Conflicts between Developed and Developing Countries," Peace Economics, 
Peace Science and Public Policy 3, no. 1 (1996). 
514 Ibid.: 30. 
515 Iwan J. Azis, "From Chiang Mai Initiative to Regional Fiancial Arrangement?" (paper presented at 
the Asia's New Regionalism: ASEAN+3, Champaign, IL, 2003). 
516 Ibid., 23. 
517 See for example, Saaty and Vargas, Decision Making in Economic, Political, Social and 
Technological Environments with the Analytic Hierarchy Process. and Thomas L. Saaty and Luis G. 
Vargas, "Models, Methods, Concepts & Applications of the Analytic Hierarch Process,"  (Boston: 
Kluwer Academic, 2001).  285 
   
 
AHP Model of Fiscal Crises in the Lao PDR 
 
Goal: 
Reduction of Fiscal Crises 
 
Objectives: 
Economic Growth: Strong and sustained economic growth 
Broad Tax Base: broaden tax base and income generation 
Expenditure control: control government spending 
 
Targets: 
Foreign Aid: sustain inflows of development assistance and foreign investment 
Solvent Banking System: reduce non-performing loans from SOEs 
Rational Administration: rationalize tax administration and better enforcement of 
fiscal rules 
Rule of Law: establish predictable rules and regulation  
 
Strategies: 
FDI: Foreign direct investment 
ODA: Overseas development assistance from donor countries  
VAT: Value-added Tax to reduce distortions and to simply tax collection 
LTU: Large Taxpayer Unit  
National: centralization of tax administration, customs administration, and treasury 
management 
SOE: Strong central oversight of SOE management 
Super: super region encompassing the provinces. 
 
Policies 
International trend: the agenda of decentralization 
Status Quo: negotiated settlement the advances reform agenda slowly 
Developmentalist: strong state-directed development to create national economic 
space  
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Table A24. Structure of AHP for Reduction of Fiscal Crises 
 
Alternative(s) in 
it: 
•  Devolution  
•  Status Quo  
•  Centralization  
Network Type:  Bottom level 
Formula:  Not applicable 
Clusters/Nodes  •  1 Reduction of Fiscal Crises: AHP mode based on researcher’s perception of 
ways to reduce fiscal crises.  
o  Overall Goal: to improve fiscal management  
•  2 Objectives: Overall, the reduction of fiscal crises in Laos requires sustained 
economic growth, a broadened tax base, and controls on expenditures. 
o  Broad Tax Base: to broaden the tax base by reducing exemptions and 
other tax distortions to streamline, rationalize, and hence modernize 
procedures for tax collection 
o  Economic Growth: to promote sustained economic growth 
o  Expenditure Control: to control expenditure management at state-
owned enterprises and banks 
•  3 Targets: To achieve these objectives, four targets must be met. 
o  Foreign Aid: sustained inflows of development assistance and foreign 
investment 
o  Rational Administration: efficient tax administration and better 
enforcement of fiscal rules 
o  Rule of Law: uniform enforcement of laws and regulations  
o  Solvent Banking System: reduction of non-performing loans from 
state-owned enterprises 
•  4 Strategies: To meet these targets, the government must follow strategies to:  
o  FDI: attract foreign direct investment 
o  LTU: expand Large Taxpayer Unit 
o  National: centralize tax administration, customs administration, and 
treasury management 
o  ODA: sustain overseas development assistance from donor countries 
o  SOE: establish strong central oversight of SOE management 
o  Super: create super region encompassing several provinces 
o  VAT: implement value-added tax to reduce distortions and to simply 
tax collection 
•  5 Alternative Policies: In order to realize above strategies effectively, the Lao 
government can pursue one of three plausible policies 
o  Centralization: a developmentalist path towards strong 
centralization 
o  Devolution: the international trend towards decentralization 
o  Status Quo: the status quo where governance is negotiated within the 
Central Committee 
 
Source: Generated from Superdecision software program. 
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Table A25. Results of AHP Simulation of Fiscal Crises 
 
Graphic Alternatives Total Normal Ideal  Ranking 
                                Centralization 0.1882 0.7529 1.0000  1 
                               Devolution  0.0288 0.1150 0.1528  3 
                               Status Quo  0.0330 0.1321 0.1754  2 
 
Source: Generated from Superdecision software. 
 
 
 
 
Table A26. Tests for Robustness of AHP Simulation of Fiscal Crises 
 
Graphic Alternatives Total Normal Ideal  Ranking 
                                Centralization 0.1950 0.7802 1.0000  1 
                               Devolution  0.0203 0.0812 0.1041  3 
                                Status Quo  0.0347 0.1386 0.1777  2 
 
Source: Generated from Superdecision software. 288 
   
AHP Model for Negative Impact of Fiscal Restructuring 
 
Table A27. Structure of AHP for Negative Impact of Fiscal Restructuring  
 
Alternative(s) in 
it: 
•  Centralization  
•  Decentralization  
•  Status Quo  
Network Type:  Bottom level 
Formula:  Not applicable 
Clusters/Nodes  •  1. Negative Impacts of Restructuring: outright centralization remains a 
planning fantasy in Laos; and the above model fails to consider the costs of 
centralization. 
o  Restructuring: Capturing the negative impacts of fiscal 
restructuring, a second AHP model helps to explain the difficulties of 
enacting centralization in communist Laos. 
•  2. Costs: Broadly speaking, fiscal structuring has political, economic, and 
social costs. 
o  Economic: reduction in economic activity  
o  Political: resentment of political elites  
o  Social: unrest and resentment among the populace  
•  3. Risks: fiscal centralization carries the following risks 
o  Central Oversight: strong central oversight of once autonomous 
regions and population 
o  Economic Decline: economic decline from disinvestment 
o  Regional Instability: provincial instability of disempowered 
governors 
o  Revenue Redistribution: revenue redistribution to the detriment of 
wealthier provinces 
•  4. Impacts: The potential impacts of these risks include 
o  Costs to Local Economy: various costs to the local economy 
o  Decline of Economic Activity: decline of economic activity 
o  Declining Political Commitment: a declining political commitment 
to the regime 
o  Higher Tax Burden: higher tax burdens 
o  Loss of Local Autonomy: loss of local autonomy 
o  Loss of Local Revenue: loss of local sources of revenues 
o  Weakening Patronage: a weakening of the patronage networks 
•  5 Alternative Policies: Given these negative impacts, three plausible policies 
are evaluated for their high costs of restructuring.  
o  Centralization: a developmentalist path towards strong 
centralization 
o  Devolution: the international trend towards decentralization 
o  Status Quo: the status quo where governance is negotiated within the 
Central Committee 
 
Source: Generated from Superdecision software program. 289 
   
 
 
Table A28. Results of AHP Simulation of Negative Impacts of Fiscal 
Restructuring, Lao PDR 
 
Graphic Alternatives  Total Normal Ideal  Ranking
                                 Centralization  0.1883 0.7530 1.0000  1 
                                Decentralization 0.0375 0.1501 0.1994  2 
                                Status Quo  0.0242 0.0969 0.1286  3 
 
Source: Generated from Superdecision software program. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A29. Test for Robustness of AHP Simulation of Negative Impacts of  
Fiscal Restructuring, Lao PDR  
Graphic Alternatives  Total Normal Ideal  Ranking
                                 Centralization  0.1865 0.7459 1.0000  1 
                                Decentralization 0.0387 0.1547 0.2074  2 
                                Status Quo  0.0249 0.0994 0.1333  3 
 
Source: Generated from Superdecision software program. 
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Table A30. Benefit-Cost Ratios of Fiscal Restructuring 
Alternatives Total Normal Ideal Ranking 
Centralization 0.999469 0.999867 1 2 
Devolution 0.768 0.766156 0.766299 3 
Status Quo  1.363636 1.363261 1.363919 1 
 
Source: Tables A25 and A28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A31. Benefit-Cost Ratios of Fiscal Restructuring 
(Sensitivity Analysis) 
Alternatives Total Normal Ideal Ranking 
Centralization 1.045576 1.045985 1 2 
Devolution 0.524548 0.524887 0.501929 3 
Status Quo  1.393574 1.394366 1.333083 1 
 
Source: Tables A26 and A29     
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